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Abstract
This study was prompted by the 1988 introduction by the Commonwealth
Government, and later on by both Federal and State regulators, of a philosophy of
wanting to achieve a target rate of return within the public sector to emulate
private sector “efficiency”. At the core of the reforms was the adoption of
replacement values for assets. This resulted in inflated prices to the users of public
services and regulated monopoly assets such as energy utilities, while asset owners
enjoyed windfall gains.
In developing a form of regulation for natural monopolies the regulators initially
looked to Accounting. However Finance Economics provided a structure called the
‘Building Block’ approach to regulation that had at its center the notion of
Depreciated Optimised Replacement Cost (DORC). ‘Capture’ by Finance
Economics, has meant that regulation has developed under the rules of Net Present
Value based on the DORC value for assets. Net Present Value calculations are
based on the timing and amounts of future cash transactions. This is the meat of
regulation. The regulators have addressed the problem of circularity by developing
a notion of Optimised Replacement Cost (ORC), and calling on the notion of
Tobin’s Q to transform ORC to ORC’used’, or DORC. Deprival Value has been
endorsed as a valuation principle by the Council Of Australian Governments;
however Deprival Value conflicts with DORC in the valuation of ‘sunk’ assets.
This research has critically examined the regulators’ use of DORC and its inherent
circularity and finds that DORC is a flawed concept. It is argued that actual or
previously ‘agreed’ values for assets would produce a better regulatory outcome
and fairer prices for consumers. The International Financial Reporting Standards
contain in their 2003 Framework notions of ‘Fair Value’ and ‘Capital
Maintenance’ that address the aims of the regulators and are compatible with
Deprival Value. Audited financial reports based on the regulators’ approved asset
valuations and prepared in accordance with International Standards would provide
cohesion between regulatory decisions and the financial results of natural
monopoly companies.
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Abbreviations
AAI

Access Arrangement Information
Access Undertaking: This term used in the 1997 Access
Determination made under the NSW Gas Code. It has the
same meaning as Access Arrangement

AAS

Australian Accounting Standards

AASB

Australian Accounting Standards Board
under the National Gas Code.

ACCC

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission

Access Arrangement

An arrangement for access to a covered pipeline that has
been approved by the Relevant Regulation in accordance
with the Gas Pipelines Access (New South Wales) Act,
1998 and the Gas Pipeline Access Law.

AC

Actual Cost

ACT

Australian Competition Tribunal

AGA

Australian Gas Association

AGLGN

AGLt Gas Networks

AGUG

Australian Gas Users Group

APT

Australian Pipeline Trust

ARP

Accounting Reported Profit

BBA

Building Block Approach

BCA

Business Council of Australia

BP

British Pounds

Capex

Capital Expenditure

CAPM

Capital Asset Pricing Model

CCA

Current Cost Accounting

CDA

Critical Discourse Analysis
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City Gate

Transition point from a high-pressure transmission
pipeline to a distribution network

CPI

Consumer Price Index

COAG

Council of Australian Government

CPA

Competition Principles Agreement

Contract Customers

End use gas customer consuming more than 10 TJ

CPI

Consumer Price Index

DAC

Depreciated Actual Cost

DEI

Duke Energy International

DOE

NSW Department of Energy, now the Ministry of Utilities
and Energy

DORC

Depreciated Optimised Replacement Cost

DV

Deprival Value

DVD

Deprival Value Depreciation

EAK

Equivalent Annual Costs of the Investment Outlay, Ko,

EAR

The Servicing Burden of the Equivalent Annual Costs of
the Investment Outlay So

EAPL

Eastern Gas Pipeline Limited

EI

Excess Income

EP

Economic Profit

ESC

Essential Services Commission (of Victoria, previously
ORG

ESI

Electricity Supple Industry

EUG

Energy Users Group

FERC

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

FV

Fair Value
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GBE

Government Business Enterprise

GTE

Government Trading Enterprise

GJ

Gigajoule, a measure of the heat content of gas (an
average residential customer in NSW consumes
approximately 20GJ of gas per year.

HC

Historic Cost

IASB

International Accounting Standards Board

ICB

Initial Capital Base

IFRS

International Financial Reporting Standards Board

IPARC

Independent Pricing and Regulatory Commission,
Australian Capital territory

IPART

Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, New South
Wales

IRD

Internal Rate of Depreciation

IRR

Internal Rate of Return

MAR

Maximum allowed revenue

MAR*

Market to asset ratio, United Kingdom.

MDQ

Maximum Daily Quantity

MEE

Modern Engineering Equivalent

MMC

Mergers and Monopolies Commission (UK)

MSP

Moomba to Sydney Pipeline

MV
National Gas Access Code

Market Value
National Third Party Access Code for Natural Gas
Pipeline Systems

NCC

National Competition Council

NCP

National Competition Policy

NEMMCO

National Electricity Market Management Company
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NERA

National Economics Research Associates

NGC

National Gas Code

NEC

National Electricity Code

NPV

Net Present Value

NRV

Net Realiseable Value

O&M

Operating and Maintenance

ODV

Optimised Deprival Value

OFGEM

Office of Gas and Electricity Market

Opex

Operating Expenses

ORC

Optimised Replacement Cost (of an asset)

ORG

Office of the Regulator General, Victoria

PSA

Prices Surveillance Act 1983

PJ

Petajoule ( equal to 1 000 000GJ)

PV

Present Value

RAB

Regulatory Asset Base

RC

Replacement Cost

‘Ring fencing’

a term that refers to the placing of a boundary around
Information relative to a part of the industry

RL

Remaining Life

ROI

Return on Investment

ROR

Rate of return

RPI

Retail Price Index (UK Term)

SC

Sunk Cost

SEL

Standard Economic Life
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the code

National Third Party Access Code for Natural Gas
Pipeline Systems.

TPA

Trade Practices Act 1974

VB or VTB

Value to the Business

VF

Value to the Firm

VO

Value to the Owner

WACC

Weighted average cost of capital
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The use of Depreciated Optimised Replacement Cost for the valuation of assets
in the regulation of utilities

Chapter 1
Introduction
Introduction
In the past two decades the Australian public sector has experienced substantial
changes. Prior to the 1990s the sector was budget funded and exercised administrative
controls. Utilities were natural monopolies and mainly state owned. Prices were set in
accordance with a ‘break even’ mentality that was designed to maintain the status quo.
The economic rationalism of the late eighties and early nineties saw a determination on
the part of government to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government
business and agencies. The private sector was seen as ‘efficient’ and the public sector as
‘inefficient’. The opportunity cost of investing in the public sector rather than the
private sector was to be recouped by the setting of target rates of return on assets of
government agencies. The rate of return was set at the riskless (or bank) rate plus an
allowance for risk such as the agency would face if it were in the private sector.

The setting of target rates of Return on Investment (ROI) and the implementation of
accrual accounting have been seen by the Commonwealth Government as a means of
achieving both measurement of performance and the target return on the opportunity
cost attaching to the investment. The form of accrual accounting adopted by the public
sector is a form of current cost accounting and uses a Deprival Value Framework (DVF)
for the measurement of assets. This reflects the ‘opportunity cost’ perspective. Assets
17

are measured in accordance with the DVF where Optimised Replacement Cost (ORC) is
the favored measurement base. The rate of return on investment to be achieved is driven
by the denominator value or asset base.

The regulation of gas and electricity industries has been developed through the
establishment of a combination of legislation, regulatory instruments and decisionmaking bodies. The Commonwealth Trade Practices Act (1974), (TPA) was developed
in order to provide legislative scope for authorisation of conduct contributing to
efficiency and economy of industries that have come under its domain. In 1994 the
Council of Australian Governments (COAG) set down the principles in the Report on
National Competition Policy that have been followed by Federal and State
governments in setting ‘access regimes’ enabling companies to access or (i.e., rent)
part of the capacity of monopoly assets, such as Electricity networks or gas
transmission pipelines.

The twin goals of efficiency and effectiveness form the backbone of the Draft Statement
of Principles for the Regulation of Transmission Revenues that was developed for the
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), by the National
Electricity Code (NEC). The ACCC was formed as an independent Statutory Authority
on 6th November 1995 by the merger of the Trade Practices Commission and the Prices
Surveillance Authority. This move was in accord with the Australian Government’s
national competition policy and its primary role is that of administering the TPA and the
Prices Surveillance Act 1983. The TPA has been amended so that, with State Territory
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application legislation, its prohibition of anti-competitive conduct applies to virtually all
business in Australia. The Treasurer is the Minister responsible for the ACCC,
restrictive trade practices and pricing policy. The objective of the TPA is enhancement
of the welfare of Australians through the promotion of competition and fair-trading, and
provision for consumer protection. Part IIIA of the TPA relates to third party access to
nationally significant essential facilities such as gas transmission networks and
electricity grids. Under the Prices Surveillance Act the ACCC has the three pricing
functions of vetting price rises, holding inquiries into pricing practices, and monitoring
prices, costs and profits. The ACCC reports to the Minister for Industry, presently
Senator the Hon Nick Minchin, Minister for Finance and Administration.

Role of the regulator
Privately owned Natural Monopolies such as Australia’s energy transmission
infrastructure assets are regulated. ‘Access regimes’ facilitate use of these natural
monopolies by payment of ‘rent’ to the owners of these natural monopolies. Thus ‘rent’
is a transmission tariff. The role of the regulator can be described as that of working to
achieve equilibrium between interested parties and long-term efficiencies by offering
financial rewards for improvements in long term cost efficiency. The ACCC’s stated
principles of best practice regulation are communication and consultation,
predictability, flexibility, effectiveness and efficiency (ACCC 1999 pp1-9).

The

interested parties include, in the case of an energy utility, the company supplying the
product and:
•

various types of customers, i.e., contract, commercial, residential and
disadvantaged groups
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•

investors, shareholders and debt holders

•

managers and employees

•

environmental groups and other special community based groups

•

upstream suppliers, and

•

downstream users

Box 1.1, on page 4 of the ACCC (1998) Draft principles sets out the objectives and
principles of the transmission regulatory regime (from the National Electricity Code,
Version 1.0, 1998, clauses 6.22 – 6.2.5.) The strategic objectives include the physical
maintenance of capital in order to meet present and projected levels of demand;
establishing the net realisable value or market value of assets, continual improvement of
technology, and, where achievable, minimisation of costs so that by-pass by customers
is avoided. The National Electricity Code (NEC) requires that a form of incentive based
regulation be used with the result that the ACCC draft guidelines (1999, p.1), asserts
that a ‘Building Block’ approach has been adopted as a way of overcoming the
disadvantage of circularity between asset book values and prices.

The Moomba to Sydney Pipeline (MSP) is a Transmission Pipeline owned by
Australian Pipeline Trust from Moomba to Wilton where it connects with another,
shorter section of transmission pipeline and a distribution system that serves the Sydney
metropolitan area and is owned by Australian Gas Light Gas Networks Ltd (AGLGN).
The term ‘ring fencing’ refers to clearly separate subsidiaries or divisions of a company
that may otherwise have competitive advantage in their dealings with each other. Under
the National Gas Code there is an agreement not to share information outside of the
company and the ACCC Code requirements for ring fencing arrangements are designed
20

to assist the introduction of effective competition into markets traditionally supplied by
natural monopolies. It involves putting structures into place to prevent flows of
information and personnel. The MSP was privatised in mid-1994. In the Moomba to
Sydney Pipeline System Sale Act of 1994 the Commonwealth Government defined the
compliance conditions for the new owner, AGL Ltd. The regulatory provisions that
apply to the MSP, supplement the ACCC functions under the Trade Practices Act. The
table following clarify regulators’ roles and relationships with relevant regulated
companies.
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Table 1 - Legislation, Agreements and Bodies with responsibility for electricity and
gas price regulation
Bodies or legislation with jurisdiction over both Gas and Electricity
Minister for Finance and Administration, the Hon Senator Nick Minchin
Minister for Small Business, the Hon Ian Macfarlane

The Trade Practices Act 1974
Gas Legislation

Electricity Legislation

National Gas Code

National Electricity Code

Gas Pipelines Access (South Australia) Act
1997

State National Electricity Laws

States gas pipeline access
Application legislation

Statement of Principles

Approved access arrangements

Tariff Orders

State Codes, licences and guidelines

State Codes, licences and guidelines

Decision-making Bodies
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (both Gas and Elect)
State Bodies, i.e., Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal in NSW (IPART),
Essential Services Commission of Victoria (previously the Organisation for
Regulation in Victoria (ORG)) and similar state bodies in the other states

In Victoria, the Electricity Industry Act 1993 contains at section 158A the Victorian
Electricity Supply Industry Tariff order that shows the Depreciated Optimised
Replacement Cost (DORC) values (listed in clause 5.10 of the Tariff Order) that were
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set by the Victorian Legislative Assembly. Gas distribution asset values are set out in
the 1998 Access Arrangement Information for each of the 3 distributors.
In the regulation of gas and electricity, the ‘Building Block’ approach has been
developed and this relies on the use of the Depreciated Optimised Replacement Cost
(DORC) values for assets as the cornerstone of this approach. DORC has been adopted
for the valuation of assets and this valuation, as applied to the Regulatory Asset Base
(RAB), has been used for the setting of target prices, that is, the determination of the
Maximum Allowed Revenue (MAR). The core feature of regulatory decisions is the
amount of money that the RAB is presumed to represent and thus a higher valuation for
the RAB results in a higher approved, or regulated MAR.
Johnstone (1999) describes a DORC valuation put forward by Australian Gas Light Gas
Networks (AGLGN) of $2023m (pp.7, 17 Revised Access Arrangement), and shows
that over the period 1996 – 1999 this valuation was revised downwards by AGLGN to
$1831m. The central point of this study is that the adoption of DORC and the hinging of
prices on this figure is ineffective as the basis of regulatory decisions where the
objective is to dilute the market power exerted by the owners of natural monopolies,
i.e., gas and electricity transmission networks.

The ACCC Draft Statements of Principles for the Regulation of Transmission Revenues
give definitions of what DORC is attempting to measure as “interpretations” of what
DORC is.
One interpretation of DORC is that it is the valuation methodology that
would be consistent with the price charged by an efficient new entrant into an
industry, and so it is consistent with the price that would prevail in the
industry in long run equilibrium (1999, p.39).
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The second interpretation is that it is the price that a firm with a certain
service requirement would pay for existing assets in preference to replicating
assets. (ACCC 1999, p.39)
On the following page these “interpretations” are described as “definitions” of DORC:
The two definitions of DORC methodology stated above suggest it has a
number of attractions from the viewpoint of economic efficiency. (ACCC
1999, p 40)
These attractions of DORC, as described by the ACCC, are identified as being that
DORC replicates the prices of a competitive market, eliminates price shocks for
customers, prevents by-pass of the system through overcharging and DORC represents
the second-hand price of the regulated assets.

The ACCC (1999 p.41) describes how the determination of DORC values proved
difficult in connection with the Victorian Gas Access Arrangement decision where there
were information shortcomings and it was conceded that there was a wide range for the
‘fair’ economic value of the asset base.
The Circularity Problem
Rate of return based on opportunity cost has become part of regulatory decisions in
Australia. The ACCC has accepted the arguments in favor of DORC for the valuation of
the assets of industries that come before it for regulatory decisions.

The State

regulators, Office of the Registrar General (ORG) in Victoria, renamed the Essential
Services Commission (ESC) in 2002, the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal
(IPART) in NSW and the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Commission (IPARC) in
the ACT have taken the lead from the ACCC and adopted DORC for the valuation of
assets in their regulation decisions. Where prices are set at a level sufficient to achieve a
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target rate of return on investment based on DORC asset values the problem of
circularity occurs. Circularity occurs because the value placed on the assets has a causal
relationship with the regulated revenue stream. It is the subjectivity attaching to the
valuation of assets when any valuation method except historic cost (HC) or market
values (MV) is used that is indefensible. Both HC and MV values for assets may be
reliably established whereas DORC valuations cannot. A change in the DORC valuation
at the time of an access decision causes a reflective and direct change in the Maximum
Allowed Revenue or regulated price of gas (or electricity). The regulators solution to the
problem of circularity has been to call on the notion of Tobin’s Q to transform the
Optimised Replacement Cost (ORC) value of the assets in the regulated revenue MAR,
to ORC ‘used’.

The ‘return’ of the regulated utility, based on the setting of prices designed to achieve a
target ROI and relating profits to a DORC value for assets is not adequately monitored
by the regulators. Financial results are reported using an accounting system based on the
Historic Cost of assets so that the impact of a regulatory decision on company profits is
disguised. 1
Performance ratios using accounting reported profit
The early 20th century performance evaluation technique developed by the Du Pont
Chemical Company in the United States of America described the relationship between
revenues earned, operating income, the value of an investment and the return earned on

1

AGLGN’s Annual Report 2003, p 58 states that the accounting policies applied in the preparation of the
annual report have been consistently applied and meet the requirements of the Corporations Act and
Accounting Standards. There is no mention of an Asset Revaluation Reserve as would result from any
revaluation as would arise if Replacement Cost had been used in the preparation of the accounts using the
latest International Financial Reporting Standards.
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that investment.

Central to this strategic management performance ratio is the

accounting standard used for the valuation of assets at the core of the figure for
investments. Post World War 11 the impact of inflation has, in general, been to increase
the cost of replacing assets. When performance ratios are calculated using the Generally
Accepted Accounting Principle (GAAP) of HC for the valuation of the long lived
assets, a higher return on investment results than when the ratio is calculated using
replacement cost (RC) for the assets. The DuPont ratio is found as follows:
Return on Investment (ROI) = Operating Profit (OP), divided by Revenues (R),
Times R, divided by Investment (I)
The dynamic nature of the DuPont ratio demonstrates that for a firm with a target ROI,
when asset values are increased to their replacement cost (RC), the firm must also raise
revenues if sufficient income is to be generated to maintain ROI at previous levels.
Increasing revenues can be achieved by either increasing prices, by increasing sales
volume or both.2

The Effect of the adoption of DORC by regulatory bodies in Australia
In the Australian Commonwealth sector, government departments may be large and
non-commercial, e.g., the Department of Defense, or small and commercial, e.g., the
Government Printing Office. Any large increases in asset values as a result of
accounting changes recognizing increases in the cost of replacement are neutral in its
impact because the assets are held in public ownership. When regulatory decisions are
made that increase the value of the assets owned by a private company the result is an
increase in revenue and profitability that benefits the owners.
2

In the US, “Last-In-First-Out”, or LIFO has been part of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles for
decades. When LIFO is used in accounting for inventory the effect is one of recognizing increased cost of
inventory in times of rising prices and the lowering of reported profits.
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The ACCC and the State regulatory bodies, (ACCC 1999, Ch 4 pp. 38-54, IPART 2000,
Ch 5 pp., 71-88), have lent their collective strength to the endorsement of DORC as the
accepted basis for the valuation of assets and the Weighted Average Cost of Capital
(WACC) as the basis of the return due to owners. They have used their powers as
regulators to set price levels that are sufficient to earn an operating profit equivalent to
the WACC.

A recent (2000) regulatory decision was made in respect of AGLGN by the
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of NSW, (IPART). IPART agreed to an
access arrangement by AGLGN Gas Transmission Networks covering the five-year
period 1999-2004. IPART’s decision gave approval to a pricing regime based on the
Building Block approach. The Building Block approach allows the regulated company
to price its product in order to cover operating and administrative expenses, a return
equal to the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) on the DORC value of the
asset base, plus depreciation based on the DORC valued assets. This revenue stream is
based on a value for assets for the company significantly higher than they owned. The
decision resulted in a windfall gain for AGLGN. The amount of the gain is equal to the
DORC valuation of the asset base, minus the market value of the Historic Cost (net of
depreciation) of assets. After the outcome of the IPART decision became clear,
AGLGN sold the MSP to Australian Pipeline Trust (APT), while retaining a 30%
interest and entered into a five year agreement with APT contractually binding AGLGN
to transport a minimum quantity of gas at the price implied in the Maximum Allowed
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Revenue as approved by the decision, through the MSP over the period of the access
arrangement, 2000-2005.

The research
My research has focused on the use of DORC for the valuation of assets and the
regulators’ setting of prices and resulting revenue stream that is to be charged to
customers by regulated utilities. This study will argue that DORC is a flawed concept
for the valuation of assets and that its endorsement by regulators leads to undesirable
outcomes. Some of these outcomes are:
•

the overpricing of services

•

the dampening of demand and resulting loss of productivity

•

underutilisation of infrastructure assets3

Finalisation of the draft decision by the ACCC in respect of the Access
Arrangement for the Moomba to Sydney Pipeline, (MSP), has been delayed and
the effect has been to prolong the period wherein the higher, excessive prices
contained in the Draft Decision have remained current. Industries dissenting from
the ACCC’s adoption of DORC have made their frustrations public but have failed
to achieve a change in the ACCC view. The beneficiaries of regulatory action are

3

At the ACCC Transend Revenue Public Forum presentations held in Hobart 17th October 2003 there
were several presentations arguing against the level of the approved asset base for Transend assets in
Tasmania. These included the Energy Users Association of Australia who complained that the ACCC has
not justified the Rejection of GHD recommendation to reduce the opening RAB and that simply
permitting inflated CAPEX forecasts will amplify the problem of an inflated RAB to the disadvantage of
Tasmanian customers. At the same forum the Energy Action Group also argued against the RAB adopted
by the ACCC and accused the ACCC of failing customers by meekly accepting the unreasonable
revaluation of the Assets from an asset base 1/07/98 of $333.25m plus actual Capex of $151.4m resulting
in a RAB of not $484,65m but $542.2m. The Major Employers group pointed out that the ACCC
allowing Transend to increase its prices by over 10% each year compounding, plus inflation for the next
five years was ignoring the rights and needs of consumers.
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the regulated companies because they charge prices that reflect a monopolistic
rent. The companies complain that a return based on the WACC is an insufficient
inducement to invest in new capital projects.

Theoretical Implications
It will be argued here that the use of DORC does not solve the problem of
regulating prices for services. The regulators have many possible valuation choices
for use in respect of assets owned by major utilities. Any of the following
valuation notions:
•

Sunk Cost (SC)

•

Historic Cost (HC)

•

Net Realiseable Value (NRV)

•

Net Present Value (NPV)

•

Replacement Cost (RC)

•

Deprival value (DV)

•

Depreciated Optimised Replacement Cost (DORC)

The study argues that each of these valuation bases has something to add to the
debate about the regulation of prices; however, the adoption of DORC as the
regulators choice does not achieve the goal of curbing the monopoly power of
natural monopolies.

The revenue setting practices of the ACCC and State Regulators consist of
determination of the amount of the Maximum Allowed Revenue (MAR) that may
be achieved during the period covered by the access agreement. Once the value of
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regulated assets is set, usually with a DORC valuation, the regulators may also
approve the changes in the CPI to adjust upwards the value of the assets and
further increases in the revenue stream.

The accounting profession has had a century long debate about measurement of
profits in business. Since the 1960s there has been considerable debate for and
against the adoption of current cost accounting (CCA) as an accounting standard,
(Whittington 1983, Clarke 1982, Burrows 1996, Peasnell 1984, Tweedie 1984).
CCA uses replacement cost (RC) for the valuation of assets and was seriously
considered but adopted only on a supplementary basis by the accounting
profession for a time. CCA failed to achieve the support of business and the
accounting profession was forced to abandon it. Coming into prominence are the
International Financial Reporting Standards (IRFS), and these include subatantial
advances towards a reporting framework that is based on notions of ‘fair value’
and ‘capital maintenance’.
Implications for Practice
The stated aim of regulation is to create trading conditions as if the regulated
company was facing competition. The adoption of DORC values for assets and the
associated pricing policy based on return on investment (ROI), over-rewards utility
companies and disadvantages consumers. The regulators assert that they have
moved away from ROI regulation based on asset values and that ‘building block’
or CPI-X is their regulation model. The difficulty with this assertion is that past
decisions have endorsed a particular valuation model based on DORC and current
regulatory actions move on from this agreed DORC base. Withdrawal of the
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regulators from their intervention role in regulation is possible. Presently there is
an action being taken, by Australian Pipeline Trust (APT), to overturn the status of
the MSP as a covered pipeline thus ‘freeing’ it from the yoke of regulation.

Competition is beginning to appear in that Duke Energy International (DEI) has
developed a new transmission pipeline called the Eastern Gas Pipeline (EAP) that
serves a limited but growing market that has some potential to attract customers
away from the monopoly provider Duke (2002). Thus some duplication of the
MSP pipeline has taken place even though the MSP has unused capacity. DEI has,
(2002), successfully fought off the National Competition Council’s imposition on
them of an access agreement and now is not subject to price regulation. They claim
that their prices are lower than those of the regulated provider.

Practical considerations – the relevance of the market
Although DORC has been endorsed as the asset valuation base on which pricing
policy is calculated, utility companies’ balance sheets reflect Historic Cost asset
values (AGL 2003 Annual Report). According to Puxty (1997), in the UK, prior to
privatization, British Gas (BG) prepared their Annual Accounts using CCA as well
as HC in accordance with GAAP. Puxty (1997) describes how the profits of BG
prior to privatisation, when CCA was the accounting standard in place, were
reported as significantly lower than post privatisation when HC valuations for
assets were used. The extent of reported profits rose from 180m British Pounds
(BP), in 1981 under CCA to 1,110 (BP), using HC in 1987 when assets were
recorded at HC. Post privatization, both HC and CCA accounting results were
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presented to the regulator, the Mergers and Monopolies Commission (MMC, now
OFGEM), as an argument in favour of price regulation based on the Replacement
Cost (RC), of the assets. However the MMC chose to use the flotation or ‘sids’4
price as the base for the determination of prices. The flotation price represents
about 60% of the RC of assets. The MMC took the view in 1994 that to set prices
based on the RC would be unfair to consumers and result in a massive wealth
transfer to shareholders. Pricing decisions that relate to new capital expenditure
decisions are by definition at RC. OFGEM have adopted a current regulation
regime that recognises the flotation price for ‘old’ assets and actual cost for new
investment. This recognition of the market price of the shares, as well as the cost
of the replacement of assets means that the UK regulators have developed a twopart or split system for price regulation.

The production of annual accounts using both HC and CCA by British Gas
provides more information than is available in annual company accounts provided
to the Australian Regulators. The UK regulators’ reliance on published annual
accounts, whether in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP) as defined by the International Accounting Standards Board or Current
Cost Accounting (CCA) displays a level of articulation that Australian companies
might follow. Although presently in Australia, utilities supply DORC valuations to
the regulators for decision-making purposes, these DORC valuations are not part
of the company’s reporting system and do not appear in the annual accounts. An
argument against the preparation of annual accounts based on regulated values is

4

‘sids’ refers to the price paid by the public when BG was first floated on the London Stock Exchange
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that those large utilities are complex businesses with many different business
sectors aggregated into the final accounts.

Measuring the results of regulated companies in the market
Regulation based on DORC asset values and the regulator’s version of straight line
depreciation based on CPI adjusted DORC values, should mean that when target
revenues are achieved, healthy reported earnings ensue. These earnings should
influence the share price. Post-decision, the share price of a regulated utility is
relevant to future regulatory decisions. Minimal interest in monitoring the results
of regulated utilities is shown by regulators post-decision. The regulatory debate
has been captured by finance economists instead of the accounting profession and
that is one reason why the impact on published results of regulatory decisions has
not become urgent either to owners or regulators.

The key benefit to interested parties arising from this study
Current Cost Accounting (CCA), based on the replacement cost of assets has been
thoroughly considered and rejected by the private sector and the Accounting
Profession. The Commonwealth Government made it plain in the 70s and 80s that
no tax concessions would be available to companies who reported using CCA
Walker (1992, p.89). Undiluted, CCA would have resulted in lower reported
profits. The Australian Tax Act, as amended, sets its own rules for the
determination of assessable income and there are many differences between the
ATO rules and GAAP practices. Contrarily, a form of CCA, i.e., DORC, based on
RC has been endorsed by the Commonwealth and State governments, the ACCC
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and State regulators. The linking of these DORC values to price levels and target
rates of return is seen as the ‘opportunity cost’ of the investment. The MAR, as
approved by the regulator, results in a pricing regime sufficiently high to attract a
new entrant to the market. In NSW, The new entrant, Duke Energy International
(DEI), by investing in a new gas pipeline transmission venture demonstrate that
the pricing regime awarded to AGLGN under the access arrangement is high
enough to allow them to under cut AGLGN prices and still make a profit. This is
while the estimated unused capacity of the regulated pipeline, the MSP owned by
APT is greater than 50per cent. The new market entrant, a competitor to the
regulated company is able to charge lower prices than the regulated company’s
prices based on DORC. By the final chapter of this study the case against the use
of DORC for asset valuation will have been made.

Unresolved Issues- Excess prices cause dissatisfaction among users.
Industry participants other than the regulated companies are dissatisfied and
frustrated with the outcome of the regulatory process, that is, the overpricing they
must pay in order to access the pipeline. In their view the prices charged are
excessive and discourage the use of the pipeline (DA Electricity 2003, Major
Employers Group 2003, Energy Users Association of Australia 2003, Comalco
2003, Energy Action Group 2003, Epic Energy 2003). The pricing structure affects
investment decisions and some projects are abandoned or exported as a result. The
extent of this frustration is measured by responses given to the IPART regulator,
post decision, on the access arrangement given to AGLGN 1999-2004 (E.g.
INCITEC, Energy Australia, BHP, Gas Advice, Duke Energy among others).
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Post-decision monitoring is inadequate.
The Trade Practices Act has been subject to review by the Dawson committee Dawson
(2003), who particularly examined Section 46- misuse of market power and the issue of
'proof of purpose'. It will be the responsibility of the new chairman of the ACCC, Mr.
Graham Samuels, to achieve required changes. (Financial Review 5th March 2003 page
62)

The structure of this study
Chapter 2 introduces the methodology adopted for this research
The research is positioned within Laughlin’s (1995), ‘middle range’ between a
logical radical deductive approach, as represented by the research approach of
financial mathematics, and a case study. The middle range view has influenced the
way this study has been developed and is suited to the wide range of data sources
examined. It allows for an analytical and interpretative view of texts and
recognition of the rhetoric of discourses taking place between decision makers and
interested parties. The political nature of decisions is thus included as part of
discourse.

In this research positioning, there is scope for analysis and interpretation that can
be viewed within an analytical framework that is both systematic and critical. My
awareness of my own culture plays an important part in the approach I have taken.
This self-consciousness increases sensitivity to research sources and the
recognition of a wide range of written sources has drawn the researcher toward
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thinking about ways of dealing with these various different texts and
communications. Relevant concepts to be implemented in examining data sources
include: text-as-meaning, discourse, and the context of communication. This
notion of the ‘context of communication’, and ‘who is communicating with whom
and why’, strike a resonant chord with my research. Many data sources examined
are written in legal prose with the pervading air of authority such documents
exude.

Fairlough (1998), views Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as

characterized by an interdisciplinary commitment and a critical commitment to a
structured configuration of different types of texts and discourses associated with a
given social domain.

The contributions to the research area from finance mathematicians are impressive
and convincing. Established techniques such as Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) have
been used to support arguments in relation to the ‘best’ regulatory decisions and
outcomes. My observation has been that regulators have been very selective about
adopting the results achieved from these techniques, relying on those results that
endorse their decisions and ignoring some very serious contrary results/findings.

The elements of the regulatory equation, other than the value placed on the assets,
are the allowable expenses described as Operating Expenses (Opex), and the
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC), able to be earned from the assets.
This study does not consider the impact of these items; neither does it examine in
any detail the structure of Australia’s major utility companies and the dividends
paid to them by subsidiaries.
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Because of the wealth of data sources, the arguments are not contained solely
within the logic of a mathematical discussion. Discovery of what is the full
situation in this challenging and complex area of business is unlikely and the
researcher is left with obtaining only partial knowledge and thus partial
understanding. The size and strategic nature of the energy sector make it a critical
one within our economy and it is worthwhile to attempt to gain a better
understanding even while there is much more to be discovered.

Finally,

researchers have an imperative to think at length about the complexity of the
regulatory process.

Chapter three examines the history of Current Cost Accounting (CCA)
Chapter three on the history of CCA helps to explain why DORC developed.
There are similarities between the CCA debate and the DORC debate. The history
of CCA provides background, language, concepts, and history of replacement cost
by business and the accounting profession. This history has relevance to the
development of DORC as a valuation model. When the DORC debate began there
was no rationale for such a valuation model and regulators looked to accounting
for a valuation model to use for infrastructure assets. The Regulators sought
validation for their adoption and use of DORC. DORC valuations became a
surrogate for the residual value of the net present value (NPV) of a stream of a
future stream of cash receipts. Finance economics provided arguments in favour of
DORC in spite of DORC’s inherent circularity when used by the regulators in
approving a revenue stream that ensured a desired return based on these values.
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While replacement cost (RC) was wanted by regulators as first preference
valuation model, in the event, DORC was adopted as the preferred model.

This chapter traces the hundred-year history of the debate concerned the adoption
of CCA. The support of the accounting profession was earned by the system of
accounting called current cost accounting (CCA). However lack of support from
government and the business community resulted in failure and CCA was
abandoned. The rationale for CCA matches the reasoning behind the adoption of
DORC, its background, language and knowledge. Attitudes within the accounting
profession are examined to determine whether there is a consensus view about the
principles and applicability of the Deprival Value Framework. This chapter also
discusses whether economists’ estimates of income can be equated with
Accounting Reported Profit (ARP). Edwards Kaye and Mayer (1987)

have

established the areas of contention that prevent a true reconciliation between the
economists’ concept of income - based on the NPV of future cash flows - and the
accountants’ determination of profit. Accounting profit is considered equal to the
economists’ concept of Internal Rate of Return (IRR) under some circumstances.
The discussion centers around the determination of the IRR compared with ARP
and the adjustments required reconciling the two. Strong linkages exist between
the two concepts; however that debate is unlikely to be resolved in time to enrich
the present debate concerning the validity of the adoption of DORC as the base for
the determination of the MAR. The practical relevance of the contribution of
Edwards Kaye and Mayer (1987) can be gauged by their work in exploring the
areas of contention between the two approaches to the determination of income.
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Edwards Kaye and Mayer (1987) require adjustments hardly any different from the
adjustments required by the Australian Bureau of Statistics in order to reconcile
Government Financial Statistics and Operating results obtained under Australian
Accounting Standard 31 for government departments.

The influential Sandilands report (1975) and the way it ranked alternative
valuation methods depended on the selection of Deprival Value as the overriding
valuation base.

This ranking was supported by the Accounting Profession;

however, in an era of raging inflation in the UK in the 1970s, the UK government
did not see fit to adhere to logic, preferring to give tax breaks to business to
compensate for the worst effects of inflation. While CCA based on RC for the
valuation of assets was practiced for a time, it was in addition to the use of HC.
Eventually, a return to the previous standard based on HC was a relief to almost
everyone concerned with the preparation of company accounts. In Australia, while
the Commonwealth Government, in its adoption of accrual accounting based on
RC for the valuation of assets, has endorsed Deprival Value (DV), Government
regulation agencies, both Commonwealth and State, have rejected DV in favor of
RC, or DORC, in all situations. The only exception may be when the replacement
cost of a combination of assets is ‘optimised’ which hypothetically results in the
abandonment of some assets because they are deemed obsolete. The rejection of
DV means that the regulators endorse the accounting principle of ‘going concern’
and override the logic which demands a sale when realiseable value exceeds RC or
NPV.
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Chapter four discusses and defines DORC
Chapter four discusses and defines DORC as pivotal to regulatory tariffs as determined
in accordance with the following formula:
Maximum Allowed Tariff (MAR) = Operating Costs (Opex) + Capital Costs.
Capital Costs include the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) based on the
Depreciated Optimised Replacement Cost (DORC), of the Assets plus
Depreciation based on the DORC value of those assets. It is clear from this
formula that the calculation of DORC for the assets of the company is pivotal to
the determination of the amount of revenue able to be collected from customers.
The conceptual basis for the use of DORC is examined in Chapter 4. Definitions
of income derived by accounting theorists such as Barton (1977), Edwards Kaye
and Mayer (1987) , Peasnell (1982, 1984), Ma and Mathews (1989), and a
consensual definition and nuances of meaning are sought. In examining regulatory
choices with regard to valuation method it has became clear that Deprival Value
(DV) has been endorsed by the Commonwealth Government in implementing its
accounting reforms within the public sector. While the energy regulators have
adopted DORC they have rejected DV for the reason that DV includes, as one of
its defined values, recoverable or realiseable value. In the gas transmission
business the term ‘recoverable’ cost, frequently means the ‘sunk’ cost of the asset.

The problem with asset valuations being the referent for pricing regimes is that of
circularity. A mechanism that has been introduced into the regulatory formula to
overcome the problem of circularity is that the Optimised Replacement Cost
(ORC), of the assets is transformed to become ORC ‘used’. The tariff formulae
40

expressed as the present value of future cash flows is the subject of a discussion of
the results of the adoption of DORC and finally DORC is modified to become
ORC used. Chapter four also examines economists’ ex ante perspective of the
measurement of income, views of opportunity cost, income, internal rate of return
and connections with DORC. Economists’ ex ante perspective emphasizing
Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) techniques has a focus on future cash flows. Also
discussed is a range of economists’ arguments concerning the pricing of natural
monopolies.

Chapter five explains the theoretical foundations of the tariff equation
Chapter five focuses on the theoretical foundations of the tariff equation as used by
the regulators in determining the MAR that may be charged by regulated
companies to their various groups of customers. In discussing the tariff equation or
formula, the ACCC’s ‘building block’ approach and the ‘balance sheet’ approach,
both of which are based on a notion of changes in the consumer price index are
discussed, plus an “X” factor, CPI-X. The regulators’ approach to, and partial
resolution of, the inherent problem of circularity by the adoption of notions
contained in Tobin’s Q, is addressed.

Present value analysis is applied to the tariff formula for the MAR and
demonstrates that at the end of the Regulatory Asset Base (RAB)’s useful life,
when assets are fully depreciated, the RAB is equal to zero. Inevitably the present
value of the RAB is equal to the value adopted by the regulators at the
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commencement of the regulatory intervention. The three consequences of this
analysis are discussed:
•

When RAB at the time of the regulatory decision is greater than the
Depreciated Actual Cost (DAC) value of the assets the result is an upward
revaluation of the asset base or shareholder wealth because the upward
revaluation represents an increased revenue stream.

•

New Capital Investment, at the time of investment, offers owners an NPV
equal to the amount of their investment. New assets are brought into the
balance sheet at cost.

•

Depreciation in total is equal to the value given to the RAB at the
commencement of the regulatory period. The NPV is constant regardless of
the time pattern of depreciation write offs.

Chapter six examines the issue of depreciation
The regulators’ treatment of depreciation as part of the tariff equation is discussed
in Chapter 6. This includes an examination of the regulators’ choice of Straight
Line (SL), depreciation. This choice, combined with changes in the Consumers
Price Index (CPI), has a substantial upwards effect on the size of the approved
MAR.

Independently of the regulators choice of depreciation method, the effect of
changes in the CPI on the value placed on the regulated assets is to increase the
DORC value of the assets by the CPI. By allowing the impact of inflation to
impact the RAB, an increase in the allowable revenue, MAR, by an amount
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sufficient to earn a return equal to the WACC on the CPI adjusted DORC assets is
permitted.

Views on performance are reviewed in the context of the tariff formula. These
include the Stern Stewart concept of Economic Value Added (EVA), which has
from its first days been based on the present value of future cash flows and
changes in this value at intervals.

Chapter seven describes the regulators’ use of Tobin’s Q.
The regulators have included the notion of Tobin’s Q as a measure of the assets
relative value compared with the cost of replacement of the assets. An assessment
of Q as less than unity, i.e., Q<1, is considered to demonstrate that the Market’s
valuation of the firm is less than the RC of the assets. Some researchers, including
Whittington, argue that energy utilities are unlikely to have a Q = 1 because of the
level of risk faced. A Q value that recognizes the gap between market price and
the replacement cost of the assets may be more realistic. Is there any likelihood of
a positive impact on the Q value when such companies expand? Do Q values
remain below 1?

The regulators’ use of Tobin’s Q is found in an argument that has been favored by
regulators in the determination of DORC as being that adjustment to the value of ORC
that is the markets’ assessment of the second-hand or ‘used’ value of the regulatory
assets. The theory that has been adopted is that of Tobin’s Q to facilitate this transition
from ORC to DORC. The market based notion known as Tobin’s Q is based on the

43

determination of the market value of the assets expressed as a ratio of the replacement
cost of the assets. The determination of a firm’s Q value is dependent on the level of
risk faced as well as the market’s perception of managerial efficiency. Chapter 7 will
consider the following issues:
•

The regulators’ acceptance of Tobin’s Q ratio as the value of second hand assets
to the replacement cost of those assets, i.e., DORC compared with ORC

•

Tobin’s Q as the market’s assessment of the company’s ability to add value to
the assets when valued at replacement cost (RC)

•

Problems posed by misuse of depreciation notions, such as ‘Competition
Depreciation’, by owners’ representatives whose interest is in increasing DORC
valuations in order to increase prices above the present level.

•

Argument made by Australian Pipeline Association advocate, KPMG, against
reliance on Tobin’s Q

•

Asset owners’ preference for ORC as the regulatory asset base (RAB), (report
by Agility Management)

Connections between research into Q, Economic Value Added, Free Cash Flows and
performance are considered.

Chapter eight is a case study of a recent IPART decision
Chapter eight looks at the impact of a recent regulatory decision of the Independent
Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of NSW in respect of the access arrangement for
AGLGN 1999-2004. Various classes of customers, - contract, commercial and
residential - have objected to the adoption of DORC values for the assets of AGLGN,
claiming that their interests have not been protected by the IPART decision. Effects of
44

the decision are examined; these include; under-utilization of the pipeline, lost load due
to overpricing, the asset definition problem, the difficulties of auditing, the impact of
new technology, treatment of revaluations, and the lack of post-decision monitoring.
There are suggestions of the existence of political expediency in the decisions made and
in the bureaucratic suppression of criticism.

Chapter nine contains a summary and recommendations
Chapter nine considers the ‘madness’ of DORC and failure in the move to achieve
greater efficiency and effectiveness in the regulation of private monopolies. There are
undesirable consequences resulting from the adoption of DORC especially in the
overpricing of product and under-utilization of ‘sunk’ assets. There has been a failure
to achieve the regulators’ stated aim of achieving a competitive trading outcome for
natural monopolies.

The International Accounting Standards Board’s Framework (IFRS/IAS, 2003,
paragraph 103) supports a physical maintenance concept of capital where the concern of
the user is with the operating capability of the enterprise: This concern when
incorporated into the relevant accounting standard, shows that the lack of cohesion
between the regulatory decision and company financial reports. This lack may be
overcome if the regulator were to insist on the use of IFRS.

Events in the pipeline industry have moved ahead of the regulatory problem. Howarth
(2003) reports that although the price of shares in Australian Pipeline Trust (APT) have
fallen in response to the final decision of the ACCC in respect of the tariffs on the
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Moomba to Sydney (MSP), increasing competition from the Duke Energy International
(DEI) owned Eastern Gas Pipeline (EAP) is anticipated to result in a fall in prices
charged by the MSP. On January 1 2004, there was an explosion at the Santos owned
gas plant in the Moomba basin. Production was halted and it is estimated that it will
take several months to restore previous levels of production of gas. Further notes are to
be found in the Endnote of the study.

Finally, the study concludes that the problems encountered in the determination of
DORC valuations are insurmountable in practice. Pricing strategies based on historic
cost asset values do not have the flaws of subjective and disputable asset valuations.
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Chapter 2
Methodology

Introduction
At the present time the superfluity of literature about research methodology in
accounting is such that any view a researcher may have about the research domain,
including empirical data notions about 'what is' compared with an 'ideal' world,
presents major challenges. Twenty years ago the choices were fewer, polarised on
the one hand towards positivism and on the other towards longitudinal case study
research. Today this expansion of choices increases the tension surrounding choice
of method. In relation to this study there is tension in the research domain. This is
expressed by the emergence of financial economists as the most prominent
contributors to the debate over the theoretical basis for Tariff/regulation in the
context of tariff setting. Accounting and particularly management accounting have
been pushed aside from being part of the regulatory debate. The narrow focus of
finance/economics ignores the wider picture. The wider picture holds the
possibility of surprise.

Key domains of choice re methodology
Laughlin (1995) argues that Burrell and Morgan (1979) in designing an abstract
scheme for understanding the broad streams of social science approaches to
empirical research, has provided researchers with significant insight into different
parameters of accounting research and how each approach connects with and
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overlaps each other.

Burrell and Morgan’s two-by-two matrix based on two

continuums posits alternative approaches to social science, ranging from
'subjectivist' to 'objectivist' and presents different assumptions about the nature of
society; the 'sociology of regulation' to the 'sociology of radical change'. Burrell
and Morgan may thereby have identified the key domains of choice in research
methodology: a position on being (ontology), on the role of the investigator
(human nature), on perceptions of society (society), on perceptions of
understanding

(epistemology)

and

on

ways

to

investigate

the

world

(methodology). Chua (1984) developed Burrell and Morgan's view into four
disciplinary matrices for use by accounting researchers, describing them as
Classical, Interpretative, Humanist and Structuralist.

The 'structuralist' view of

research in accounting is closest to 'functionalism'.

The view that opposes a

‘functionalist’ or objective approach is an interpretative one based on a subjective
view of reality which emphasizes perceiving, describing and understanding. Thus
the interpretative view rejects an exclusively objective approach.

This

interpretative view of research has some echoes in the 'Frankfurt School', one of
whose exponents is Habermas.

Laughlin (1988) draws on Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) view of accounting as
being anchored in 'functionalism', where the emphasis is on the technical and
tangible aspects of accounting. Laughlin discusses the thinking of Habermas
(1984, 1987), and is concerned with the analytical exposure of 'Social Systems'
behind accounting system design. Laughlin (1988) describes how the research
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endeavour can and should be involved in the processes of critique and change in
both the technical and underlying factors in accounting systems design.

Laughlin (1995) further develops these ideas into a 'lens' through which to position
research in relation to three important variables:
· The 'theory' dimension, the ontological assumptions, the prior theorising or
prior theories that the researcher brings to the research
· The 'methodology' dimension, which can have more or less of a theoretical
definition for the empirical investigation, and
· The 'change' dimension, which generally refers to the attitudes of the
researcher about an 'ideal' world and the necessity to promote change.
The alternatives are either to adopt a critical approach, that points to a possibility that
the researcher actively desires change, or the possibility that the researcher accepts
the status quo and is content to achieve an 'understanding' of change.

Laughlin thinks of these three choices as being:
…….on three different scales ranging from high to low. The 'theory'
dimension refers to high or low levels of usage of prior theorising before
undertaking any investigation (1995, p.67).
While a researcher can identify with the need to position oneself about the level of
theorising prior to researching, experience informs the researcher of the difficulties
of theorising which result in constant iterations about theory formulation. This
iteration continuously affects the certainty with which one can position theory.

Elements of Critical Theory as a Research Methodology Choice
Critical Theory should incorporate:
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•

a statement of the researchers view of an ideal world – e.g., a managerial
accounting perspective

•

information - present and observed - which is recognised as different from the
ideal world, and

•

reflextivity, or acceptable action required to alert agents to their delusion. –
request monitoring.

The work of Habermas (1984, 1987), has dominated the debate about the nature of
critical theory as a general methodological approach for understanding and change.
An evaluation of Habermas' work leads to an understanding of the potential of critical
theory for understanding and facilitating change in accounting in that
•

much emphasis is placed on language, i.e., epistemological issues

•

emphasis is on the need to go beyond the tangible

•

understanding must be in the context of lasting and meaningful change,
and

•

The development process is one of discovery.

Laughlin (1988) raises five issues with regard to the use of Habermas’ methodology
for understanding and changing accounting. He questions
•

the accuracy of Habermas' insight

•

the validity of this particular use

•

the processes that lead to or prevent change

•

the uncertainty about the adequacy of the discursive processes being
applied (because benchmarks are unclear), and

•

The difficulties in exploring key cultural dimensions.
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The goal of critical theory is to present the possibility to agents in society that they
can explicitly recognise their true aims and can form correct views.

Broadbent

(1995), describes how the application of the main elements of Habermas’s approach
(Habermas (1984, 1987), provide advantages in linking theory and practice in order to
challenge the ‘status quo’, and provides an historical and societal context in which to
bring about Accounting-led changes. At best, critical theory can undermine current
ideology.

The tools of discourse
The study of the English legal traditional discourse provided by Goodrich (1986,
1990) illuminates the deep origins of the British legal tradition from which the
Australian legal system derives much of its rhetoric. The development of Australian
legal discourse since settlement two hundred years ago has taken a divergent course
that differentiates it from its English cultural origins. Perhaps this course recognizes
the break with tradition that occurred unconsciously, such that its actors and
participants are blind to this difference.

The two highest levels of government in Australia, i.e., Federal and State, assume
authority to make decisions from a perceived need to solve a problem. An example
of such a decision is the making of a tariff order invoking legislative power that
seems to address only a minority of the parties that have an established interest in the
outcome of the decision. The most striking absence from this discourse is the needs
of different groups of customers. Customers fall into three main groups: contract,
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commercial and residential users. Residential customers include the disabled and the
poor who are often unable to endure price ‘shocks’. However tariff orders and final
decisions make little or no mention of this group of customers. Shareholders are
another prominent group who are ignored and while there is an inference that the
well-being of the company’s owners is at the heart of the regulation process, market
prices for shares are considered peripheral and irrelevant. The regulated company is
looked on by the regulators as almost the property of the managers at the forefront of
the negotiation process. The needs of large contract customers and their evident
frustrations at the regulatory outcome are either not addressed or are ignored.

This narrow focus of attention from the Federal and State government bodies towards
the management in place within regulated utilities suggests that ‘political deals’ are at
the heart of the regulatory process.

Otherwise the legislation that gives rise to

regulation would have a more inclusive feel about it. The tools of discourse used to
dissect these documents can assist in uncovering the true aims of the regulators, or
more correctly, the political masters of the regulators, state premiers and the federal
government cabinet.

The particular configuration of the relationships between government and these
regulated utilities deserves closer attention. Puxty (1977)’s view is through the
lens of the classical concept of systematic crisis traced to Marx (1906) in
"Capital". The steps of Marx’s thinking are as follows:
•
•
•

Increased competition results in a lower rate of profit
The reaction is increased working hours and lower pay
This exploitation results in increased labour productivity and then an increase in
the reserve army of labour.
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•
•

Then there is a fall in the general wage rate plus economic imperialism which
results in lower cost of raw materials.
Nonetheless profit declines - results in overproduction, excess capital, relative
overpopulation and economic crisis.

Puxty infers that from such a progression of events:
'The inherent contradictions included the needs of capital to expand and
concentrate, and to increasingly expropriate the fruits of labour, while at the
same time requiring labour to have the purchasing power to purchase the
outputs of the system' (1997, p.717).
Cooper (2003) takes a Marxist approach when she describes the three main
motivations behind the Scottish Executive privatisation proposals (in respect of
Scottish prisons). These were the destruction of public sector pay and conditions,
the transfer of wealth from the public to the private sector through prison
privatisation and the maintenance of the current penal regime.

Contradictions in institutional power and discourse
It has been argued by Hunt (1992) that, with regard to the French Revolution, the
new symbolic behaviours were not simply the means of power, but their ends.
Recent emphasis on interpretative traditions in research into organisational
behaviour from an anthropological perspective, give ontological primacy to culture
as an explanatory factor. However, Foucault (1984) drew an historical connection
between power and discourse recognising as discipline, technologies of control,
mechanisms of normalisation and human adaptation to a changing institutional
environment.
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A key task is the challenge of understanding contradictions apparent in institutions
experiencing movement within fields. An example of the politics of institutional
contradiction occurring in recent times, given by Friedland (1991) is that of capitalist
markets. Such a capitalist market may depend on families in order to minimise the
costs of supplying a labor force, but at the same time, the labor market may undercut
the capacity of families to support reproduction.

The tools of discourse
Bell (1998) makes an important distinction between texts and discourse as follows:
Written texts traditionally implied a remote reader unable to influence the
flow of discourse. Text-as-meaning is produced at the moment of reading not
at the moment of writing. Since meanings are now seen to be more a product
of negotiation between readers and texts, text takes on more of the interactive
qualities of discourse. Text is the outward manifestation of a communication
event whereas Discourse may be exemplified through a statement by Cook
(1982) about discourse analysis: (1998, p. 2)
Cook (1982) uses the term discourse analysis:
It (discourse) is not concerned with language alone. It also examines the
context of communication: who is communicating with whom and why; in
what kind of society and situation, through what medium; how different types
of communication evolved and their relationship to each other. (1982, p.2)
This notion of ‘context of communication’, and who is communicating with whom
and why, strikes a resonant chord with my research. Without some analytical
framework these sources of information are a confusing mass of detail that takes
the researcher in circles. Many data sources examined are written in legalistic
prose with the typical pervading air of authority such documents exude.
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Some of the facets of this ‘context of communication’ will be discussed. They touch on
the following:
•

Ideas of economic rationalism and the rhetoric of communication

•

the direction the finance debate has taken in continuing to refine notions of
DORC

•

the exclusiveness of rhetoric that denies the relevance of the market’s
assessment of share price and excluded the organisational structure of
regulated businesses from scrutiny

•

the paucity of dialogue between regulatory agencies and interested parties,
and

•

The gradual encroachment of regulatory ideas to the present situation where
Depreciated Optimised Replacement Cost (DORC) is considered as the
‘status quo’ valuation base.

Some attempt is necessary to determine how text should be considered as part of the
analytical framework because the application of the definition of discourse shown
above explains, or else offers a methodology for classifying and clarifying text that
otherwise presents a confusing jumble where the search for truth is fruitless.

Fairlough (1998) describes an analytical framework for Critical Discourse Analysis
(CDA), characterized by an interdisciplinary commitment and by a critical commitment.
Fairlough draws on a concept borrowed but also adapted from Foucault’s (1984) ‘order of discourse’, which is a structured configuration of different types of text and
discourses associated with a given social domain.

In my research I find this

interdisciplinary notion complements the difficulties I have experienced in extracting
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essential information from a variety of different disciplines within the social sciences,
e.g., sociology, economics, accounting and finance mathematics.

Some of the most influential contributions to the research have come from finance
mathematicians, [Johnstone, 1996, 2002, King, 1998, 2000, Davis 2002a, 2002b]. They
have applied established techniques such as Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) to support
their arguments in relation to the ‘best’ in their view, regulatory decisions.

My

observation has been that regulators have been very selective about adopting the results
achieved from these techniques, relying on those results that endorse their decisions and
ignoring some very serious contrary results/findings.

Because of the wealth of data sources, the arguments are not all contained within the
logic of a mathematical equation.

Discovery of what the full situation is in this

challenging and complex area of business is unlikely and the researcher is left with only
partial knowledge and thus partial understanding. The researcher is aware of this,
however, the size and strategic nature of the energy sector make it a critical sector
within our society and it is worthwhile to try to gain a better understanding even while
there is much more to be discovered.

Economists’ Rhetoric
Incremental economics and economic rationalism appear to have a strong domination of
the decisions made by regulators. Critical theory potentially emancipates action and
presents the possibility of a wider social philosophy.

This conclusion of a wider
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enterprise of social philosophy opens the way to examine what is and leave the
implications of these results to the social scientists.

McCloskey (1987) revives some useful arguments about the way economists understand
their subject and communicate it to the world. He describes the phenomenon whereby
what economists argue inside their heads or in the seminar room differs from the
official rhetoric. This is a very powerful accusation because it imperils the validity of
economic rhetoric.

He recommends that economists should become more self-

conscious about their rhetoric because they will then better know why they agree or
disagree and will find it more difficult to dismiss contrary arguments on merely
methodological grounds.

The temper of argument would improve if economists

recognized on what grounds they were arguing. On the basis that present arguments are
clothed in economic rhetoric, ‘the economic emperor has positively no clothes’.

Economic Rationalism
Economic rationalism is an expression that has been associated with the political
movement of the eighties and nineties. It encapsulates thinking that occurs with a
marginalist theory of values in society. An economic analysis of profitability of a firm
can affirm that the firm should continue to manufacture and sell up to the point where
the marginal cost of production is equal to the selling price (or marginal revenue). It is
held that this level of sales is the point where the firm achieves maximum profit. This
analysis provides worthwhile insight into the behaviour of revenues, costs and profit.
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The concept of ‘opportunity cost’ is that when a firm invests in one basket of assets it
foregoes the opportunity to invest in another. Economic marginalists seek to maximize
profits and therefore would sell a basket of assets that is not achieving maximum profits
in order to invest in another that is achieving at the maximum and as a consequence earn
a higher return on those assets. This action would reduce their ‘opportunity’ costs.

The nature of community assets and community service goals is in conflict with a
marginalist theory of values.

In the energy sector, gas transmission networks are

frequently ‘sunk’ assets and therefore have low opportunity cost. Economists that
support the adoption of a DORC valuation for gas transmission networks move the
point of marginal efficiency into a higher sphere. Tinker (1984), argues that this
reliance on utility based marginalist economics ignores other viewpoints and threatens
to limit the scope of accounting research. In Tinker’s view, what is needed is a
Unified and underlying theory of social value to situate the research in the
overall context of social conflict (1984, p 23).
McCloskey (1987) argues that nothing is to be gained from clinging to scientific method
or any other methodology except honesty, clarity and tolerance. Nothing is gained
because the methodology does not describe the sciences it was once thought to describe.
In the area of regulation of ‘sunk’ assets, the adoption of DORC values and then the
imposition of opportunity cost and marginalist values is plainly absurd. McCloskey
criticizes the scientific method because it is an amalgam of logical positivism,
behaviouralism, operationalism, and the hypo-deductive model of science. An example
is drawn from Samuelson’s (1947) book on the foundations of economic analysis.
McCloskey (1983) describes how Samuelson presents himself as a skilled

58

mathematician even while the mathematical examples he calls upon are often pointless5.
McCloskey, in conclusion, argues that
The point is that one cannot tell whether an assertion is persuasive by
knowing at which portion of the scientific/humanistic circle it came from.
One can only be persuaded by thinking (1983, p.511).
Non-Rational Roles of Accounting
Macintosh (1987) has suggested that non-rational roles of accounting should be the
subject of research. The role of accounting has rationally been to report on events and
determine the amount of profit earned. Theoretically ‘profit’ is the difference in the
value of capital between the beginning and end of the accounting period adjusted for
dividends paid and movements in capital. This Balance sheet approach has had
resurgence through recommendations of the International Accounting Standards Board
(IASB) and is included in general terms in the Accounting Framework contained within
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS, 2003).

Paragraphs (15-20) of the

IASB Framework cover Financial Position, Performance and Changes in Financial
Position. While various standards throughout give direction on financial report
preparation IAS 36 contains two relevant standards relating to Impairment of Assets
(paragraphs 7-14) and Value in Use (paragraphs 26-46). Value in Use of an Asset
contains two steps:
(a) estimating the future cash inflows and outflows to be derived from
continuing use of the asset and from its ultimate disposal; and
(b) applying the appropriate discount rate to these future cash flows (2003,
p.301).
IASB Framework and Standards have relevance to the difficulties encountered in
reconciling the accounting view of profit with the economist’s view of income as
5

‘Samuelson’s economics’ was a basic economics textbook in the 1960’s. Many scholars will remember
trying to make sense of this text as an undergraduate; I certainly do.
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‘return’ on the present value of invested capital. In reading a piece of regulatory
legislation, any connection between the regulatory decision and reported results
prepared in accordance with accounting standards is missing. While it is common
knowledge that changes in profit expectations have the power to instantly affect the
price of the underlying share or value of the company’s capital, the dialogue that has
occurred has taken place between company managers and the regulators who have
called on economic models of the future for support and advice. The connection
between prices and reported profits has been lost, and monitoring processes that are in
place are fragmented and ignore the accounting profession’s annual audit of company
results undertaken by an independent auditor.

The narrowness of the discourse

undertaken by regulators leads to the suggestion that what is needed is a challenge to the
form of asset valuation methodology adopted by regulators in Australia. This asset
valuation methodology, DORC, has led to
•

the belief that the 'dominance of Replacement Cost’ should be allowed
to persist even in the face of ‘lost load’ e.g., when two contract
customers of AGLGN move their contract to receive gas from AGLGN
to the Eastern Gas Pipeline owned by Duke Energy International.
(IPART’s Final Decision re AGLGN, 2000)

•

Implementation of DORC values even though resulting valuations
show wide fluctuations, (Johnstone (1999) Energy Markets reform
group (1999)).
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•

Failure of regulation insofar as the regulated prices imposed is at the
maximum and more like monopoly prices than regulated prices. Energy
Action Group (2003), Energy Users Association of Australia (2003)6

Macintosh's view is that critical theory contains a notion of 'objective illusion' which
stems from ideologies which individuals and groups have a hand in creating or at least
legitimising, but subsequently come to treat as the handicraft of others. In terms of
acceptance of DORC values for regulatory purposes, one might identify groups as
being:
•

Federal and State political leaders who have an interest in regulatory outcomes

•

the ACCC and their state bodies, IPART (NSW) and ORG (VIC) as ‘creators of
objective illusion’, and

•

AGLGN as ‘Legitimisers of objective illusions’.

An important theme of Macintosh's work is his discussion on the topic of delusion. He
describes the working world as being dominated by males with an ideology which
legitimises delusion and serves to reproduce social relations at work whereby women
are disadvantaged. He describes the role of critical theory as being self-conscious of a
successful process of emancipation and enlightenment for the male group. Critical
theory, with its emphasis on ideology and legitimation, may result in a narrow range of
interests which ignore the historical roots of the current social order. Perhaps the
historic roots of the current social order as analysed by evaluating the narrowness of the
6

Energy Users Association of Australia in their submission to the ACCC Transend Draft Decision Public
Forum described the forthcoming decision in the following terms: It walks like a duck, it smells like a
duck, it quacks like a duck…it is a duck. It walks like monopoly rent, it smells like monopoly rent, its
quacks like monopoly rent…it is monopoly rent.
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discourse may reveal the narrowness of the range of interests. The process of regulation
corresponds with Macintosh’s notion of ‘objective illusion'.

The commitment to radical change through interpretation and transformation links with
the previously expressed interpretative view of accounting research. Although critical
theory goes further in that one of its key characteristics is commitment to radical change
through interpretation and transformation of the previously identified ‘objective
illusion’, understanding must be in the context of lasting and meaningful change.
Critical theory proposes dynamically linking theory to practice. Thus the objective
illusion of the benefits of DORC would be negated by examining the medium term
effects on prices and thus on consumers; the consumers are the group that regulation is
designed to protect yet the discourse that occurs takes place between the regulators and
the companies being regulated i.e., companies that are exhibiting signs of exerting
market power.

Another objective illusion that needs interpreting is the action of

AGLGN in protecting their regulated MAR by opposing the Duke Energy Industries
action for removal of their status as a covered pipeline. Having failed in this action
AGLGN are presently attempting to have the Access Arrangement for the MSP
removed from regulation. This attempt is occurring while transmission prices charged
on the MSP exceed the prices set out in the ACCC draft decision.

The aspect of critical theory which causes the greatest concern to the writer is the idea
that it requires a critique of the 'status quo' and the search for a 'better' life. This
concern arises from the suspicion that the researcher’s view of an 'ideal' world may be
as flawed as that of the 'status quo' and that in practice ‘critical’ thinkers do not get far
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without social movements. In questioning the recent regulatory decision of IPART in
respect of AGLGN, one must ask whether the decision based on DORC was better or
worse than if historic cost was used as the regulatory asset base. While the regulatory
body IPART (NSW) seemed to concur with the arguments in favor of DORC, the 2000
Decision in respect of AGLGN contained values for the assets that were a compromise
between the previous ‘agreed values’ and the owners proposed DORC values.

Perhaps the research might lead to a discovery of the advantages of DORC. One
possibility is that the self-reflective nature of critical theory would lead to the ACCC
and IPART officials admitting that they had been influenced by economists' views of
what is a superior measure of 'real' income as argued by economists. An hypothetical
critical theory transformation of the ACCC and other regulators may take the direction
of recognition of their 'true' aims and formation of the 'correct' view that may explicitly
recognise that they can achieve regulation and greater efficiency and effectiveness. In
achieving these ‘aims’ and ‘views’ the regulators might seriously question the use of
DORC.

One can agree with the aim of critical theory to promote self-criticism and selfconsciousness that must precede a successful process of emancipation and
enlightenment. However, undue emphasis on this process may result in too narrow a
view of the causes of the problem. The historical roots of the current social order of
economic rationalisation should be explained.

The use of DORC may be a political

solution to a regulation problem.
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There is an argument here which supports the view that incremental or marginalist
economics dominate the ACCC, IPART and ORG, therefore researchers should not be
limited to a paradigm of structuralist functionalism which supports this form of
rationalism.

An interpretative critical theory view of research linked to action

emancipates accounting to action (change) and a wider enterprise of social philosophy.
This legitimises the requirement of describing and discussing the implications of what is
proposed rather than neglecting this role. Why should accounting researchers not
accept this outcome of change instead of defaulting to other social scientists to consider
the implications of the adoption of DORC for regulatory purposes? Mackintosh’s
(1999) view is that each paradigm looks at different aspects or facets of institutions.
Perhaps the ‘ultimate paradigm’ exists in the relationship between the dominant
institutions, the ACCC and state regulatory bodies such as IPART, and dependent
institutions such as AGLGN.

Organisational ‘domains’ and ‘fields’
Powell and DiMaggio (1991) refer to formal and informal networks, linking a collective
definition of a set of organisations as an ‘industry’ and as the ‘structuration’ of
organisational fields.

The commitment of organisations to supporting, policing or

setting policy towards the ‘industry’ has the effect of institutionalisation of
organisational forms.

With the emergence of the development in organisational

sociology of the concepts of ‘domains’ and ‘fields’, key questions arise regarding how
field boundaries are defined and how the institutionalising and structuring of
organisational fields are determined. The consideration of these concepts leads to the
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concept of institutional logic. Friedland (1991) suggests the use of institutional logic as
constructed through institutionalised practices and historical experiences that construct
normative models of organisational legitimacy. DiMaggio (1988) calls for a synthesis
of political and institutional approaches as, he argues, without politics it is not possible
to explain the sources of either institutionalisation or deinstitutionalisation.

The

understanding of the institutional logic of an organisation, its relation with other
organisations within the ‘industry’ and the effect of political forces in changing the
‘culture’ of the organisation leads to the recognition that the organisation migrates into
another field and assumes a different relationship with the ‘industry’.

The contradictions apparent in the IPART regulatory decision include setting prices at
the maximum with a possible result being that AGLGN may have difficulty in
achieving the regulated sales volume. AGLGN tried to impose this pricing regime on
the new entrant to the post-decision market, Eastern Gas Pipeline, their main NSW
competitor.

The political motivation of State political leaders is that of a

determination to maximize the proceeds from the sale of utilities to the private sector.
This is a process that has become part of the culture of those arms of the Public
Sector that administer it.

The method of analysis undertaken is rational deductive and uses an analytical case
study approach to analyse and interpret in a practical way the recent regulatory
decision by IPART in respect of AGLGN. An analysis of subsequent events follows,
including AGLGN’s defense of the regulated pricing regime.

By this research
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approach, it is hoped to achieve a methodological triangulation of the research
process.

Information Sources
In this study a variety of information sources have been examined:
•

the social political welfare economic approach adopted by early
economists such as George (1879), Fisher (1906) and Hicks (1939) in
their research into income and capital

•

The recommendations of the Hilmer (1992), Committee to the
government that were largely ignored.

•

the dominance of economists’ views in relation to the Present Value of
Future Cash Flows as accepted for regulatory purposes and hardly
questioned by the regulator, and

•

The history of accounting attempts in pursuit of change towards Current
Cost Accounting and the private sector rejection of change.

There is 'hard' information contained in published annual accounts and final decisions,
'soft' information contained in excerpts from many sources. This study accepts that it is
important to recognise the social role of accounting and that this requires an
interpretative view of accounting actions. Incremental economics and economic
rationalism appear to have a strong domination of the decisions made by regulators.
Critical theory potentially emancipates action and presents the possibility of a wider
social philosophy.

This conclusion of a wider enterprise of social philosophy

emancipates in that it opens the way to examine what is and leave the implications of
these results to the social scientists.
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Operationalising the study
The research methods employed in this study can be grouped into broad data categories.
Thus, in Laughlin's terms (Table 1) this research is characterised by having a skeletal or
ill-defined theory. The approach to data is essentially qualitative, although the use of a
variety of data sources, the scope of the data collection and the interaction gives the
research an empirical content.

This process leads to the possibility of radical

recommendations for change, but also the possibility that the process may lead to a
change in this researcher’s view of an 'ideal world' and qualified acceptance of the
status quo.
An interesting result of the understanding achieved through Laughlin’s ‘lens’ approach
is that the direction of this research inquiry positions itself in the area described by
Laughlin as high/medium/medium. Table 1, has been reproduced on the next page from
Laughlin's Figure 1; ‘Methodological themes: Empirical research in accounting and a
case for “middle-range” thinking’7 .

7

University of Sheffield, published in the AAAJ Volume 8, Issue 1).
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Table 2 - Laughlin’s Key Characteristics of the dominant schools of thought.

High/high Low*
Theory
Characteristics
Ontological
belief
Role of theory

Generalisable
world
Waiting to be
discovered
Definable theory
with hypothesis
to test

Methodological
characteristics;
Role of observer
and human
nature belief
Nature of method

Observer
independent and
irrelevant

Data sought

Cross-sectional
data used usually
at one point in
time and
selectively
gathered tied to
hypothesis
Tight
conclusions
about findings

Conclusions
derived

Validity criteria
Change
Characteristics

Structured,
quantitative
method

Medium/medium
medium*
“Skeletal”
generalizations
possible

Low/low
Low*
Generalisation
may not be there
to be discovered

“Skeletal” theory
with some broad
understanding of
relationships
Observer
important and
always part of
the process of
discovery
Definable
approach but
subject to
refinement in
actual situations,
invariably
quantitative
Longitudinal,
case study based.
Heavily
descriptive but
also analytical

Ill-defined theory
– no prior
hypothesis

Reasonably
conclusive tied to
“skeletal” theory
and empirical
richness
Statistical
Meanings:
inference
researcher and
researched
Low emphasis on Medium
changing the
emphasis open
status quo
to radical change
and maintenance
of the status quo

Observer
important and
always part of
the process of
discovery
Unstructured, illdefined,
qualitative
approach

Longitudinal,
case study based.
Heavily
descriptive.

Ill-defined and
inconclusive but
empirically rich
in detail
Meanings
researched
Low emphasis on
changing the
status quo.

*Theory
methodology
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The theory dimension
This high/medium/medium positioning of research implies a well-developed framework
of theory to be discussed. The arguments for the adoption of DORC are well entrenched
with the regulators in Australia. Opposing arguments are also well established by
researchers in finance; however, these opposing views are not accepted by the ACCC.
In this study, contributions from finance researchers are supported rather than developed
and so agreeing with Laughlin that this makes the current investigation and inclusion of
these theories supportive of their truth rather than the researcher disputing such theory.
In terms of Laughlin’s ‘lens’ regarding the ‘theory’ dimension, this approach
corresponds with Laughlin’s view that a ‘high’ level of theorizing is occurring:
On the “theory” dimension we can express the amalgam of concern in
relation to the level of prior theorizing and prior theories that can legitimately
be brought to the empirical investigation. This links to ontological
assumptions about the nature of the world we are investigating and our views
about its materiality as well as its generality of representation through
previous theoretical endeavours. High levels of prior theorizing are indicative
of an assumed material world (which exists distinct from the observers’
projections and bias), which, despite empirical variety, has high levels of
generality and order and has been well researched through previous studies.
The current investigation becomes little more than an additional incremental
study in the great general theoretical design which has been unfolding over
maybe centuries of time. As such the detail and diversity of the empirical
focus is not as important to confirm the well-developed theory which is
brought to the investigation. (1995, p.64)
The previous theoretical endeavours that have been accepted are mainly the
finance/economists’ theory that when a revenue stream is regulated to ensure that a
return equal to a predetermined rate (i.e., the WACC) on the assets and these assets are
valued at DORC, this DORC valuation of the assets is equal to the present value of the
income stream. Thus as the researcher, I have identified the level of theorizing as being
in the high to medium range within Laughlin’s classification.

69

I recognize the necessity to engage in self-reflection as to why this topic has been
chosen. It is the understanding of the radical nature of the adoption of DORC, for the
setting of prices, not only in the utility sector, but in a modified form, more widely at all
levels of the pricing of government services. Reflexivity gives insight into the approach
that has been adopted as having origins in a personal brief originating in a concern for
social welfare and being convinced of the central role of accounting systems in the
social fabric of society. This social welfare approach has fashioned my research
approach taking a broad sweep.

The ‘methodology’ dimension
The ‘methodology’ dimension relates to theoretical closure on the methods of
investigation. In describing the methodology dimension Laughlin suggests that, among
other attributes, it defines the ‘set of spectacles’ that the researcher brings to the task of
observation. The extreme points of the range of possibilities range from ‘high’, where
Laughlin (1995, p67), considers that the observer is largely irrelevant to the process and
his or her subjectivity or bias, which at the furthermost extreme are assumed not to
exist, plays no part in the process. At the ‘low’ end of this continuum, on the other
hand, the individual observer is permitted and encouraged to be free to be involved in
the observation process completely uncluttered by theoretical rules and regulations on
what is to be seen and how the ‘seeing’ is to be undertaken. My approach is that of a
management accountant with concern for social welfare as well as regard for the worth
of the iterative processes of managerial reports. This self-reflection is ‘cluttered’ and
does affect ‘seeing’ placing my ‘set of spectacles’ in the middle range of observers.
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The variety of approaches taken range from an epistemological analysis of the notion of
DORC to an ontological approach in relation to the various reports that have been
published. These include:
•

a survey of the history of Current Cost Accounting

•

a discussion of the equivalences between the determination of income as the
Present Value of future cash flows compared with accounting reported
profit (ARP)

•

the analysis of the Tariff Equation,

•

a descriptive discussion of a case study of a recent decision

•

analysis of the ‘political’ nature of standards setting.

These are some of the aspects of the research area that I have viewed as critical to an
understanding of the use of DORC. It reflects the overall managerial accounting
approach of the writer and preparedness to consider the economists’ approach as well as
recognizing the implications of the practicalities of the decision on the various interest
groups.

The reliance on published information as sources for the research work has virtually
excluded interactive discourse. The exceptions were open meetings of IPART and the
ACCC where researchers and customers gave expression to their opposition to DORC.
This has been reported in the AGLGN case study. However, there is a need to explore
beyond the theoretical boundaries of the debate. The research area is one of such
complexity that this study has only scratched the surface and more needs to be done.
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While the sources used in this research were mainly published documents, the range of
these sources may assist in explicitly recognizing that the current adoption of DORC by
regulators does not advance their regulatory objective.

The Change dimension
Laughlin’s final choice dimension relates to the ‘Change’ dimension. In the area in
which the research is being undertaken, events are moving quickly so that the decision
that has been criticized in this research may have been superseded by external events.
These events relate to the arrival of competition and or regulatory failure to arrive at a
compromise with a company over pricing policy. The change dimension considers the
level of emphasis given to criticism of the status quo. The history of past decisions by
the regulators has produced the present regulatory outcome whereby their intervention
in the market for gas transmission networks is not seen as a success by interested
parties, customers among them. Perhaps the regulators have been captured by the wave
of economic rationalism over the past decade. The trading environment for gas and
electricity has experienced substantial change following an international trend towards
privatisation fuelled by demands for greater efficiency and the goal of competition. The
regulatory process is a valid intervention in the case of a company exerting market
power. The control exerted over the debate by economists, essentially taking a rational
approach is not concerned to evaluate outcomes, i.e., the impact of ‘Lost Load’ as a
result of excessive prices.

This seems to point to the inadequacy of economic rationalism as a guiding principle in
regulation. The main error by the regulators has been in establishing DORC as the
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valuation base, ignoring the other possible valuation bases. IPART’s Final Decision
Access Arrangement for AGLGN (2000, Chapter 5), includes a valuation of the
regulatory assets mid-way between the previous ‘agreed values” and the final DORC
value placed on the assets by AGLGN. The immediate result has been the bestowing of
bonuses8 on the regulated companies. The regulators need to adopt the normal
commercial practice of monitoring and audit. Such monitoring would not be considered
a non-rational change but would reveal the extent of monopoly profits, if any. Part of
the difficulty lies in the fact that DORC valuations are not brought into the books of
companies and there is no requirement that the ‘regulated’ sector of the company should
maintain separate accounts. Contamination with other businesses owned by the
company make the trading results of the regulated sector impossible to identify.
However, it is within the power of the regulators to demand information as they see fit.

The politicisation of DORC as the valuation base
It can be argued that the adoption of DORC by regulators has been subject to a political
process before being accepted as the regulatory valuation model. This is not surprising
as there is ample evidence to demonstrate that attempts at accounting standard setting
go through a process seen as one of finding compromise between competing groups
before gaining approval. DORC is not an accounting standard and is unlikely to
become one; however, the use of this valuation notion is given a determining role in the
regulation of major utilities.

In the historical evolution of changes to accounting

standards resulting from inflation, the debate has been an historical and a political
process. Because of the existence of many different groups who have different interests
8

Bonuses refers to the difference between previous ‘agreed’ values for assets compared to the regulated
‘DORC’ values.
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in relation to accounting data, accounting standard setting has become politicised and a
process of finding compromises between different groups of people.

Watts and Zimmerman (1990) found that self-interested pressure groups operate to
influence the choice of accounting standards. Whittington (1985), discussing the
relationship between the theoretical and the research role, found that accounting reports
have economic consequences which affect different groups differently and in so doing
bring accounting into the political sphere.

The examples of political pressures from the past that have been exercised in order to
adopt Current Cost Accounting, in the first instance, then abandon it when it proved
politically unacceptable show how fragile acceptance can be and how easily voided.
The Commonwealth Government has adopted Deprival Value and this means that
Replacement Cost is used for the valuation of government assets. Admitting that
government and the regulators have been influenced by economists' views of a 'superior'
measure of ‘real' income, say, from Treasury would be revealing of the extent of
domination.

Conclusion
Positioning the research within Laughlin’s ‘middle range’ thinking is suited to the wide
range of data sources examined. It allows for an analytical and interpretative view of
texts and recognition of the rhetoric of discourses taking place between decision makers
and interested parties.
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The texts examined have raised many questions. Some of these are:
•

the rhetoric of legal prose, its exclusiveness and Text-as-meaning

•

discourse analysis and the culture of interested parties

•

the contribution of finance mathematicians

•

the encroachment of ideas, and

•

Finally the need for ‘thinking’ about the problem.

The following chapter, (chapter 3) discusses the history of Current Cost Accounting
within the accounting profession and defines Depreciated Optimised Replacement Cost
(DORC). In examining the interest in CCA, an attempt is made to explain why CCA
developed so widely. The CCA debate provides background, language, concepts, and a
history of DORC. The regulatory debate has been captured by financial economics
rather than accounting. Net present value (NPV) has been recognized as the theoretical
basis for tariff regulation/asset valuation in the context of tariff setting. The conceptual
basis for the regulatory formulae, net present value (NPV), is examined and considers
the definitions of income derived by accounting theorists such as [Edwards Kay and
Mayer, 1987, Peasnell, 1982, Johnstone 2002] etc. A consensual definition and nuances
of meaning are sought. In examining accounting choices with regard to valuation
method it became clear that Deprival Value has been endorsed by the Commonwealth
Government in implementing its Accounting reforms within the Public Sector.

When the DORC debate began there was no rationale for its adoption by the regulators.
The regulators looked to Accounting for a valuation model for infrastructure assets.
Their intent in looking to accounting was to find legitimacy for the adoption and use of
DORC. While DORC is not likely to become an accounting standard, it has been
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accepted by regulators as a defensible valuation model. The energy regulators have
adopted DORC and they have rejected DV for the reason that DV includes, as one of its
outcomes, recoverable or realiseable value. In the gas transmission business the term
‘recoverable’ cost, frequently means the ‘sunk’ cost of the asset.

The regulators search for theoretical justification for the adoption of DORC was
satisfied by theories advanced by Financial Economists has meant that the Accounting
literature became irrelevant. The use of DORC for the valuation of assets is not justified
by the Accounting Literature.
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Chapter 3
History of Current Cost Accounting within the accounting profession

Introduction
The background to the development of current cost accounting (CCA) was in response
to criticisms of accounting reports as failing to adequately report on financial results
during periods of changing prices, i.e., inflationary conditions. The needs of managers
to be informed about business outcomes in order to make rational decisions were not
met by historic cost (HC) accounting reports. This connection between accounting
reports and rationality in decision making is crucial to an understanding of the reasons
for the movement towards the development of accounting principles that provided an
improved financial scorecard of performance. At the core of the wide-ranging debate
was reliance on the monetary unit for the measurement of transactions and events.
Individual goods and services exhibit volatility in times of changing prices.

The

monetary unit is unstable. The CCA debate provides background, language and
concepts that are relevant to the history of the development of DORC as a basis of
financial measurement.

When the DORC debate began there was no rationale for the adoption of this valuation
concept and regulators looked to Accounting for a valuation model to find legitimacy
for the adoption and use of DORC for infrastructure assets. Regulators began to learn
about Finance Economics and discovered that DORC may be used as a surrogate for the
NPV of a business in some circumstances, notwithstanding the subjectivity of DORC
and the problems of securing verifiable valuations for assets when valued at DORC.
77

This adoption of DORC by Finance Economics meant that regulators assigned the
Accounting literature and the hundred years of debate surrounding the adoption of
current cost accounting to irrelevance.

A consequence of this has been that the

arguments in favour of the adoption of DORC supersede the old literature on CCA. As
well, the accounting reported results are not given status as evidence of the results of
regulatory decisions, good or bad, and this is surely a loss to interested parties. The
natural course of events is that regulatory decisions result in setting price levels that
translate into money that is eventually recorded in the double entry accounting system
of the regulated company. The nexus between regulatory decisions and financial results
is critical in evaluating outcomes of decision-making. Because of the critical nature of
financial results there is an imperative to examine DORC against the arguments for and
against its nearest manifestation as an accounting principle, i.e., CCA. The reasons why
CCA failed as a generally accepted accounting principle are relevant to the arguments
against the use of DORC. Support for CCA as an accounting system for a major utility
has come from the ACCC, through the Department of Finance within the
Commonwealth Government. The ACCC (2003), seeking to improve the financial
reporting of Telstra, have issued a paper “Accounting Separation Regimes”, and request
contributions from interested parties to the problems involved in the preparation of
CCA based annual reports. ACCC are exploring the advantages of CCA for reporting
purposes in an endeavor to better understand the costs Telstra faces as an ongoing
sustainable business.

The failure to examine the financial consequences of regulatory decisions is a serious
criticism of decisions based on DORC. In addition, DORC as a valuation concept is
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unauditable. This study recognizes that regulators in adopting DORC as a valuation
principle have endorsed some of the ideas that gave rise to the CCA debate. CCA is a
thoroughly articulated system of accounting that offers transparency and perdurability to
accounting reports. If the regulators were to implement the accounting rules of CCA,
then there would be significant feedback provided to decision-makers.

The tradition of Historic Cost for the valuation of assets
Traditionally accountants have valued assets at historic cost (HC) and expensed that
cost over the useful life of the asset. Whittington (1983) refers to Historic Cost (HC), as
the traditional method of accounting which is associated with the idea of stewardship accounting for actual amounts paid. Accounting theory offers a number of different
valuation concepts; Whittington gives an excellent discussion of each of the major
valuation bases:
Each is of potential relevance in particular circumstances; hence it is natural
to consider an approach to valuation which makes use of all three 'pure'
current valuation bases, selected according to their relative values for the
assets concerned. This is the basis known variously as 'value-to-the-owner',
'opportunity value', or 'deprival value', which we shall refer to by the first of
these names (1983, p.35).
The accounting policy of HC has often led to uneven profit results and in times of
inflation it has been claimed the use of HC has over-reported profits with the dual
consequences that taxes payable have been higher than if the ‘true’ profit was reported
and dividends have been overgenerous. In order to understand this problem it is
necessary to examine the notions of ‘capital’ and ‘income’ and the various alternative
accounting systems that have received the most support from researchers over the last
century.
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The use of Return on Investment as a performance measure
A notion held by the public is that accountants produce financial results and published
accounts that are ‘facts’. It is held that there is nothing to dispute when a profit is
announced. Few shareholders peruse published accounts of companies even ones they
hold shares in, relying on accounting processes and the independent audit report. The
popularity of a single figure profit number is well established. Return on Investment
(ROI), is a ratio that is derived from the profit figure and enjoys popularity in describing
the performance of a company. Simple division and multiplication are used to find a
value for this ROI ratio. However that is where simplicity ends as every change in the
numerator and in the denominator produces a different ROI.

If shareholders and the

market are sensitive to the size of the ROI and of course ‘Bigger is Better’, then any
interference is likely to be directed at making the ROI a bigger number.

Regulation of utilities, centers around rewarding the monopoly provider of gas or
electricity with a return equal to the ‘opportunity’ cost of capital. In capital markets the
‘opportunity’ cost of capital is commonly represented as being the Weighted Average
Cost of Capital (WACC). The regulators, in making regulatory decisions, have agreed
to the WACC as representing a rate of return accepted by capital markets as adequate
reward to utility owners.

WACC is a term that has meaning in Capital markets as

being the annual amount that a company that pays company tax would need to earn on a
new investment project in order to justify their investment. Consequently, when
regulators agree on the size of the WACC they are agreeing on the size of the
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Company’s ROI. A full discussion on the topic of weighted average cost of capital
(WACC) is outside the terms of this study.

Going back one step in the multiplication and division exercise described earlier, ROI is
directly related to the profit earned and the value placed on the assets as the
denominator. A regulated monopoly, given approval to achieve an ROI equal to the
WACC understands that if the value of the regulated assets is increased, then the
maximum allowed revenues able to raised from customers will be regulated at a higher
level than if the value placed on the regulated assets is lower.

The primary or predominant notion inherent in the valuation base called Depreciated
Optimised Replacement Cost (DORC) is the notion of Replacement Cost for the
valuation of assets. The adoption of DORC as a valuation base invariably increases the
value of assets. Since many of the gas transmission assets are ‘sunk’, the use of DORC
as a valuation base results in a substantial upwards revaluation.

RC as a valuation principle is embedded in Current Cost Accounting
Under the Historic Cost (HC) principle, accountants have the tradition of recording
purchases of assets at the sum of money used to pay for them. When purchase price is
used to record the value of the asset in the books of the business this amount is called
the ‘Historic Cost’ of the asset. The adoption of replacement cost (RC) for the valuation
of assets has gained popularity, but not acceptance, by business and the Accounting
Profession, as a way of handling the impact of the almost continuous inflation
experienced by many countries. Inflation has meant that the original cost of assets has
become further and further removed from the cost of replacement with a similar asset.
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The assets, land and buildings, frequently experience the most dramatic shifts in value
in times of inflation. Under the rules of CCA, recognising these changes would be
achieved by increasing the book value of the asset to the market valuation, and crediting
the increase or difference to a special reserve account, ‘Asset Revaluation Reserve
Account’.

19th Century views of income and wealth.
Earliest records of manufacturing and farming show that the distinction between wealth
and income was poorly understood. Wealth and Income were frequently described as
capital and labour. Economists such as George (1879) wrote in 'Progress and Poverty’
of the essentially political nature of the debate:
The ideas that there is a necessary conflict between capital and labour, that
machinery is an evil, that competition must be restrained and interest
abolished, that wealth may be created by the issue of money, that it is the duty
of government to furnish capital or to furnish work, are rapidly making way
among the great body of the people who keenly feel a hurt and are sharply
conscious of a wrong. Such ideas… cannot be successfully combated until
political economy shall give some answer to the great question which shall be
consistent with all her teachings and shall commend itself to the perceptions
of the great masses of men (1879, p.56).
The final sentence in the above passage shows the writers human response in grappling
with ideas and issues relevant to the political economy, income, competition, and
capital. Although George was famous in his time, a better remembered thinker is the
American economist Fisher (1906), one of the first scientists in America coming from
mathematics to economics. He was perplexed as to how to write his dissertation, since
his educational background had been primarily in mathematics and economics. He
solved this problem by combining both disciplines. Fisher built a remarkable machine
equipped with pumps, wheels, levers and pipes in order to illustrate his prices theory for
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his 1892 dissertation at Yale. He has been described as one of the earliest American
Neoclassicists of unusual mathematical sophistication.

It is in relation to Fisher’s

writings about the pure theory of income that we shall be concerned because he used the
discounted value of future cash flows as a measure of wealth.

His theory of income,

first published in 1906, frequently cited, was a measure of personal income in terms of
personal consumption and grounded in welfare economics.

Fisher’s ‘income’ or

‘earnings’ concept, was adopted by (Canning, 1929) for measurement of profit and loss
of a business.

20th Century views of Hicks
However (Hicks, 1939)’s view of income is the most frequently quoted;
that amount of income that a ‘man’ may dispose of and be as well off at the
end of a week as at the beginning.
Whittington (1981) describes three versions of Hicksian income. These three
versions were published originally published by Hicks in Value and Capital.
Hicks 1:
income No. 1 is …the maximum amount which can be spent during a period
if there is to be an expectation of maintaining intact the capital value of
prospective receipts (in money terms).
income No. 2 is…the maximum amount the individual can spend this week,
and still be able to spend the same amount in each ensuing week,
income No.3 is…the maximum amount of money which the individual can
spend this week and still expect to be able to spend the same amount in real
terms in each ensuing week. (1939, Chapter 14)
In considering the above ex ante concepts it is necessary to consider how closely each
view of income can be matched by accounting measures of value and thus from that,
measures of income. Accountants have in general favoured Hick’s first definition of
income:
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income is the maximum amount which can be spent during a period if there is
to be an expectation of maintaining intact the capital value of prospective
receipts (in money terms).
Edwards Kay and Mayer (1987) challenge the usefulness of the above Hicksian
definition's relevance to answering the questions that investors, analysts, regulators and
economists are most interested in. The Hicksian concept of income is relevant
concerning the level of distribution that can be maintained i.e., permanent income
streams. Edwards Kaye and Mayer (1987) maintain that it is not relevant to answering
questions about expansion or contraction of a firm or industry or about the relationship
between returns being earned in different sectors.
The importance of Value to the Owner
Whittington (1994) argues that the British contribution has supported the view that
capital maintenance is defined in terms of general purchasing power, and that the use of
replacement cost for valuation purposes is usually justified on the grounds that it will
typically represent the ‘value to the owner’ or ‘opportunity cost’ of the assets.
Heightened debate surrounding problems of accounting for rising prices in a period of
high inflation resulted in the British Government setting up a Committee of Inquiry.
The Sandilands Committee report (1975) was presented to Government but was never
adopted as the Government offered tax relief as a means to adjust the income of
companies affected by high inflation. However, logical steps were established and
accepted as true by accountants and others as to the rational actions or decisions of a
manager when faced with a range of different circumstances. The Sandilands
Committee recommended that fixed assets and stock were to be valued at 'value to the
business' (VB), or Value-to-the owner (VO), or deprival value (DV), which the
Committee attributed to a concept that originated from the writings of Bonbright (1937).
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Valuation of Property - Bonbright et al., The Sandilands report
Bonbright’s (1937) definition of value to the owner is as follows:
The value of a property to its owner is identical in amount with the adverse
value of the entire loss, direct and indirect, that the owner might expect to
suffer if he were to be deprived of the property (1937, p. 606).
The Sandilands (1975) report recommended the adoption of a VB approach to the
valuation of fixed assets and extended it to include ‘economic value’ which is Net
Present Value:
Assets should be shown at their ‘value to the business’. In the majority of
cases this will be their written down current replacement cost (or current
purchase price) but may in some cases be their net realisable value or
‘economic value’ (1975, p. 97).
And further:
The value of an asset to a company is its written down current replacement
cost (current purchase price), except in situations where the written down
current replacement cost is higher than both the 'economic value' and the net
realisable value in which case the value of the asset to the company is the
'economic value' or the net realisable value, whichever is the higher (1975,
p.112).
Thus RC would be the valuation base in the typical situation, in which a firm holds an
asset for future use within the business. The Sandilands Committees views were
revolutionary because they recommended a change in the valuation base from historic
cost to the new current value basis, flatly rejected the use of general price indices and
questioned the usefulness of the idea of general price level adjustments.
The Sandilands ‘Rankings’, as the above algorithms of company asset values have been
called, attempt to show the rankings to be applied in order to establish the VB:
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Table 3 - Sandilands Rankings

Sandilands rankings
Asset in Use

Decision context

Decision rule

Valuation rule

1
2
3
Asset in trade
4
5
Asset divesture
6

PV > RC > NRV
PV > NRV > RC
RC > PV > NRV

Use and replace
Use and replace
Use, do not replace

RC
RC
PV

NRV > PV >RC
NRV > RC > PV

Sell, replace, sell, replace RC
Sell, replace, sell, replace RC

RC > NRV > PV

Sell, do not replace

NRV

The decision rule should be consistent with the wealth maximising rule.

Sandilands (1975), in Chapter 13 makes recommendations for an initial standard of
Current Cost Accounting as follows:
The two adjustments required to the historic cost profit and loss account to
reflect the 'value to the business' of assets consumed are described; these are
the 'cost of sales adjustment' and an adjustment to relate the depreciation
charge for the year to the year-end valuation of fixed assets.
Recommendations are made for the treatment of trade investments and for the
retention of certain historic cost figures by way of a note to the accounts.
(1975, Para. 558).
Wright writing in 1965 expanded this concept of Value-to-the-owner by defining asset
values as “opportunity” values for inventories as follows:
Inventories:
1. For profitable items the opportunity value is:
Replacement Cost on condition that sales are limited by demand,
Net realisable value if sales are limited by supply and
2. For unprofitable or discontinued items the opportunity value is net
realisable value (1965, p. 154).
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The contribution of Wright was that he linked the role that demand plays in the
determination of value-to-the-owner.

Value to the Firm theory: Gee and Peasnell
Gee and Peasnell (1976), re-examine the defense of replacement cost provided by value
to the firm (VF) theory. Their difficulty with the deprival principle is that it may on
occasion point to the discounted present value of an asset as being VF of that asset.
They argue that the main purpose of using the VF approach is to avoid using PV and to
provide a means of choosing between entry and exit market prices.

Gee and Peasnell (1976), reconcile VF approaches which rely on PV and entry and exit
prices for individual assets. They examine the Parker and Harcourt (1969), rule of VF
whereby VF = RC, except where RC>PV or RC< NRV.
In the valuation of fixed assets to the firm Gee and Peasnell find that the
maximum loss a firm sustains when it loses a fixed asset which is worth replacing is the
cost of replacing it (1976 p.243).

They examine the six possible cases, using their Sandilands rankings9 and applying their
valuation rule:
•

In respect of Case 2 where NRV>RC >PV, suppose the lowest RC for A is to
purchase B where RC > NRV, i.e. the opposite of Case 2; then hold B and thus
A could either be replaced with another for sale or asset B for use.

9

Gee and Peasnell agree with the Sandilands Committee’s assessment of the rational action of managers
and identify the six cases as follows: Case 1, where NRV> PV>RC. Case 2, NRV>RC>PV. Case 3,
PV>RC>NRV, Case 4, PV>NRV>RC, Case 5, RC>PV>NRV, Case 6 RC>NRV>PV.
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•

If A or B then: A provided, [NRV - RC] - [PV - RC for B] at time of
replacement. Cases 1, 2, and 4, where NRV > RC are all likely to be extremely
rare. Case 5 RC > PV >NRV is where Fixed Assets are frequently immovableperhaps sunk and consequently NRV may well be negative, even though PV is
positive. If NRV is used to value the firm, asset may have a negative value.
Clearly an absurd situation.

•

Cases 3 and 5 differ only in their relative rankings of PV and RC, in cases, PV
and RC are in excess of NRV.

If assets were to be valued at NRV, the process is costly and open to manipulation. The
problems of aggregation are found at the group level, the individual level and at the
component level. The answer may be to value at that level that maximises total NRV.
The market may be thin and also open to income manipulation. A firm could 'increase'
NRV for end-period assets by searching for best market price. There is no 'given' net
resale price; hence it is difficult to see what NRV 'market validation' means.

The above concepts are important because they establish the connections between the
Accounting system of CCA, RC and the relevance of DV. Many writers dismiss the
importance of the capital maintenance rule in relation to the underpinnings of DORC;
however this concept has been in the minds of regulators in their support of RC. It is
considered that while the business should earn income that compensates them for risk,
they should also be in position to replace assets when required.

The physical maintenance concept and CCA
Ma and Mathews (1989) describe CCA, as:
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An example of the physical capital maintenance is the co-called current cost
accounting (CCA) system. Capital is viewed as a physical phenomenon that
is it is measured in terms of the physical properties of the assets and their
capacity to produce goods and services. Changes in asset values which do not
represent changes in physical capacity are not treated as income. The capital
at the beginning of the year that is to be maintained is the firm’s productive
capacity (1989, p. 482).
They describe one of the principal purposes of current cost accounting as being to
derive a measure of income that may be distributed while maintaining operating and
hence financial stability.

They describe CCA as a physical capital maintenance

concept. This may refer to the physical assets themselves or to the firm’s operating
capacity.
Ma and Matthews:
The physical maintenance concept is based on a valuation philosophy which
limits distributable income to an amount that will not impair the maintenance
of the firm’s operating capacity and hence the continuity of its production
process. Since the system objective is to maintain the operating capability of
the firm, the appropriate valuation base for the assets in normal
circumstances is replacement cost (1989 p. 605).
The authors point out that when trading conditions change such replacement may not be
appropriate and in such circumstances market selling price more clearly represents the
value-to-the-business of an asset. They consider that identifying the stage at which it is
appropriate to change the valuation base represents a seemingly intractable problem.
The use of long run profit concept provides more useful information on the efficiency
and effectiveness of their operations; hence the replacement basis of valuation is
preferred.
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Gee and Peasnell (1976) discuss a ‘transcendent value’ concept in relation to the
Sandilands rankings and argue that if an asset is in service it can only be because in
management's eyes its PV >NRV. It is not possible to say what management thinks
concerning the PV/RC relationship for an asset and there is no opinion unless
replacement is contemplated. The irony is that in cases where PV >NRV -replacement
would not be contemplated. Thus RC instead of PV etc. RC valuation rests a RC
valuation rule. Then PV subjectivity of estimates disappears - all but the few assets
covered by footnote are valued at RC. Gee and Peasnell repeat their argument because
they fear being misunderstood:
All that is being asserted here is that if the assets of a going concern are to be
valued on a deprival value basis, then there is much more to be said for
adhering to replacement cost as approximations to deprival values well-nigh
irrespective of PV or NRV of the asset being valued (1976, p.247).
In addressing problems of aggregation, if all assets except outmoded stock are to be
valued at RC then the effect on the total asset position will be to overstate the value of
the assets. And the overstatement will be larger the more fixed assets have values in
excess of their NRV's; i.e. 'sunk' assets.

Problems of forecasting future cash flows are inherent and the additional problem also
arises of how to adjust the forecast flows for risk. This involves management in
determining how the firm's cash flows will co-vary with the market, and how investors
will 'price' these co-variations (estimates of which must be obtained from share price
data already 'contaminated' by the market's growth expectations). Hence the total PV of
the firm should be viewed as the market's task, or at least as lying outside the
boundaries of financial accounting. Gee and Peasnell:
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The notion of market validation views the excess of Total PV over VF Sum,
i.e. where VF Sum < Total PV, as the extent to which management's
expectations have not been converted into wealth....
Further,
aggregations of the Values to the firm of individual assets are themselves
subject to difficulties of interpretation. Moreover, use of RC will help in
recalculation of Total PV; no one analysing a firm believed to have a VF sum
substantially in excess of its (conjectural) total PV will believe that firm to be
overachieving when it is persistently reporting the subnormal returns
associated with Case 5 (Assets revalued at RC in excess of PV, thus
increasing the denominator of a return on capital while depressing, through
higher depreciation, the numerator of that return) (1976, p.248).
RC is the PV of an asset in the majority of (detectable) cases, while value to the firm is
the transcendent value concept to which RC relates. However, the value to the firm of
an asset should not be confused with the present value of the investment opportunity in
which the asset is to be used. The assumption is that the asset will continue to be used as
before and the resulting asset values can be used to evaluate the efficiency of the firm
whereas PV measures cannot be used for this purpose. In all cases (except Case 6), RC
is the closest objective (i.e. market validated) measure of the VF of its assets.

Economic income and aspects of accounting reported profits
The following arguments represent the ideas contained in the seminal publication of the
Cambridge economists, Edwards, Kay and Mayer (1987), who made a major
contribution to the debate about the areas of overlay between ‘economic’ profit (EP),
and Accounting Reported Profit (ARP). They begin their analysis by taking the practical
view of an investor towards an investment:
In general the way to appraise investments is by discounting the net cash
flows generated by an investment using as discount rate the measure of the
opportunity cost of the funds tied up in the project, and comparing the
resulting with the initial cost of the investment - the net present value
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approach. In some cases it is possible to make optimal investment decisions
by calculating the discount rate at which an investment has a zero net present
value - which is known as the internal rate of return n - and comparing it with
a measure of the opportunity cost of funds (1987, p.12-14).
The discount rate at which an investment has a zero net present value is called the
Internal Rate of Return (IRR). If accountants were able to determine this IRR when
determining profit then Edwards Kaye and Mayer (1987) maintain that the ARP would
be equal to the IRR:
If Accounting rate of profit of an activity corresponded to its internal rate of
return, then the use of accounting rates of profit as summary indicators of
performance, to be compared with the opportunity cost of capital, could be
justified (1987, p. 27).
Edwards Kaye and Mayer’s research has been directed at economists’ assessment of
income using discounted cash flows (DCF) and a reconciliation with accounting
reported profits (ARP). Only in exceptional circumstances will the ARP = IRR; i.e.,
when the accounting depreciation charge is computed along the lines described by
"Hotelling" as the change in the present value of remaining net cash flows discounted at
the IRR. In this case IRR must be known. Even using cost of capital instead of IRR to
discount remaining net cash flows, will not yield a depreciation figure such that the
ARP = IRR.

Arrow (1987) uses Hotelling (1925)’s theory of depreciation within a general dynamic
model to explore the concept of depreciation. He describes how in Hotelling Harold,

Here, apparently for the first time, he stated the now generally accepted
definition of depreciation as the decrease in the discounted value of future
returns. This paper was a turning-point both in capital theory proper and in
the reorientation of accounting towards more economically meaningful
magnitudes (1987, p 670).
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Edwards Kaye and Mayer (1987) describe how in the single project case in which a
complete set of accounting data is available then a number of valuable results are
readily available.
1. If ARP is constant for a single project then it =IRR.
2. If the ARP of one project is always > than ARP of another, then the IRR of
former is > than IRR of latter.
3. If ARP > cost of capital then so too is IRR.
4. A weighted average ARP can be defined such that the IRR of the project is
exactly equal to this average ARP (1987, p. 27).
Thus Edwards Kaye and Mayer place emphasis on the investors' point of view and the
superiority of economist’s assessment of income. Many researchers concur that this
measure is superior to accountant’s determination of income. However the problem of
uncertainty regarding future events presents obstacles to the implementation of PV
calculations. Penman (1992) makes a useful criticism of discounted cash flow
assumptions, viewed in many finance texts as inherently superior to accounting reported
income. The calculation of PV:
Has to involve projections to infinity or incorporate an estimate of firm value
at the 'finite' horizon date (1992, p.469).
Barton (1984, p.535-543) evaluates PV accounting in relation to HC accounting and
finds PV deficient because of the following:
•
•
•
•
•

PV relates only to the future: it does not report on actual operations or
measure achieved performance or current market position of the firm. It can
never satisfy the stewardship or legal functions of HC Accounting.
HC accounting will always be used to prepare forecasts of the future for PV
accounting.
PV accounting is almost completely subjective and cannot be verified.
Treating the two systems as alternatives confuses the information required
for decisions with the realised consequences of those decisions.
PV estimates change with changes in expectations about the future. Hence
PV calculations tend to be unstable (1984, p.535-543).

Reliance on future, subjective, market expectations and actual past results, for the
preparation of PV estimates is merely highlighting the problems associated with PV
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calculations. Horngren, Foster and Datar (1999), recognize this particularly when
discussing the use of Accounting Results based on HC as the performance measure used
for the evaluation of managers. They argue that unless an annuity approach is used in
recording the results of project decisions taken using PV techniques that accounting
results using HC will distort the performance of the project. Managers will be averse to
positive NPV projects where the bulk of projected revenues are delayed beyond the
current period. If an annuity approach is taken by the company in determining
profitability, then this aversion may be overcome. However the length of time that
passes between adoption of a project and date of receiving the bulk of revenues adds to
the risk attaching to the reality of actually receiving those revenues and the projected
profits.

Leaders in the debate for change in accounting policies
For most of the years that the debate concerning the adoption of current cost accounting
(CCA) raged, Australian researchers led the debate, however in the last stages of the
CCA debate the UK played out the major leadership role. In the UK and in Australia,
economic and trading conditions in the 70’s were dramatically affected by inflation.
CCA was seen by businesses as an accounting system that mitigated the worst effects of
inflation. However, in the UK, just as the accounting profession was reaching a level of
acceptance about the adoption and use of CCA, the government stepped into the
situation. Businesses were experiencing severe cash flow problems due to inflation and
the government offered tax breaks on new capital investment and working capital. This
pulled the rug on the acceptance by the business community of CCA. Australia had
enjoyed a similar tax reprieve in the 70’s through the Trading Stock Value Adjustment
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(TSVA), and this arrangement was cancelled by the then Liberal Government in mid1979.

CCA in Australia and in the UK
Burrows (1996), writes about events within AARF in the 1970s to bring about
acceptance of CCA. In chapter 8, entitled The Foundation's Gallipoli Burrows traces the
movement to adopt an alternative system, to combat inflation. Based on continuing
interest in alternative accounting measurement systems:
Comparing inflation accounting developments in a range of countries, UK
Professors, David (later Sir David) Tweedie and Geoffrey Whittington
identified a strong Australian tradition associated with the current value
approach. Pre-1974, Russell Mathews, Reg Gynther and Ken Wright were
respected internationally for their contributions to current value
methodology. Tweedie and Whittington also identified another Australian,
Professor Ray Chambers, as a sometime current value advocate.
Subsequently, Chambers had lost faith in current values and turned to exit
(market) values for assets and CPP measures for capital (1995, p. 96).
The Foundations Preliminary Exposure Draft was Accounting for Changes in the
Purchasing Power of money and was hardly altered from the UK's Provisional Standard.
Mitchell produced a preliminary Exposure Draft using current value concepts that
embodied a 'relative price' rather than strictly 'current value' approach. Statement of
Provisional Accounting Standard 'Current Cost Accounting' was issued in October 1976
and excluded monetary items.

Acceptance of the new accounting system proved

difficult and many attempts to gain acceptance were made. In mid-1979 the Trading
Stock Value Adjustment TSVA ceased and while tax and accounting issues were
logically separable, this decision made CCA less attractive to business. Issues and
topics discussed in relation to how they were to be treated under CCA included:
investments in extractive industries, foreign currency translation, consolidated
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statements, intangible assets, tax-effect accounting and non-monetary liabilities, (see
Omnibus Exposure Draft released in March 1980).

Late 1981 the committees appointed to examine economic and taxation implications of
CCA finalised their reports but they were withheld by the project committee. The
March 1980 release in the UK of SSAP 16, Current Cost Accounting, bore marks of
compromise, Pong and Whittington (1996). SSAP16 had ‘value to the business’ as its
valuation base. This was based on deprival value although it did not require an exact
calculation of the asset values. Pong and Whittington describe the reasons for the failure
of SSAP 16, and argue that in 1981 there was 95% compliance with SSAP16 while by
1985 compliance had significantly fallen. Inflation fell from double figures in 1977-81
to around 5%p.a. In March 1982 the Green Paper on Corporation Tax was issued It
dictated that CCA adjustments would not affect taxation because of subjectivity and the
potential for manipulation by taxpayers. Previously the CCA debate was influenced by
the prospect that adoption of CCA might provide a basis for making stock appreciation
relief a permanent feature of the tax system. The government preferred the use of
general indices rather than CCA for tax purposes.

In the UK, Government support during the period of 1980-88 also failed. The price
Commission was abolished and there was adoption of a policy of non-intervention in
business affairs. Whittington writes:
It is notable that the applications of current cost accounting which have
survived the demise of SSAP16 have been mainly in the Public Sector (such
as London underground) or in the recently privatised and regulated sector
(such as water companies and British gas plc) in which CCA still offers
potential advantages in dealing with regulators (1996, p.48).
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The Australian committee agreed that the Australian Standard should resemble SSAP
16 as closely as possible.

A provisional standard CCA package was nearing finality and recommended
supplementary CCA disclosure from 1 July 1978. Late-1979 financial statements, the
first to be subject to this recommendation, resoundingly ignored the CCA disclosure
recommendation. Only five companies produced full CCA accounts, two of which, BP
and Phillips industries, followed their overseas parents practices. Few other firms
provided even minimal CCA data. Burrows describes how the committee's chairman
John Balmford commented:
Business, while wary, took a positive interest [in CCA]... in part...because it
saw...taxation relief as being part of the outcome; the short-lived TVSA was
a welcome sample. But this view rather overlooked the reality that the
Government would be likely to maintain a dollar taxation target to be raised
from the corporate sector and that, while the "taxable income" base might
change, so might the applicable taxation rate. The "relief" might vary as
between different types of business, and some, such as financial institutions,
saw themselves as potentially missing out or even burdened as a result of
having low fixed assets and inventories but high monetary items. Relief from
corporate taxes, while obviously welcome, was never part of the profession's
objective (1996, p. 109).
Monetary items... became the obstacle which seemed to make the whole
approach too difficult to manage. (1995, p. 110)

CCA was later described by Kevin Stevenson as the Foundation's Gallipoli. With its
connotations of huge effort, noble failure and background manipulations by larger
powers, Burrows considers it is an apt description.
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The use of Current Cost Accounting in the UK by regulated utilities
[Whittington, 1994, 1996, Pong and Whittington 1996] discuss the use of CCA by
regulated utility companies, including British Gas, the regional electricity companies
(REC), the water companies. These companies produce full CCA information in
addition to reports based on Historic Cost Accounting Standards, while the private
sector use an ‘uneasy’ mixture of Historic Cost and current values. Most private
companies produce CCA data only as supplementary data. Whittington suggests that
British Gas and other regulated utilities have persisted with CCA as it offers them
potential advantages in dealing with regulators. Their annual reports use Historic Cost
as normal and include some selected revaluations at CCA. In their reports to regulators
utilities such as British Gas (BG) submit CCA reports as additions to their annual
reports. However the Mergers and Monopolies Commission, BG plc, report under the
Gas Act 1986, HMSO, 1997, which acts as an appeal body in the regulatory cases ruled
that these CCA reports did not provide a suitable basis for regulation. Companies had
applied the Deprival Value Rules on an Individual basis. Whittington writes in the
conclusion to a discussion on the role of CCA in regulated utilities:
The sad conclusion for someone who has long advocated a form of current
value accounting for private sector companies, is that current cost and
replacement cost accounting do not have an important role to play in the
current regulatory framework for privatised utilities. Thus, the use of CCA is
not well supported in the very enterprises which have continued to use it. The
unregulated sector, for which a stronger case could be made for the use of
CCA rejected it long ago. One of the factors motivating that rejection was the
removal of the prospective benefits of using CCA as a tax base (Tweedie and
Whittington, 1997). Perhaps the recent evolution of the regulatory framework
away from the use of CCA to determine the regulatory asset base will lead to
the final rejection of CCA by regulated companies (1997, p.15).
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Whittington considers it is likely that the valuations of the RAB will involve the
adjustment of the valuation by indexation, more than likely a general rather than a
specific index. He considers that it is difficult to envisage a role for CCA based on
aggregate VTB, because this could be indeterminate, due to the circularity created by
using PV in calculating the regulatory base which itself is supposed to determine the
cash flows which determine PV.
A comparison of Historic Cost based accounting results with Current Cost
Accounting results.
The two tables that follow have been adapted from ones created by Whittington (1985).
They are designed to demonstrate the impact on financial end of year reports of a
business under the regimes of historic cost (HC) accounting and current cost accounting
(CCA) where there is an imperative to maintain ‘commercial’ rates of return on
shareholders’ funds. In order to emphasise the impact of changes in the (CCA) values of
assets, other inflationary impacts have been excluded. This means that increases in
variable costs have been excluded and selling prices have been increased only
sufficiently to meet the increased dividend and depreciation requirements resulting from
changes in asset values. Assets are assumed to have a 20 year life that translates into a
straight line (SL) depreciation rate of 5% p.a. The asset values are reset annually to
reflect an increase in Optimised Replacement Cost (ORC) of 15% per annum. Investors
receive a return (before taxes) of 10.5% p.a. on the book value of their investment. The
cost structure has been designed to approximate that of the utility sector where it is
understood that approx 60% of revenues represent return of and on assets.
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Under HC methods, both the revenue and cost structure remain static over the three
years. The book value of the assets has declined by the amount provided for
depreciation while the cash balance has increased by a corresponding amount. Prices
charged to customers and returns to investors remain at the same level from year to
year.

Under CCA methods, there has been a steady rise in selling prices in order to meet the
larger depreciation allowances and increased dividend payments required to service the
increased value of assets. The larger depreciation allowances are reflected in the
increases in the cash balances. The shareholders are the obvious beneficiaries of the
adoption of CCA as their dividends have risen sharply over the three years reflecting the
higher prices charged to customers. Consumers have paid prices that reflect a level of
dividends that relates to increased asset values however those prices have rewarded
investors for increases in asset values they have not paid for.

The question of ability to replace infrastructure under each method must be examined.
Are the cash reserves built up over the life of the assets sufficient to replace the assets?
The cash reserves are greater under CCA than under HC but not significantly. CCA
depreciation expenses over time reflect the increases in the replacement cost of the
assets in a ratio that consists of expected useful life in years expressed as a percentage
of basic asset values, compared with the required rate of return by investors.

Under CCA, where the expected useful life of assets is 20 years this reduces to a SL
depreciation rate of approx 5% p.a. Where the required rate of return (including taxes) is
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set at 10.5% based on the RC of assets then dividends will rise at slightly less than twice
the rate of the increase in the depreciation provisions. Thus a relationship can be
established that connects the annual increase in asset values, as reflected in increased
selling prices, to both depreciation expense and dividend increases. In this instance an
annual increase in asset values of 15% results in an increase in depreciation expenses
and dividends in a proportional relationship relative to the annual rate of depreciation
allowed and the required rate of return. Hence in this example, depreciation is at 5% p.a.
while dividends are at 10.5% p.a.

The speed with which the ORC of the assets accelerates over useful life will determine
whether towards the end of useful life the capital returned to investors is an amount
closer to the historic cost of the asset or the replacement cost of assets.
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Table 4 - The Effect of the use of Historic Cost values where ‘commercial’ rates of return are set as
revenue targets over a three year period.

Profit and Loss Accounts

Year 1

Selling price per
unit
Sales (200 units @ Total Costs /No.
Units)
Costs
Variable Costs
Depreciation
Shareholders Dividend
Total Costs

Year 2

$0.13

$0.13

$0.13

$26.00

$26.00

$26.00

10.3
5
10.5

Profits

Year 3

10.3
5
10.5

$10.30
5
10.5

25.8

25.8

25.8

$0.20

$0.20

$0.20

Balance Sheets
Shareholders'
Funds
Profits
Shareholders' Funds
Represented by:
Fixed Assets
Less:
Depreciation
Provision
Total Fixed Assets
Current Assets
Cash

100

100

100

$0.20

$0.40

$0.60

100.2

100
5

100.4

100
10

100.6

100
15

95

90

85

5.2

10.4

15.6

Total Assets
100.2
100.4
100.6
Notes: There is no increase in asset values as Historic Cost values have been preserved.
Variable costs have been assumed to remain stable over the three year period.
Numbers have been rounded for simplicity
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Table 5 - The Effect of the use of Current Cost values where ‘commercial’ rates of return are set as
targets over a three year period.

Profit and Loss Accounts

Year 1

Selling price per unit
Sales (200 units)
Costs
Variable Costs
Depreciation HC
Depreciation CC
Shareholders Dividends
Total Costs

Represented by:
Fixed Assets
Less
Depreciation
Provision
Total Fixed Assets
Current Assets
Cash
Total Assets

$0.14

$0.15

$26.00

$28.00

$30.00

10.3
5
0.75
12.02

10.3
5
1.6125
13.82

25.8

28.07

30.7325

$0.20

($0.07)

($0.73)

100
$0.20
15

Shareholders' Funds

Year 3

$0.13

10.3
5
0
10.5

Profits

Balance Sheets
Shareholders' Funds
Profit/Loss
Add Asset Revaluation
Reserve

Year 2

100
$0.13
32.25

115.2

115
5

100
($0.60)
52.09

132.38

132.25
10.75

151.49

152.09
17.36

110

121.5

134.73

5.2

10.88

$16.76

132.38

0 151.49

115.2

0
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Ma and Mathews’ support of CCA
Ma and Mathews (1989), in their book “The Accounting Framework”, define income
as:
Income is that which can be distributed to owners after the stock of capital at
the beginning of the period has been maintained intact. While there are
immensely complex measurement problems, the concepts of capital and
income are well defined in a number of accounting systems (1989, p. 48).
They describe an example of physical capital maintenance as the current cost
accounting (CCA) system where capital is viewed as a physical phenomenon, that is, it
is measured in terms of the physical properties of the assets and capacity to produce
goods and services. The emphasis is on physical productive capacity. Changes in asset
values which do not represent changes in physical capacity are not treated as income.
Thus capital to be maintained includes physical assets, capacity volume or value of such
goods and services.

Ma and Mathews (1989), discuss a total of six accounting valuation systems and argue
that only CCA, with its measure of current cost income from continuing operations,
employs a physical capital maintenance concept and while maintaining operating and
hence financial stability, it follows that both dividend and tax distributions need to be
related to current distributable income and not to accounting profit. In a period of
inflation, CCA is needed to maintain current distributable income and to maintain the
operating capability of the firm. They consider that the three goals of capital
maintenance, appropriate levels of distributions of income by way of taxes and
dividends and the appropriate valuation base for the assets in normal circumstances is
achieved by the adoption of replacement cost.
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Thus Ma and Mathews bring together for us the issues of definition of income and
capital, the concept of capital maintenance and argue that only Current Cost Accounting
with its emphasis on replacement Cost for the valuation of assets satisfies this concept’s
definition.

IFRS/IAS Framework
The International Accounting Standards Board’s Framework (IFRS/IAS, 2003)
Paragraph 103 describes how under a physical concept of capital where the concerns of
the user is with the operating capability of the enterprise:
Paragraph 103
The selection of the appropriate concept of capital by an enterprise should be
based on the needs of the users of its financial statements. Thus, a financial
concept of capital should be adopted if the users of the financial statements
are primarily concerned with the maintenance of nominal invested capital. If
however, the main concern of the users is with the operating capacity of the
enterprise, a physical concept of capital should be used. The concept chosen
indicates the goal to be attained in determining profit, even though there may
be some measurement difficulties in making the concept operational (IASB
Framework 2003, p.33).
The regulators’ focus on the asset base is evident. Following on from the determination
of the Initial Capital Base (ICB) and the adoption of the regulatory formula taking an
Incentive Regulation approach, the regulatory revenue for subsequent periods would be
determined by actual movements in important components of the cost. Section 4.2 of
the Draft Decision Access Arrangement gives an overview of IPART's approach. Davis
(2000) confirms that over 60 per cent of AGLGN's gas distribution costs relate to
capital costs. In considering the controversial nature of the determination of the asset
base and rate of return, IPART, consistent with the objectives and requirements of the
National Third Party Access Code for Natural Gas Pipeline Systems (the Code), has
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adopted a process that involves assessing operational and capital expenditure and
analysing financial indicators. IPART says it has not endorsed any specific
methodology for the determination of the initial regulatory asset base. The code
requirements identify several factors that should be considered in establishing the initial
capital base (section 8.10), but it does not specify any particular asset valuation
methodology. At the same time the Code suggests that the ICB should normally lie
somewhere between depreciated actual cost and depreciated optimised replacement
cost.

The physical capital maintenance versus the financial equity view of the Regulatory
Asset Base
Whichever valuation concept is decided upon by the regulator, future decisions will be
consistent with the value placed on the ICB. The financial equity view places emphasis
on the preservation of the purchasing power of shareholder investment. Under the
physical capital concept, return of capital represents the amortisation of the sum
required to replace (or renew) the existing asset stock as and when required. These two
may be the same, however not necessarily. The asset base on which return is to be
calculated will vary for the two concepts insofar as under the financial equity approach
the actual monetary investment could be adjusted for changes in the purchasing power
of money or even to adjust the size and scope of operations; under the maintenance of
physical capacity concept the capital base will vary with the required replacement
expenditure. The physical capacity concept of the firm concerns the ability of an
enterprise to maintain the same level of goods and services over time.
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The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB 2003, p.33), make this fine
distinction between these two concepts of Financial Capital Maintenance and Physical
Capital Maintenance when they describe in Paragraph 104 of the IASB Framework:
Concepts of Capital Maintenance and the Determination of profit;
Para 104
The concept of capital in paragraph 102 give rise to the following concepts of
capital maintenance.
(a) Financial Capital Maintenance Under this concept a profit is earned only
if the financial (or money) amount of the net assets at the end of the period
exceeds the financial (or money) amount of net assets at the beginning of the
period, after excluding any distributions to, and contributions from, owners
during the period. Financial capital maintenance can be measured in either
nominal units or units of constant purchasing power.
(b) Physical capital maintenance. Under this concept a profit is earned only
if the physical productive capacity (or operating capacity) of the enterprise
(or the resources or funds needed to achieve that capacity) at the end of the
period exceeds the physical productive capacity at the beginning of the
period, after excluding any distributions to, and contributions from, owners
during the period. (2003, p.33)
This can be likened to the physical capital maintenance concept as defined by the IASB,
2003) as being:
The concept of capital maintenance is concerned with how an enterprise
defines the capital that it seeks to maintain. It provides the linkage between
the concepts of capital and the concepts of profit because it provides the point
of reference by which profit is measured; it is a prerequisite for
distinguishing between an enterprise's return on capital and return of capital;
only inflows in excess of amounts needed to maintain capital may be
regarded as profit and therefore a return on capital. Hence profit is the
residual amount that remains after expenses (including capital maintenance
adjustments, where appropriate) have been deducted from income. If
expenses exceed income the residual amount is a net loss (ASB FW 2003,
Paragraph 105, p.33).
In the UK the regulatory asset bases are considered to represent shareholder financial
investments in the firm rather than the physical assets or operating capacity of the firm.
This situation reflects the referencing of the initial financial capital base for the
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electricity and water sectors to the market value of equity in the immediate postprivatisation period. Whittington (1998) writes
On privatisation, for financial reporting purposes, most of the utility
companies resorted to the common U.K. practice of historic cost accounting,
with occasional revaluation, in their main accounts. This was felt to make
their accounts comparable with those of other listed companies, and the fact
that CCA tended to give a lower profit figure gave a strong incentive to
achieve such comparability in the eyes of investors. For regulatory purposes,
on the other hand, the privatised utilities preferred to retain CCA, and the fact
that CCA reported a lower profit and a larger asset base was possibly an
advantage in the process of persuading the regulator to allow higher prices.
CCA does not provide a suitable basis for regulation because companies
applied DV rules on an individual asset basis which, when aggregated gives
an approximation to the replacement cost of the assets of the business.
However flotation price also gave a substantial discount on the replacement
cost of the assets of the business. This is reflected in the so-called market-toasset ratio being less than one. The regulator will only allow a reasonable
return on the flotation price thus the aggregate present value of the business
is below the RC of the assets. This was recently recognised by the auditors
of BG who recommended a write down of assets to reflect the lower
regulatory value (1998, p.34).
Whittington (1998) argues that this aggregate value based on aggregate present value is
no longer a suitable basis for regulation because this would result in circularity.

Government accounting policies keep CCA alive.
This chapter traces the debate over capital and income and the effectiveness of current
cost accounting compared to historic cost accounting in the determination of capital and
income. It is considered that any discussion of capital and income must consider
economists’ contributions to the debate. In the context of this study economists views
and a possible reconciliation with accounting views is relevant. Although economists’
views have influenced regulators in the approach taken in their regulation of natural
monopolies and RC is defined as part of DORC there is little or no connection between
CCA and regulatory asset values. However the Commonwealth government through
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the Department of Finance and Administration (DoFA) has moved to accrual
accounting and chosen CCA as the form of accounting that is to be used in reporting by
departments. A recent publication by the ACCC (2003), recognized as an independent
body although under the domain of the Commonwealth’s Department of Finance and
Administration, expresses support by government for CCA as well as the desire to
unravel some of the accounting problems that CCA poses.

In examining regulatory choices with regard to valuation method it has become clear
that while Deprival Value (DV) has been endorsed by the Commonwealth Government
in implementing its Accounting reforms within the Public Sector, the energy regulators
have adopted DORC and rejected DV which includes as one of its outcomes
recoverable or realiseable value. In the gas transmission business, many assets such as
gas pipelines are ’sunk’ assets.

IASB definition of Fair Value and an Impairment loss
In IAS 16 definitions of Property, Plant and Equipment are described and the terms
‘Fair Value’ and Impairment Loss’ are given considerable emphasis.
Fair value is the amount for which an asset could be exchanged between
knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm’s length transaction.
An Impairment Loss is the amount by which the carrying amount of an asset
exceeds its recoverable amount (2003, 16, Paragraph 6, p.129).
Australian Accounting Standards’:definition of Recoverable amount under AASB 1010
and AAS 10
Both AASB 1010 and ASB 10 require that
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'....a non-current asset must be written down to its recoverable amount when
its carrying amount is greater than its recoverable amount' (AASB 1010, s
5.1, italics in original).
In these standards, the recoverable amount is defined as '.....the net amount
that is expected to be recovered through the net cash inflows arising from its
continued use and subsequent disposal' (AASB 1010, s9.1).
General government valuations under AAS31
Under AAS31 government entities are required to apply the standards set out in AAS10.
However, it is acceptable for non-current assets to be valued at their .written-down
current cost, which is determined by reference to the current market buying price of the
remaining service potential embodied in the asset. Where a market buying price is not
available, the lower of replacement or reproduction cost may be used as a surrogate
(AAS31, s11.3).10

In Conclusion
The emergence of financial economics:

DORC originates from the

Commonwealth governments’ adoption of replacement cost (RC) as the basis for
the valuation of assets when the move to Accrual Accounting occurred in the early
90’s. It is considered that these policy choices resulted from the dominance of
economists in the DoF (now the Department of Finance and Administration
(DoFA). The new accounting system moved from a cash based system where
budget compliance was the overriding financial imperative to Accrual Accounting
where the government wanted the sector to meet new goals of efficiency and
effectiveness and be more like the private sector.

10

Source: SCNPMGTE (1994a); Johnstone and Gaffikin (1995).
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The accounting profession has argued about the use of RC as the basis of accounting for
more than a century. The system of accounting called Current Cost Accounting uses
replacement cost for the valuation of assets. Where this results in increases or decreases
in value the difference is treated as income or expense, while the book value of assets is
increased or decreased, minus depreciation. The accounting treatment of changes in
asset values should be recorded in the financial accounts. This would ensure
perdurability in respect of the accounting records. Perdurability means that from any
point in the history of published accounts the analyst of a company’s balance sheet can
look backward or forward from one year to the next and trace the accounting treatment
of and movement in asset values. There is a case to be made for the adoption of RC as
the method of accounting for regulated businesses. It would offer the advantage to the
many interested parties of an opportunity to see the financial impact of the regulator’s
choice of Depreciated Optimised Replacement Cost (DORC) values on the regulated
business. For example:
(i)

Recognition of profit or loss resulting from the move from
Depreciated Actual Cost to DORC.

(ii)

The use of DORC values in the Balance Sheet.

(iii)

The auditors would be able to connect the level of revenues
achieved to the regulated MAR.

(iv)

The extent of incurred operating expenses (Opex) incurred
compared with the approved Opex contained within the MAR.

(v)

The actual depreciation written off compared with the amount of
depreciation contained within the approved MAR.
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The linkage between finance/economics and accounting is strengthened by the
Commonwealth government, through the Department of Finance and Administration,
(DoFA)’s, commitment to CCA. DoFA has recently, (2003), through its offshoot the
ACCC, issued an Accounting separation regime document requesting public comment
on its proposed use of CCA in respect of Telstra. Included are the following sample
statements:
the CCA reports will enable the Commission to better identify true
economic/replacement costs of particular assets owned and operated by
Telstra (2003, p.12).
The main drawback with using historical information to determine access
prices is that the current cost of a company's assets may bear little
relationship to their historic purchase price because of technological change
and general inflation. This means that an access seeker, in paying an access
charge, might be paying for the historic purchase costs of the incumbent's
network rather than the economic costs of the service. (2003, p.13)
ACCC consider that the Telstra system is not suitable for CCA reporting,
currently Telstra's asset register does not identify assets in such a manner as
to allow meaningful CCA derivation and analysis (2003, p.14).

The concern for the adoption of current cost accounting has also been taken up by the
United Nations. Blignaut (2002) discusses the United Nations proposal to construct
satellite accounts (NRA) to supplement the System of National Accounts (SNA)
(United Nations 1993a, 1993b.) Their discussion focuses on the need to provide a
framework or blueprint for ways to develop various physical and monetary indicators to
evaluate the state of resources bearing in mind intergenerational equity issues. Pollution
emissions and environmental damage, costs caused by mining companies, affect
generally sustainable income, at (a), when they say….
According to Hicks (1946), sustainable income is defined as the level of
consumption that can be sustained indefinitely without diminishing the asset
stock (Authors use of italics). ….This definition does not require that physical
stocks of natural assets be maintained at a constant level, but rather, that their
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capacity to generate income and employment in the future remains intact
(2002, p.6).
Thus the authors have chosen Hick’s first definition as most closely matching the UN’s
proposal for National Resource Accounts.

The Australian Government regulators, through their own economists and academic
economists have adopted DORC as their own intellectual property. DORC is kept on a
pedestal for the purpose of setting revenue bounds/prices. This is a kind of academic
capture that has allowed practical issues of financial accounting results to be treated as
irrelevant. In the chapter support has been found for the adoption of RC in preference to
other valuation bases. The definitive excerpt from Gee and Peasnell (1976) offers such
support:
All that is being asserted here is that if the assets of a going concern are to be
valued on a deprival value basis, then there is much more to be said for
adhering to replacement cost as approximations to deprival values well-nigh
irrespective of PV or NRV of the asset being valued (1976, p.247).
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Chapter 4
The development of a framework for regulation constructed around
the use of DORC

Introduction
This chapter builds on the work of the previous chapter that considers the results of a
century of thinking about the impact of changing prices on asset values and issues of
capital and income. The definitive analysis of Sandilands (1975), followed by the
detailed explanation of these decision rules developed by Gee and Peasnell (1976), offer
explanations that provide insight. In particular, the emphasis placed on the use of Value
to the Firm, Value to the Business and Deprival Value is observed to be an overriding
dictum influencing the ‘rational’ manager’s action taken in order to maximize the value
of the firm. This chapter discusses the beginnings of regulation and influential findings
of the judgments found in the landmark US cases of Smyth v Ames and the Hope case.
These two cases are seen as having direct links to the debate over Deprival Value and
the adoption of DORC.

Every market economy has a set of rules designed to ensure that the competitive process
is not undermined by the anti-competitive behaviour of firms, whether acting
collusively or individually. Typically, these rules prohibit agreements or arrangements
that increase the market power of firms and inhibit firms which individually possess
substantial market power from using that power in an anti-competitive way. In Australia
these rules are contained in Part IV of the Commonwealth Trade Practices Act 1974
(TPA). Other rules relevant to this study are found in the TPA where Part IIIA has
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formed the basis of access to and pricing of regulatory systems while Section 46
contains provisions used to determine misuse of market power. A recent (2002-3)
review of the TPA has been performed by the Dawson Committee and this will be
discussed later in the chapter. In 1988, in Australia, the twin goals of increased
efficiency and effectiveness were desired by Government and were the initiating force
behind the movement towards change in the public sector. A ‘user pays’ mentality was
adopted and changes in accounting within government departments from a cash based
break-even system to accrual accounting based on the replacement cost of assets was
implemented over the next decade.

Hilmer (1992) recommended the establishment of two national bodies to oversee the
administration of a National Competition Policy framework, namely the Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) and the National Competition
Council (NCC), by the merger of the Trade Practices Commission and the Prices
Surveillance Authority. In 1995 the Commonwealth and State governments agreed to
implement a National Competition Policy package containing measures to increase
competition and enhance economic performance.

The Commonwealth committee chaired by the Productivity Commission’s predecessor,
the Industry Commission, produced a ‘red book’ of guidelines recommending Deprival
Value (DV). The inclusion of DV is debated and Optimised Depreciated Replacement
Cost (ODRC) has been seen as the pragmatic alternative by regulators. The Productivity
Commission (2001), in respect of access pricing principles, asserts that there seems to
be a general presumption endorsing the adoption of Depreciated Optimised
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Replacement Cost (DORC), for the valuation of assets subject to an access arrangement.
The threat of over-engineering the system or other practices designed to ‘game’ the
system is recognized where DORC is operational while the issue of Deprival Value
remains unclear.

The Productivity Commission endorses the ACCC’s ‘Building Block’ approach to
regulation and the use of DORC. Flaws inherent in the notion of DORC include:
•

The subjectivity of valuations

•

The problem of circularity

•

The probable use of Gaming to increase the level of regulated prices

•

Treatment of Sunk Assets under DORC rules

•

Problems of the determination of Modern Equivalent Asset

Running through the Productivity Commission’s Review of the National Access regime
is a concern that the present regulatory principles are insufficient to reward owners for
investment in new infrastructure facilities.

Australian Accounting Standard AAS38 and its reissue with amendments by the
Australian Accounting Standards Board as AASB1041 relevant to accounting for assets,
has been strongly influenced by the thinking with the Commonwealth Department of
Finance, (DoF), now the Commonwealth Department of Finance and Administration
(DoFA). The differences between the ACCC and various State and Territory regulators’
approaches to the implementation of DORC values are discussed. Accounting policy
choices by the owners of UK monopolies demonstrate attempts by owners to maximise
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their bargaining power Vis a Vis the UK regulators. Finally a New Zealand approach to
the determination of DORC values is discussed.

Fair Value US Supreme Court (1898) Smyth v Ames; Hope case; Deprival Value and
DORC Bonbright (1937).
‘Fair Value’ was a notion that emerged from the USA. The case of Smyth v Ames
produced this notion for the regulation of railroads in the 1890s in the United States.
Railroad rates in Nebraska were set by Nebraska’s Board of Transportation. The
Supreme Court concluded the company was entitled to a ‘fair return on fair value’. It
argues that value should be approached as follows:
We hold, however, that the basis of all calculations as to the reasonableness
of rates to be charged by a corporation maintaining a highway under
legislative sanction must be the fair value of the property being used by it for
the convenience of the public. And, in order to ascertain that value, the [.169
U.S. 466, 547] original cost of construction, the amount expended in
permanent improvements, the amount and market value of its bonds and
stock, the present compared with the original cost of construction, the
probable earning capacity of the property under particular rates prescribed by
statute, and the sum required to meet operating expenses, are all matters for
consideration, and are to be given such weight as may be just and right in
each case (1898, p.345).
Thus the consideration of the present cost of construction enters into the calculation of
‘fair value’ for the purpose of determining rates for prices.

Grout and Zalewska (2002), discuss the Smyth v Ames case:
In this case the Court suggested that probable earning capacity had to be
considered when valuing entities for regulatory purposes. But then a
circularity problem arises since the value of assets in place is to be
determined by reference to future rates but these future rates are themselves
determined by the fair return on the value. Early recording of work activities
were often descriptive of individuals and their job descriptions plus the
counting of inputs and outputs. The breaking up of time into year long
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intervals and the publication of annual reports of income became common in
the early part of the twentieth century (2002, p.35).
One of the attributes of ‘Fair Value’ identified in the case of Smyth v Ames relates to
the probable earning capacity of the property under particular rates prescribed by
statute. This indicates that the fixing of revenues is not a new concept in regulatory
economics. The notion that rates were prescribed by statute and that this affects the
value placed on the asset shows the link between ‘fair value’ and prices. The notion that
statute determines ‘fair value’ has echoes in the Australian situation whereby ORG in
Victoria does not dispute DORC as a valuation basis because the Victorian State
Government has passed a law approving the adoption of DORC for the valuation of the
assets of utilities.

Until 1944, debate continued as to the appropriate mechanism by which to value the
assets of a utility, when the Hope Natural Gas Case was resolved. In that case, the
Supreme Court put its emphasis on pragmatism and a presumption in favour of the
Regulatory Commissions. Regulators began to use their power and, in an inflationary
era, tended to favour original cost valuations.

Bonbright (1948) described the Hope case as:
one of the most important pronouncements in the history of American Law.
Unless the Court reverses itself, no longer will it impose upon legislatures or
commissions, state or federal, the severe restrictions upon their powers to fix
rates that it previously imposed under its doctrine in Smyth v Ames. The rule
of ‘reasonable return on fair value’ may still be retained by states that choose
to retain it. But it has ceased to be ‘law of the land’ (1948. p.254).
Grout and Zalewska (2002), discuss the circularity problem evident in Smyth v Ames
and consider that this problem has reappeared in the last decade as the result of the wave
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of privatisations of public utilities in the UK that have occurred. There has been a strong
tendency for the market price of privatised utilities to be below their replacement cost at
privatisation. What is an appropriate asset valuation? In the UK the procedure used to
avoid a transfer of wealth from customers to shareholders has been to take a market
value (debt plus equity) approach as the asset base.

The inability to value assets in the face of circularity has become an industry standard.
Grout and Zalewska (2002), suggest the core problem is that the use of market values,
instead of replacement cost as the asset base is justified but announcing in advance that
this is accepted by regulators itself increases the likelihood of under valuation. Thus the
authors recognise that to allow the privatised assets to attract sales revenue that would
represent a WACC on the CCA of the assets would endow shareholders with a windfall
gain at the expense of customers.

The initiatives of the Department of Finance and Administration, the Trade Practices
Act of 1974, the Hilmer Review, the Productivity Commission and the ‘Building Block’
approach provide the web of boundaries for regulation. The role of the regulator can be
described as working to achieve equilibrium between interested parties, that is, the
company supplying the product (pipes and wires), and:
•

various types of customers, - contract, commercial, residential and
disadvantaged groups

•

Investors, shareholders and debt holders

•

Managers and employees

•

Environmental groups and other special community based groups
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•

Upstream suppliers

•

Downstream users

The other role of regulation is that of achieving strategic objectives and transparency of
operations. The strategic objectives include the physical maintenance of capital in order
to meet present and projected levels of demand; continual improvement of technology,
and, where achievable, minimisation of costs so that by-pass by customers is avoided.
Transparency goals relate to accounting information regarding the asset base used by
regulators as the base on which the return is calculated and verification in relation to the
approved revenue stream.

A Department of Finance (DoF) paper, Rate of return reporting for Government
Business Enterprises (GBE's); a conceptual approach, of July 1988 on rate of return
reporting made clear that there had been a Government decision that there should be:
Decontrol of enterprise (GBE) operations to the maximum extent possible,
while requiring enterprises to operate within the discipline imposed by a rate
of return target. The rate of return target is intended to achieve a similar
result to the discipline of the market to which private sector companies are
subject (1988, p.3).
Further on the paper says:
In economic jargon the rate of return would be intended to be the 'opportunity
cost' of utilising assets in the public rather than the private sector, and the rate
of return should, therefore, reflect what the resources could earn in the
private sector (1988, p.4).
The setting of a rate of return target for a GBE was considered to be a quantum leap
forward on the more detailed administrative controls that had hitherto been imposed:
The Steering Committee on National Performance Monitoring of Government Trading
Enterprises (GTE) was established to consider the performance monitoring necessary to
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achieve efficiency and effectiveness in GTEs. It continues the earlier series of broader
Red Book publications by the Commission under the auspices of the Steering
Committee on National Performance Monitoring of Government Trading Enterprises,
between 1991 and 1997. DoFA, in1996, developed and published guidelines for the
valuation of assets called, Asset Valuation Guidelines Exposure Draft.

In October 1992, following the agreement of all Australian governments, the Prime
Minister established an Independent Committee of Inquiry to investigate and report on a
recommended course of action to achieve consistent competition rules across Australia.
The Committee was chaired by Professor Fred Hilmer. Hilmer (1992), established that
the first priority is for government to limit anti-competitive conduct and that there be
rigorous, open and independent study before competition is introduced to a sector
traditionally supplied by a permanent monopoly, or where privatisation is proposed, to
protect the interests of consumers. The Committee described regulation at all levels of
government as an impediment to enhanced competition in many key sectors of the
economy. The need for government regulation may occur when market failure occurs.

An essential element of any competition policy is that regulatory restrictions on
competition must provide benefits clearly greater than the costs incurred. Hilmer (1992)
drew attention to the anomaly whereby all price fixing arrangements on goods are
prohibited but it was possible to obtain authorisation for price fixing on services. Hilmer
saw no grounds for this treatment of services and recommended removal. The
government of the day took the opposite view and currently authorisation of price fixing
of goods is permitted, bringing it into line with the arrangement for services.
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Hilmer’s final report was released in August 1993. This report recommended the
establishment of two national bodies to oversee the administration of a National
Competition Policy framework, namely the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission (ACCC) and the National Competition Council (NCC), by the merger of
the Trade Practices Commission and the Prices Surveillance Authority. The Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) was formed as an independent
Statutory Authority on 6th November 1995.

This move was in accord with the

Australian Government’s national competition policy, and its primary role is that of
administering the Commonwealth Trade Practices Act 1974 (TPA), and the Prices
Surveillance Act 1983.

The objective of the TPA is enhancement of the welfare of Australians through the
promotion of competition and fair-trading and provision for consumer protection.
Under the Prices Surveillance Act the ACCC has the three pricing functions of vetting
price rises, holding inquiries into pricing practices and monitoring prices, costs and
profits. The ACCC reports to the Minister for Industry, the Hon Senator Minchin,
Minister for Finance and Administration who is responsible to the Treasurer.

Anti-competitive rules are contained in Part IV of the Commonwealth Trade Practices
Act 1974 (TPA). The TPA has been amended with the inclusion of Part IIIA. Part IIIA
of the TPA has formed the basis of access to and pricing of regulatory systems while
Section 46 contains provision used to determine misuse of market power. Access
regulation, i.e., Part IIIA of the TPA, provides means for businesses to use the services
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of ‘essential’ or ‘bottleneck’ infrastructure, such as gas pipelines, that is uneconomic to
duplicate. This regulation is designed to prevent owners denying access to their
facilities or charging monopoly rents for the use of their facility. The three ways, under
Part IIIA, that a business may seek and gain access to the essential service:
•

having the service declared: this gives the access seeker the right to negotiate
with the service provider,

•

through an industry-specific regime deemed to be effective

•

Under the terms and conditions specified in a registered undertaking from the
service provider.

The recommendations of the Hilmer Committee have informed the Regulatory
framework, or regulatory formula as incorporated into the ‘Building Block’, and CPI-X
methodologies for regulation of natural monopolies subject to Access Arrangements.

Recognition is given to the difficulty in separating the effects of access regulation from
the myriad of market and other government regulation by the Productivity Commission:
The fact that the national access regime is still in its infancy further
constrains assessments of its efficacy. As well as the limited case history, a
number of the regime’s key concepts and processes have yet to be fully
bedded down. Also, many of Australia’s infrastructure sectors are still
undergoing significant structural change. At this juncture, it is difficult to
judge what implications such changes will have for access regulation in
general and Part IIIA in particular (2001, P. xx).
The Productivity Commission (2001) considers that the present national access regime
is deficient in a number of important respects, particularly that there is no overarching
objective or pricing principles to guide negotiations between access providers and
seekers to underpin regulatory determinations. The administration of States and
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Territory regimes often vary unnecessarily and are administratively cumbersome and
time consuming. The ACCC when arbitrating a dispute is constrained by factors more
tightly prescribed under Part IIIA than the States and Territories and this leads to
inconsistent determinations.

The Productivity Commission assert that the insertion of an objects clause into Part IIIA
of the TPA would help to overcome some of these difficulties and that there is a need to
address the issue of risk attaching to new investments and to help ensure that decision
makers are accountable for their decisions. The Commission has made pricing
recommendations to the ACCC in respect of access pricing principles (12.1). These
Pricing principles are sufficiently broad to be suited to different circumstances however
the major area of difficulty seems to have arisen in the need to reconcile the pricing
principles in relation to existing facilities with the need to facilitate new investment.

A recent (2002-3) review of the TPA has been performed by the Dawson Committee.
The political nature of the Act may be appreciated by the reality that the Federal
Government announced on 9th May 2002 the formation of a Committee to review, in
particular, the competition provisions of the Trade Practices Act. This Committee is
known as "The Dawson Committee", after its Chairperson Sir Daryl Dawson. Chapter 3
of the Committee’s report refers to Section 46- misuse of market power and the issue of
'proof of purpose' was considered at length. Section 46 prohibits a corporation with
substantial market power using that power for a proscribed anti-competitive purpose.
The ACCC argued that an "effects" test should be added to Section 46 so that a business
that was found to have used its market power to harm or eliminate a competitor could
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be found to be in breach of the Section. In the recent case of ACCC v Boral Ltd., Martin
(2003), the company was accused of aggressive under-pricing in order to increase
market share. However the February 2003 High Court Decision found that Boral Ltd
was not in breach. Small business was incensed at the decision claiming that Section 46
was there to protect them from abuse of market power. However the interests of
consumers may have been served by the decision because currently the case is listed for
appeal to the High Court. The Dawson report made no recommendation in respect of
section 46 directly although a recommendation was made that the ACCC should give
consideration to consulting with industry and issuing guidelines on its approach to Part
IV (2003, Recommendations 3.2 and 3.3).

Deprival Value to Fair Value
The Finance Brief issued in June 2002 by the Accounting policy branch of DoFA
describes the transition to ‘Fair Value’. This paper aims to describe the transitional
arrangements for the gradual change in Asset valuation from Deprival Value (DV) to
Fair Value (FV). This transition is designed to occur progressively between 2002 and
2005 whereafter, FV will be the standard measurement rule. The only exceptions to this
permitted method of revaluation are assets specifically excluded within not-for-profit
entities where ‘Deemed’ values are permitted. One of these not-for-profit entities
happens to be the Department of Defense whose assets exceed the aggregate cost value
of the assets of all other Commonwealth government departments. Since the assets of
Defense are so extensive it is a remarkable concession that allows Defense to revert to
Deemed values.
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The specific point of argument whereby DV has been rejected and FV adopted needs
scrutiny. Page of the Finance Brief defines Fair Value in the following manner:
•

for cash generating units, FV = the lower of RC and adjusted RC

Adjusted Market Buying price (adjusted RC above), is found by an iterative process. A
series of interrogations must be answered by the cash generating unit to determine NPV
and NRV. Then the RC must be determined and any excess of RC over NPV may be
applied to the writing off of goodwill, where it occurs.

The Productivity Commission has now considered the valuation of assets in their (2002)
Review of the National Access Regime. They endorse the ‘Building Block’ approach to
the determination of revenue to be approved by regulated utilities and attempt to
develop principles suitable for the setting of revenues. A particular concern expressed
by the Productivity Commission is the assessment of the level of risk faced by regulated
utilities and the need to ensure that adequate incentives are in place to adequately
reward new infrastructure development initiatives.

The Productivity Commission’s proposes certain modifications to the architecture of
Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act. These focus on the mechanisms by which Part IIIA
operates in approving coverage, the negotiate-arbitrate framework and on the
consistency of decisions made. A discussion is mounted about the possible advantages
of a productivity based approach to regulation instead of the present Building Block
approach. The Productivity Commission has canvassed interested parties about their
views on Part IIIA and the need for an objects clause. Some interesting submissions
follow. Professor Maureen Brunt recommended a
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'drastic simplification of Part IIIA by replacing Divisions I and II with market
conduct provisions for nationally significant corporations possessing
substantial market power (2002, p.xx).
The Law Council of Australia was particularly critical of Part IIIA’s lack of clarity,
while in their response to the Productivity Commission’s Issues paper the Australian
Pipeline Industry Association noted that:
Part IIIA does not currently have specifically outlined objectives, yet it has
formed the basis of access regulatory systems and pricing regulatory systems
(2000, p.2).
The Australian Pipeline Industry Association consider that currently Part IIIA is largely
an “access only” regulatory system yet third party access to natural monopoly
infrastructure while the need for pricing principles has been addressed only on an “ad
hoc” basis with little regard for the need to create a framework which encourages new
development and reinvestment activity. Their recommendation is as follows:
Part IIIA should contain a single set of clear “access and pricing” principles.
Regulator discretion should be directed by these principles, there should be a
strengthening of appeals provisions and preferably, a regulator’s code or
guidelines should be developed in conjunction with representatives of
regulated industries. Any such guidelines to regulators should strengthen the
current lack of focus on the desirability of new infrastructure development
activity, including in the gas transmission sector (2000, p.3).
The Productivity Commission considers that the insertion of an objects clause would
reduce uncertainty by assisting all parties, regulators, the judiciary, access seekers,
facility owners and potential infrastructure investors. The Commission has proposed in
the Position Paper's suggested pricing principles within Part IIIA that:
In sum, the pricing principles must necessarily involve a balancing act
between addressing monopoly pricing and allowing a degree of flexibility for
revenue to be above costs....the ACCC must have regard to the following
principles:
(a)
That the regulated access prices:
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(i)

be set so as to generate revenue across a facility's regulated services
that is at least sufficient to meet the efficient long-run costs of
providing access to these services; and
(ii)
include a return on investment commensurate with the regulatory
and commercial risks involved;
(iii)
generate revenue from each service that at least covers the directly
attributable or incremental costs of providing the service.
(b)
that the access price structures should:
(i)
allow multi-part pricing and price discrimination when it aids efficiency;
(ii) not allow a vertically integrated access provider to set terms and conditions
that discriminate in favour of its downstream operations, except to the
extent that the cost of providing access to other operators is higher.
( c)
that access pricing regimes should provide incentives to reduce costs or
otherwise improve productivity (2001, p. 339).

The ACCC and Rail Track Corporation (ARTC) suggested that the principles in the
position paper would not prevent cross subsidies between services.
...one might have expected that if the proposed pricing principles were to
disallow cross subsidies between a regulated activity and a vertically related
contestable activity, then those same principles would also disallow crosssubsidies between horizontally related regulated services or products. That is,
access prices at each connection point should be subsidy free (sub. DR93, p
29).
The Commission agrees that subsidy-free prices are a requirement for efficient pricing
outcomes and that minimum revenue should cover incremental costs of providing the
service.

There is a perceived tension between the different interests, the efficient use of
infrastructure and short-term versus long-term efficiency considerations. The
subjectivity of valuations is discussed as well as the issue of companies ‘gaming’ their
asset values in order to achieve higher approved regulatory revenue. The Commission
argues that notions of asset valuation that assume ‘one size fits all’ is not appropriate
and may not be achievable in a practical sense. The utilities under coverage include:
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•

large infrastructure utilities where there are substantial sunk assets/costs

•

telecommunication companies who own substantial assets that have
characteristics of being Long Term but not necessarily ‘Sunk’

Other problems with large utilities include the impact on renewal where ‘sunk’ assets
remain in situ and serve the interests of the business by providing additional capacity in
emergency and thus lowering the ‘risks’ of bottlenecks and supply failure. The above
discussion shows that the TPA is not definitive regarding access and pricing for natural
monopolies. Instead the debate seems to be in an early stage. The Productivity
Commission has consulted widely and rejects productivity measures resulting to a
default commitment to the building block approach. As well, the objects list is only a
list and the States and Territories differ in their administration of regulation principles
from the ACCC.

Criticisms of the ‘Building Block’ approach. From AusCID:
Both the Victorian Regulator General and the ACCC have interpreted
‘incentive regulation’ of the form CPI-X to mean the so called ‘Building
Block’ approach, which is really thinly disguised cost of service or rate of
return regulation (sub.11, p.13).
And from (KPMG, 2002)
Rather than using it (the building block approach) as one source of
information about an outcome they have turned it into the outcome (quoted
in Energex sub. 14, p.7).
While productivity based approaches have been recognized as having merit, the
Commission remains unconvinced that costs can be uncoupled from prices without
substantially increasing the risks that prices will fail to cover costs and that the firm will
be driven into bankruptcy or that the margin between prices and costs will result in
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excessive profits. Central to the building block approach is the notion of Depreciated
Optimised Replacement Cost (DORC).

Regulators’ Understanding of DORC
An often quoted, background definition of DORC by the regulator IPART (NSW)
follows:
Optimised Replacement Cost (ORC) is the replacement cost of an
‘optimised’ system, less accumulated depreciation. It allows for the
depreciated state of the asset and also incorporates engineering
optimisation of the utility’s asset. An optimised system is a
reconfigured system designed to serve the current load plus expected
growth over a specified period using modern technology. This method
excludes any unused or underutilised assets beyond the specialised
planning horizon, and allows for potential cost savings which may
have resulted from technological improvement (IPART 1999 d Vol.1,
p52).
ORC is a variant of the replacement cost valuation methodology which measures the
cost of the most efficient method of providing the services of the current asset
(ACCC1998a).

Further justification for the use of the version of DORC described as Optimised
Depreciated Replacement Cost (ODRC) is provided by the ACCC (2001):
Rather than being the regulator’s tool of choice, the ODRC has largely
become the technique of choice by government owners of the assets. This
preference stems back to the “red book” which was published by a committee
comprising the representatives from the Commonwealth, State and Territory
governments and chaired by the Productivity Commission’s predecessor, the
Industry Commission. The ODRC methodology is seen as a pragmatic
alternative to the “red books” preferred use of deprival valuation (2001, p.
35).
The problem with the extension of the use of ODRC from the “red books” situation
where the government was concerned about GBE’s making sufficient profits and
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measuring performance is that it is not necessarily appropriate in all cases for
controlling monopoly power. ODRC or DORC is more than simple recognition of the
increase in market values. It includes recognition of the cost of replacement of an
existing asset, an improved, or ‘optimal’ asset and recognition of the ‘fall in value’
attaching to the old asset.

However DORC values are applied to assets, there is

generally an increase in the asset values.
Problem of circularity
The problem with asset valuations being the referent for pricing regimes is that of
circularity. In order to overcome this problem, a mechanism that has been introduced
into the regulatory formula is the transformation of the notion of Optimised
Replacement Cost (ORC) of the Assets to become ORC used. The tariff formulae
expressed as the Present Value of future cash flows is the subject of a discussion of the
results of the adoption of DORC and finally ORC is modified to become ORC ‘used’.

The Productivity Commission, in their PC Inquiry Reports, Cost Recovery by
Commonwealth Departments and Agencies, offer the following definitions central to a
discussion about Depreciated Optimised Replacement Cost:

Replacement cost values assets at the current cost of replacing the asset with
a similar asset that can provide equivalent services and capacity.
Depreciated optimised replacement cost (DORC) values assets at the
replacement cost of an ‘optimised’ asset, less accumulated depreciation. An
‘optimised’ asset is one that most efficiently produces a specified level of
product. The effects of inefficiencies such as excess capacity, duplication,
redundancy and poor location are removed from the valuation.
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ACCC Draft Guidelines (1999) outline general principles and objectives for the
transmission revenue regulatory regime to be applied by the Commission. This is a
framework outlined in the Draft Regulatory Principles and it claims to be an accrual
building block approach based on forecasts of the cost of service over the regulatory
period. MAR is calculated as being the sum of the return on capital, the return of
capital, and operating and maintenance expenditure (including administrative costs).
The guidelines assert that no single approach to asset valuation is appropriate in all
circumstances.

The Productivity Commission in its 2002 report describes the use of the term “Fair
Value”:
According to AAS38, fair value is defined as
'the amount for which an asset could be exchanged, or a liability settled,
between knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm's length transaction'
(s11.1). For general assets this usually would be either the market buying or
selling price. For specialised assets, such as those typically owned by GTE's,
this would include the 'replacement cost of the asset's remaining future
economic benefits' (AAS 38, s5.1.8).
The Productivity Commission under ‘Regulator practice’ on page 41 asserts that all
regulators report a DORC valuation for assets in their gas determinations and
assessments of access arrangements. However, only in about two-thirds of cases is
DORC accepted as the final valuation method. In other cases, the final valuation is
either an average of the DAC and the DORC or a current valuation based on the NPV.
The DAC valuation for the Goldfields pipeline (WA) can be considered a DORC
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valuation as the asset was relatively new at the time of the regulator's assessment.
(OffGar 2001b11)

Among utilities examined for this study the total value of assets under the regulators'
initial DORC valuation was higher than the total value of assets under their final
regulatory valuation. In some cases, regulators revised asset valuations to balance the
interests of the utility owners and their customers. Some of the differences are:
•

$3 billion in electricity: 89% of initial DORC valuation

•

$1 billion in gas: between 87 and 91% of initial DORC valuation

•

$10 billion in water and sewage: 45% of proposed DORC.

The Productivity Commission links the final value expressed as a percentage of their
initial DORC valuation as being a ratio conceptually similar to Tobin’s Q – the value of
a firm’s market capitalization divided by the value of the replacement cost of the firm’s
assets. (2000. p.42)

While the Regulator Practice report talks about regulatory action in respect of DORC
values submitted by companies, nothing is said about original Historic Cost or
Depreciated Actual Cost, (DAC), and how DAC relates to either initial or proposed
DORC values.

11

OffGar 2001b For valuations implicit in regulator's price determinations, see page 42

of report on Regulator Practice 2001.
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The National Electricity Commission (NEC) provides that existing and new assets can
be revalued, on a basis to be determined by the Productivity Commission. NEC requires
the Productivity Commission to use the Optimised Deprival Value (ODV)
Methodology. The NEC considers that given the circularity that would be associated
with any deprival value assessment, a DORC valuation should be adopted for any initial
valuation.12 The DORC valuation is to be used to set a cap on the valuation of the initial
regulatory asset base.

The NEC states that the Commission must have regard to the Council of Australian
Governments’ agreement that Deprival Value (DV) is the preferred approach to valuing
network assets.

To prevent 'circularity' Optimised Replacement Cost (ORC) is

preferred. An economic interpretation of ORC would mean that it sets the cap on the
valuation of the Regulatory Asset Base (RAB). The ORC valuation would have to be
adjusted to take account of depreciation (D), resulting in a DORC valuation.

The ACCC’s Draft Statement of Principles for the Regulation of Transmission
Revenues (1999), recognises that judgment is required in the determination of DORC
values. In recognition of this it plans to develop guidelines for valuation by the year
2003. The main economic principal for assessing the economic value of any assets is
that their value to investors is equal to the Net Present Value (NPV) of the expected
future cash flows generated by those assets. Here the draft decision recognises that the
practical difficulty in making this assessment for regulated monopoly business is that
future revenue derived from the assets is itself determined by the regulator - hence the
12

The NEC is right to recognise the circularity of determining revenues based on the Optimised
Replacement Cost of Assets. The regulators have overcome this problem by calling on the reasoning
contained in Tobin’s Q. This issue is discussed in Chapter 7.
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circularity associated with the use of Optimised Deprival Value (ODV) as a
methodology to value sunk assets.

New Zealand Views of DORC: Horsley and Wallace
New Zealand showed great enthusiasm for the use of Optimised Replacement Cost in its
financial reforms of the 90s. At the time New Zealand was held up as an example to the
world of how to achieve financial reforms, greater efficiency and effectiveness. These
reforms are now being questioned but at the time of introduction they were acclaimed.

A descriptive view of DORC is offered by G. Horsley (1994) on the valuation of
Wellington International Airport:
Depreciated Replacement Cost is a method of valuation which is based on an
estimate of the current value of the land plus the current gross replacement
costs of all improvements less allowances for physical deterioration, and all
relevant forms of obsolescence and Optimisation. …This method is
sometimes referred to as Optimised Depreciated Replacement Cost (1994. p
3).
Wallace writing in the New Zealand Investment Analyst, (1994 pp14-17) affirms the
definition of Optimised Deprival Value methodology that is the basis of DORC and
gives guidance as to how to proceed in finding the DORC value of an asset. Historic
Cost is described, by Wallace, as a deficient benchmark when used to value the
infrastructure assets of natural monopolies on a consistent basis. A link is made between
the cost of replicating the existing infrastructure and the amount that would be paid to
avoid being deprived of the asset’s service capacity. The ODV is the least cost
replacement alternative or optimised (depreciated) replacement cost of an asset, subject
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to the caveat that the value ascribed cannot exceed the economic worth of the asset. The
economic worth of the asset is the maximum of [ODV, NRV].
Wallace’s interpretation of the rules in use in New Zealand for the determination of
ODV asset valuation is:
•

if asset were to be replaced, then, RC

•

If asset not to be replaced but is in use, then, Present Value.

•

If asset to be sold or scrapped, then, Net Realisable Value.

Wallace (1994) describes the four phases of implementation of ODV as:
1. Find RC recognising that determination of RC is a complex business and
may require an engineering assessment and international cost comparisons.
2. Determine the optimum assets to purchase.
3. Depreciate ORC based on remaining useful life of assets to ODRC.
4. Where ODRC exceeds the value to the user of the service, write down to
economic value (1994, p. 15).
Wallace’s discussion about easements in New Zealand relates to their origin as having
been obtained by enforcement of statutory power, access and maintenance rights being
maintained pursuant to legislation. This has relevance to the Gas Transmission
Networks of NSW where easements were acquired in a similar fashion and notably
excluded from the DORC valuation given to assets.

Writing on depreciation, Wallace advises that it should reflect economic depreciation
but instead straight line methods are adopted. The author makes several references to
related issues such as target rate of return, business risks, and freedom to set charges by
any method desired by line businesses. This valuation methodology does not appear to
be tied to revenues and the engineering aspect of the methodology is emphasized:
ODV establishes a current economic value which if applied to pricing is a
proxy for the market value of the infrastructure assets of natural monopolies.
Any discrepancy between the ODV and market value should simply reflect
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rate settings lags and fluctuations in costs and the investor required rate of
return (1994, P. 17).
The above implies that the ODV has gained acceptance as the regulatory base. By
suggesting that the market value may be below ODV, Wallace is implying that the
amount of the regulatory revenue manifested in the accounts as income may be below
investor requirements for purposes of pricing the shares at ODV. Thus the connection
between the regulatory asset base and the market is identified.

In determining the above ‘rules’ for the valuation of infrastructure assets, Wallace has
given ascendancy to owners’ intentions instead of the assessment of the market.
Sandiland’s rankings place market price ahead of owners’ intentions implying that the
realities of the market are superior and will ‘fashion’ owners’ actions. So, in the
scenario where NPV > NRV, then Sandilands would recommend that the action of a
rational manager is to hold. Alternatively, if NRV > NPV then sell. The situation is
unlikely to hold where infrastructure assets are in use and subject to regulation because,
where the asset is priced at ODV or DORC, the revenue stream as determined by the
regulators will render an NPV above NRV. This demonstrates the circularity of the
process of regulating revenues where the assets which are subject to regulation are
valued on any basis other than NRV.

Opportunity Cost’ and ‘Circularity’ in the NZ debate.
A Final Report Part IV Inquiry into airfield activities at Auckland, Wellington and
Christchurch International Airports, prepared by the Ministry of Economic
Development (2002), discusses the relative advantages of two valuation models for use
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in valuing airports. They compare Depreciated Historic Cost (DHC) with Optimised
Depreciated

Replacement

Cost

(ODRC)

and

describe

them

as

‘valuation

methodologies’. The use of the term ‘valuation methodologies’ allows the Ministry to
consider that they are in the position of arbitrator of the future of these assets, not only
from the perspective of determining how much income they generate but also whether
they continue in existence or are to be disposed of. They discuss practical issues of
applying ODRC, such as partial valuation, the difficulties of demand forecasting and
inconsistent assessment of efficiencies, and complain that the valuation costs and the
monitoring of these valuations is expensive. Then affirmation of the inherent circularity
of the connection between asset values and prices is demonstrated by the following:
Moreover, ODRC is but one stage of a full ODV methodology, under which
assets that earn an insufficient return on ODRC value – assets that are noneconomic - have to be re-valued downwards to match that lower economic
valuation (Section 5.61, p5).
While the Productivity Commission recognizes the importance of ‘opportunity cost’
because it holds itself to be the final arbiter of prices, it does not explore the possibility
that the NRV of a sunk asset may be greater than the NPV but prefers to suggest the
following:
Both replacement cost and historic asset valuations ignore the fact that
specialized assets have no alternative use, and therefore have an opportunity
cost of, or close to, zero. Hence from an economic perspective, any return
earned by such assets is a “rent”; i.e., a return over and above cost (Section
5.51, p.3).
The report considers that regulated assets may be valued using one of a variety of
approaches. Their criteria for choosing one ‘approach’, or ‘methodology’ over another
seems inextricably hinged on their view of the level of revenue able to be extracted
from use of the asset. Inhibitors to regulatory switching from one valuation base to
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another are considered to be the need to avoid the adverse effects of increased
perceptions of increased regulatory risk, discourage investment and disrupt efficiency
(whatever that means). In infrastructure industries, including the provision of airports
and electricity the regulators recognize the prime importance of adequate capacity and
recommend that:
specialized assets need to be allocated a value above opportunity cost,
although the increase in value above opportunity cost (all else being the
same) should be minimized so as to minimize the adverse impact on
allocative efficiency (Section 5.83, p.10).
It seems that the Commission has erred in placing its regulatory role above the market.
If DV were accepted as the valuation base, then the opportunity cost of the regulatory
assets would be defined by demand. Wellington International Airport Ltd recognizes
the danger of switching from one methodology, ODRC to DHC, as this would increase
perceptions of regulatory risk, discourage investment, and may be detrimental to
efficiency.

The above reluctant admission that regulatory risk plays an important role in investors’
intentions regarding future investment in a regulated business should gain proper
prominence and the adoption of DV would contribute to a lower risk environment for
new infrastructure investment. The New Zealand opposition spokesman on economic
affairs, former Reserve Bank Governor, Don Brash, was reported in the Australian
Financial Review (15/02/03) as being of the view that the level of investment in new
electricity infrastructure assets was insufficient to meet projected demand. One might
conclude that the Commission’s preoccupation with ‘allocative efficiency’ and the use
of ODRC has had the effect of unnecessary interference in the market so that the level
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of risk faced by firms contemplating new investment initiatives has become exaggerated
and the regulatory pricing structure has distorted demand forecasts.
The regulatory use of Current Cost Accounting in the UK.
Whittington (1995) (1998), and Pong and Whittington (1996), discuss the regulatory use
of CCA by regulated utility companies, British Gas, the regional electricity companies
(REC)s, and the water companies. Each of these companies produce full CCA
information in addition to reports based on historic cost accounting standards, while the
private sector use an ‘uneasy’ mixture of historic cost and current values. Most private
companies produce CCA data only as supplementary data. Whittington suggests that
British Gas and other regulated utilities have persisted with CCA as it offers them
potential advantages in dealing with regulators. Their annual reports use Historic Cost
as normal and include some selected revaluations at CCA. In their reports to regulators,
utilities such as British Gas submit CCA reports as additions to their annual reports.
However, the Mergers and Monopolies Commission, British Gas plc, report under the
Gas Act 1986, HMSO, 1997, which acts as an appeal body in the regulatory cases, ruled
that these CCA reports did not provide a suitable basis for regulation. Companies had
applied the Deprival Value rules on an individual basis.

The framework favoured in the UK for the regulation of utilities is price-cap regulation
rather than rate-of-return regulation. The regulators recognized that pure rate-of-return
regulation was potentially a recipe for misdirecting management’s energies towards
negotiating a higher regulatory asset base or a higher permitted rate of return. Goals of
greater productive efficiency or innovation in products and services to meet customer
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needs were seen by the regulators as being more likely to be achieved if the more
judgmental process of setting a price cap on services is adopted.

Whittington frames his view of regulation by connecting the CCA asset value to the
discount on flotation. This, in the UK’s Mergers and Monopolies Commission’s (MMC)
notation reduces the Market to Asset Ratio (MAR*) to less than unity and in the case of
British Gas to 60% of the full CCA value of the assets by the time British Gas was
referred to the MMC. (The ‘sids’13 paid only 40p for each pound of the current cost
value of net assets at flotation). Thus if the MAR had been permitted to rise to the full
CCA asset value the price would have risen to one pound per share. The MMC’s
process of inquiry raised the question of whether value to the business (VTB) is the
appropriate basis for calculating a regulatory return in such industries and if so how it
should be calculated. Whittington (1995) reports the widespread use of Replacement
Cost indices to estimate VTB because of subjectivity in the determination of the
Modern Equivalent Asset (MEA) and lack of, or unreliability of, market prices for
assets. Since the assets of gas companies are so specific and, in many cases, may be
regarded as ‘sunk’; the NRV may be ignored and the value at or immediately after
flotation as the stock markets estimate of recoverable amount. With stock market values
so substantially below the replacement cost value of assets per share at time of flotation,
the effective VTB can be regarded as being determined by the share price rather than the
replacement cost of the assets.

13

‘sids’ refers to the price per share paid by the public at flotation.
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Although the MMC adopted ‘price cap’ regulation in respect of British Gas, the
company received depreciation allowances/flow based on the CCA value of the assets.
This resulted in lower reported income than if a depreciation flow based on HC was
used. Whittington argues that unless this ‘cash flow’ becomes earmarked or ‘ring
fenced’ for re-investment purposes then the company will have incentives to invest
(excess funds) outside of the company where a full return can be achieved.

The MMC response was to allow full CCA return on new investment. This meant a
departure from ‘price cap’ regulation and Whittington argued the return would
eventually rise to a Market to Asset Ratio (MAR*), of unity as assets would be replaced
resulting in unpopularity with consumers and gains to investors. Because a balance was
struck by the MMC the effects on these two interest groups of replacement investment
were not great over the short term. However, in the longer term the effect of
replacement investment would be to increase the MAR* to unity.

Whittington identifies the dilemma of the regulators whereby if they accept the MAR*
as unity and this becomes the cost base for the future, the share price would become a
self-fulfilling prophecy. Thus, if the MMC’s approach of allowing a full CCA return
became a habit, rather than a ‘one-off’, there would be windfall gain to shareholders.
Alternatively, if not a habit, regulators will face the problem of dealing with an
historically based MAR which looks increasingly anomalous. He suggests that the
depreciation charge (based on the CCA value of the assets at flotation) as allowed for
regulatory purposes should be abated over time to reflect the flotation discount.
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A difference between the UK situation and Australia
In the UK, the MMC regulation decision is based on consideration of the flotation share
price as well as an estimate of the CCA valuation of the assets. Whittington’s
discussion, above, is able to meaningfully use the MAR* as the value of the company to
be regulated. In the 1999 IPART (NSW) decision in relation to AGLGN, the area of
greatest conflict between IPART, AGLGN, customers and consumers was over the
determination of the regulatory asset base (RAB), whether it was to remain at the
previous ‘agreed value’ or be increased to a value that in its final form was at
approximately 65% of DORC.

In the UK, the MMC decided not to allow full CCA valuation for the determination of
the recoverable revenue. Whittington describes the increase in the value of the assets to
approach the CCA valuation as gradual over time as assets are written off through
depreciation and new replacement assets are purchased. In the IPART (2000), decision,
having adopted a DORC valuation for the Regulatory Asset Base, IPART then allowed
increases due to changes in the CPI from the date of adoption of the DORC value in
1996 up to the date on which the decision was to take effect on 1 July 1999. So the
pricing regime, required to support the return on these assets might have been based on
the pre-1996 agreed values, was increased to DORC as at July 1996, and then increased
to the present values based on DORC plus the CPI changes from 1996-1999.

Whittington (1995) writes that apart from the difficulties of obtaining the cost of the
modern equivalent asset (MEA), there is the much more difficult problem that stock
market values have typically been below the replacement cost value of assets per share,
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and were so at the time of flotation. He concludes that the effective VTB can be
regarded as being determined by the share price rather than the cost of replacing assets.
Since this is so, it is fortunate that ‘price cap’ regulation is in place rather than pure ‘rate
of return’ since there are obvious uncertainties in estimating relevant variables, for
example, the relevant return on capital.

Whittington (1997) has identified a significant problem. He asserts that there is
confusion among regulators about the difference between the terms, “current cost” and
“replacement cost” when used as a valuation methodology for assets. His definition of
'replacement cost' follows:

Replacement cost (RC) implies that assets (and, strictly, liabilities also) are
valued at their current cost of replacement. Replacement is itself an
ambiguous concept: it can embrace both physical and economic replacement.
Regulation is an economic process, so that it is reasonable to assume that we
are concerned with the economic rather than the physical concept, i.e. with
the cost of replacing the economic service which an asset represents, in its
most economical manner possible, rather than with a replacement by an exact
physical replica. The objective of economic replacement is captured by the
concept of the modern equivalent asset, which is widely accepted in
accounting for regulatory businesses (1997 p1).
Whittington argues that current cost (CC) as a valuation method goes further than
replacement cost in that it adopts the concept of value to the business (VTB) or
recoverable amount. Whittington affirms that VTB modifies RC by reference to
recoverable amount (RA). It is the maximum amount that can be recovered from an
asset owned. It is the greatest of net selling price (NRV) and present value (PV).
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‘Optimised’ Replacement Cost
In going back to IPART’s definition of DORC one should consider the “optimised”
section of their definition:
An optimised system is a reconfigured system designed to serve the current
load plus expected growth over a specified period using modern technology.
This method excludes any unused or underutilised assets beyond the
specialised planning horizon, and allows for potential cost savings which
may have resulted from technological improvement (IPART 1999 d Vol.1,
p52).
This section of IPART’s definition suggests that ‘stranded assets’ would be excluded
when considering the DORC value of assets. Perhaps this exclusion is a monitoring
issue for IPART. The IPART definition also contains notions of engineering
optimisation. This is the point where the words ‘depreciated’ and ‘optimised’ enter the
valuation concept and overcome the circularity objection to the regulators’ dilemma.

New assets are purchased at RC and this must equal the PV at that time. New assets
must also be the best available to do the job in hand. In other words the new assets are
an optimal choice by management. Therefore, the new acquisition may be described as
an Optimised Replacement Cost asset and in normal circumstances will be both
recorded in the books of the company at actual cost and regulators will approve a
revenue stream that will return an amount equal to the WACC. Thus the above
mentioned problem of regulatory circularity does not occur because the acquisition cost
is determined by the combination of managerial expertise and market price to acquire
the replacement asset.
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The approach taken by regulators in approving the use of DORC brings into the CC/RC
discussion the idea of a valuation base consisting of the optimum assets to perform the
work of the regulated utility. Since this optimal configuration of assets does not consist
of new assets, the regulators reflect this by lowering the value of the regulatory asset
base from full Optimised Replacement Cost to DORC.

The use of VTB or the DV framework when used by regulators of natural monopolies is
that the binding value that may emerge from the rules may well be NPV. NPV may be
equal to RC, however, NRV may be significantly less than either and in fact may best
be described as ‘sunk’ costs of little recoverable amount.

This immediately raises the problem of circularity as the value of the assets becomes the
NPV of the income stream and its consequent price regime. So the determination of the
value of the assets at NPV places the regulator in the unenviable role of being in the
middle of a circular argument. The regulated revenue could be set, and justified, at any
level up to the point where NPV exceeds the value of RC so that RC becomes the VTB.

Whittington (1997, p3) discusses the reality of the aggregation of inter-dependent
components of network utilities because from a regulators perspective an aggregate
assessment of VTB is required. The individual value of assets may well be different
from the aggregate value; however, while there is a commitment to continuation of the
business the aggregate value of the business is the relevant value. Whittington
We have already seen that the rolled forward regulatory value can determine
the current cost valuation when it is below Replacement Cost, but the reverse
is not true: current cost value cannot determine regulatory value when it is
below Replacement Cost. This arises from the circularity problem identified
earlier (1997, p 6,) (Whittington’s use of Bold).
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Whittington is here concerned with utilities where the flotation price has become the
Regulatory Asset Base and thus flotation price represents NRV.

Conclusion
The origins of ‘fair value’ as antecedents of DORC have been researched. The
determination of ‘fair value’ as in Smyth v Ames and its hold on the regulation of
railways in the US followed by the abandonment of this view and the return to the use
of HC resulting from the Hope decision. The recommendations of the Hilmer report
encouraged competition and recommended against regulation.

A smorgasbord of definitions has been described for Depreciated Optimum
Replacement Cost (DORC) as a valuation base for regulatory assets.

Initially the

separation of wealth from income was discussed and Fisher’s use of discounted value of
future cash flows as the determinant of income. It has been argued that separation of
income from capital is an essential task in the debate surrounding different valuation
bases to adopt for the valuation of business assets. From the debate three notions have
gained support in the finding of the VTB. They are NPV, NRV and RC. Of these, RC is
favored by many writers/theorists with the qualification that stock market values for
regulated business tend to be below RC and therefore NRV may be best described as
VTB. The inclusion of the words ‘Optimum’ and ‘Depreciated’ to RC add nuances that
are particular to the regulation of assets.
Various regulators’ views on DORC have given the most detailed instructions about
what DORC is and how the values are arrived at. None the less, the determination of
DORC valuations remains extremely subjective and the identification of the identity of
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the modern equivalent asset (MEA) has yet to be discovered in most industrial
situations. The Australian regulators avoid any consideration of the relevance that share
prices on the Stock Exchange have to the underlying asset values. This blinkered view
is probably because of the capture of regulatory economics by Finance Economics who
have a regulatory view that is probably too narrow. The MMC in the UK, by using as a
starting position the ‘flotation’ price of the underlying assets have focused on the
competing interests of shareholders and consumers before arriving at their ‘balance’
solution to the regulation problem. Privatised utilities in the UK, i.e., British Gas plc,
prepare annual accounts using both HC and CCA although the regulator does not
require CCA accounts. Having long been a champion of current cost accounting,
Whittington questions whether there is a role for current cost accounting or replacement
cost accounting in the regulatory process:
…very little role for CCA or RCA….This is certainly the case insofar as
regulation is concerned with determining what is a reasonable return on and
of capital to shareholders. This is because shareholders did not pay for the
replacement cost of assets when the major utilities were privatised.
Furthermore rolling forward the regulatory base using replacement cost
values rather than a general index produces greater uncertainty in the
regulation process (1997, p. 14).
While IPART (NSW) was considering the Access Arrangement for AGLGN in respect
of its recent decision, contract customers argued against the adoption of DORC values
for regulatory assets because AGLGN had not paid DORC values for its pipeline.
Unfortunately their arguments were not acted upon by the regulator and many consider
that AGLGN enjoyed a windfall gain resulting from the increase in asset values and the
final approved pricing structure contained in the MAR. This abandonment of the
concerns of the wider environment and market values in favour of DORC, in spite of its
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deficiencies, by Australian regulators, shows loyalty to the model presented by Finance
Economics even though this model excludes ‘real world’ considerations.

Chapter 5
The theoretical Foundations of the Tariff Equation.
Introduction
Chapter 4 gave a detailed description of DORC within the context of Value to the
Business (VTB), and indications of the strength of regulators’ support for DORC as the
basis for their determination of the Regulatory Asset Base (RAB). DORC is the key
determinant of the regulated revenue stream in regulatory decisions. Chapter 5 describes
the regulatory legal principles, i.e., the gas code and the electricity code that the federal
and state regulators must adhere to. Setting the level of approved revenues described as
the ‘Building Block’ approach and Incentive Regulation defines the parameters within
which regulation occurs. The Chapter describes the now well recognised Finance
theorem that proves that when the RAB is the base on which Regulated Return is
calculated, and over the expected life of the RAB the capital is returned to owners, then
the NPV of the asset base is equal to the RAB at time zero. The consequences that flow
from this are:
1. Any increase in the RAB over previous values represents an upward
revaluation of the assets.
2. New capital expenditure (capex) offers an NPV to the owners equal to the
outlay and will be rewarded at the WACC.
3. NPV is constant no matter what pattern is used for depreciation write-offs.
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The National Third Party Access Code
The Code for Natural Gas Pipelines Systems is premised on the notion that reference
tariffs be based on providing services at efficient cost. The objectives of Part IIIA of the
TPA provide the starting point for developing access pricing principles and these are
recommended to:
(a) Enhance overall economic efficiency by promoting efficient use of, and
investment in, essential infrastructure services, and
(b) Provide a framework and guiding principles for industry-specific access
regimes.

The need for regulation of gas transmission pipelines has been scrutinised by interested
parties including Network Economics Consulting Group, (2002) who argue that the
competition provisions of the Act are more prescriptive and detailed than legislation in
the United States or the European Union and that this has resulted in unnecessary
complexity. Newberry (1997) writes about the needs of customers and how essential it
is to command the confidence of customers. The essence of regulation is to give
customers confidence that they are not at the mercy of large monopolies.
Competition provides better incentives for efficiency than regulation, but it is
impossible or ineffective for the core natural monopolies of electricity
transmission and distribution (1997, p.3).
Core natural monopolies are gas transmission pipelines. In the UK, the Gas Act of 1996
introduced a network code for gas transmission. As outlined in Chapter 4, the Trade
Practices Act (TPA), establishes a regulatory regime to facilitate third party access to
the services of certain essential facilities of national significance such as electricity grids
or gas pipelines. Under Part IIIA of the TPA, ‘Access regimes’ are established and are
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the end product of an approval process that bestows on the successful applicant, the
right to access or rent the capacity of these monopoly assets. In exchange for access to
their network assets, owners are able to charge transmission tariffs.

The gas and electricity codes
Under the Gas Supply Act 1996, IPART regulates gas pricing through the establishment
of gas pricing orders under which charges for natural gas supplied to customers are
fixed. The objectives of Part IIIA of the TPA provide the starting point for developing
access pricing principles and these are recommended to:
(a) Enhance overall economic efficiency by promoting efficient use of, and
investment in, essential infrastructure services, and to
(b) Provide a framework and guiding principles for industry-specific access
regimes.
Under the National Gas Code, Clause 8.1 states that a reference tariff and reference
tariff policy should be designed to achieve the following objectives:
•

Providing the service provider with the opportunity to earn a stream
of revenue that recovers the efficient costs of delivering the
reference service over the expected life of the assets used in
delivering that service

•

Replicating the outcome of a competitive market

•

Ensuring the safe and reliable operation of the pipeline

•

Not distorting investment decisions in pipeline transportation
systems or in upstream or downstream industries

•

Efficiency in the level and structure of the reference tariffs, and
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•

Providing an incentive to the service provider to reduce costs and to
develop the market for reference and other services.

Federal and State regulatory bodies

Regulation at the national level is carried out by a Commonwealth agency, the ACCC
and at the State Level there are about thirteen energy regulators across the country. The
two largest State regulators are the Independent Pricing and Review Tribunal (IPART)
in NSW and by the Essential Services Commission (ESC), previously the Office of the
Regulator General (ORG) in Victoria.
Regulators are called upon to decide the amount of revenue that the infrastructure owner
is allowed to earn from access pricing in order to gain a reasonable return-oninvestment. There are 3 steps:
1. Regulator must determine the rate base -- value of infrastructure facility
2. Regulator must determine the allowed rate of return
3. Regulator must place constraints on prices that the facility owner can charge for
access services.

The IPART's history of gas and electricity regulation in New South Wales dates from
July 1996 when it took over gas regulation from the Gas Council. The Gas Supply Act of
1996 makes the Tribunal responsible for gas tariffs and access arrangements for third
parties to the gas network. Section 27 provides for the Tribunal to establish a gas
pricing order and the Tribunal must decide whether to issue a gas pricing order and if
so, the form and duration of such order.
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The IPART discussion paper dated January 1999 Rolling forward the regulatory Asset
Bases of the Electricity and Gas Industries, describes clearly the framework under
which IPART operates. Under section 2.2 of the Code for natural gas pipeline systems
the following matters must be considered:
(a) the service provider's legitimate business interests and investment in the
covered pipeline;
(b) firm and binding contractual obligations of the service provider or other
persons (or both) already using the covered pipeline;
(c) the operational and technical requirements necessary for the safe and
reliable operation of the covered pipeline;
(d) the public interest, including the public interest in having competition in
markets (whether or not in Australia);
(e) the interests of users and prospective users;
(f) Any other matters that the relevant regulator considers relevant (1999,
Section 2.2).
The above items describe a similar range of interests to those under which the ACCC
operates. IPART groups these factors into four categories, consumer protection,
economic efficiency, financial stability and environmental and other standards. The
environmental and other standards include protection of environment by appropriate
pricing policies, consideration of demand management and standards of quality,
reliability and safety.

IPART is required to report on its assessment of each of these factors and may be
required by the Premier to consider specific matters in its investigations. Under Section
7.5 of the Code for Natural Gas Distribution Networks in NSW, IPART must establish
and maintain a public register of all determinations made under the Code, which may
including, at the discretion of the regulator, a summary of the reasons for the
determination, and identification of the parties involved.
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The Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal Act 1992 (IPART Act), Section 15
specifies the criteria the Tribunal must consider in determining prices under its Act.
This related in the past to electricity and gas. However, in future, electricity prices must
be determined in accordance with the National Electricity Code. Under Section 4 of the
IPART Act the Tribunal has responsibility for pricing the services declared to be
monopoly services for which:
1.

there are no other suppliers to provide competition on the part of the market
concerned, and

2.

For which there is no potential contestable market in the short term in that part
of the market.

The Tribunal carries out two forms of regulatory activities:
•

the determination of maximum prices, which must be charged by the agencies
concerned unless they have the Treasurer's approval to charge lower prices

•

Reviewing and making recommendations on pricing policies for the monopoly
services.

The Tribunal must assess proposals in accordance with the National Access Code which
came into effect in August 1998 with the enactment of the Gas Pipelines Access (NSW)
Act 1998. The latter gives backing to the National Third Party Access Code for natural
gas pipeline systems. Gas tariff regulation continues under the Gas Supply Act of 1996.

Setting the Initial Capital Base (ICB).
In Victoria, legislation was passed in the Victorian Parliament setting out the values to
be placed on regulatory assets. In contrast to NSW, the ESC (previously ORG) does not
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have any involvement in the establishment of regulatory value of utility assets. In
returning to the question of how DORC has been accepted by regulators, we examine
legislation passed that gives authority to DORC valuations. In Victoria, DORC values
were endorsed in the following pieces of legislation:
•

Electricity Industry Act 1993, Section 158A, the Victorian Electricity
Supply Industry Tariff Order, June 1995. See Appendix N page 89,
where the table included shows the Optimised Depreciated Replacement
Cost of the five distributors plus (or in some cases minus) adjustment
and giving adjusted asset values described as ‘Opening book values,
presumably for tariff determination purposes’.14

•

Victorian Third Party Access Code for Natural Gas Pipeline Systems:
Access Arrangement Information for Distribution Pipeline by Westar Pty
Ltd and Westar (Assets) Pty Ltd. See Appendix N1 page 2, Table 2:
Asset Valuation for ODRC values.

•

Victorian Third Party Access Code for Natural Gas Pipeline Systems:
Access Arrangement Information for Distribution Pipeline by Stratus Pty
Ltd and Stratus Networks (Assets) Pty Ltd. See Appendix N2 page 2
Table 2: Asset Valuation for ODRC allocated values.

In each of these documents there is a definitive statement of the DORC values to be
attributed to assets for regulation of revenue purposes. On page 2, Table 2, of the
Stratus Access Arrangement Information, Asset Valuation appears as shown below:
Regulatory tariffs are commonly determined in accordance with the
following formula:
14

Item 5.10 (a) states ‘utilise price based regulation adopting a CPI-X approach and not rate of return
regulation;
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Maximum Allowed Tariff (MAR) = Operating Costs (Opex) + Capital Costs.
Capital Costs include the Depreciated Optimised Replacement Cost (DORC),
of the Assets plus Depreciation based on the DORC value of those assets.
From the above it is clear that the calculation of DORC for the assets of a company is
pivotal to the determination of the amount of revenue able to be collected from
customers. A brief history of the regulation of major utilities reveals that replacement
cost for asset valuation has been prominent through legal precedent, and in Victoria,
DORC values for electricity and gas have been enshrined in legislation while Deprival
Value (DV) has been abandoned as a valuation rule.

A key component of the recent (1999) decision by the Independent Pricing and Review
Tribunal of New South Wales (IPART NSW), in relation to the Access Arrangement for
AGLGN 1999-2004, was the approval of the tariff formula based upon the
determination of the Initial Capital Base (ICB). The ICB is established by adopting an
arbitrary percentage of the Depreciated Optimised Replacement Cost (DORC) valuation
that was closer to the Optimised Replacement Cost (ORC), of the regulated assets. Once
the regulator has agreed to the amount or size of the ICB, a rate of Weighted Average
Cost of Capital (WACC) to be achieved in relation to those assets, is struck and
approved. In addition to this rate of return or capital component, operating and
administrative expenses are approved for that level of revenue as well as return of
capital by way of depreciation. Parry (2000) argues:
Importantly, it is the capital-related costs (return on and of capital) that
dominate the total revenue requirements for the infrastructure assets involved
in access to the major utilities such as electricity, gas, telecommunications
and rail (2000, p.140).
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This mode of regulation - Rate of Return - regulation is criticised in that once the ICB
has been set, and the rate of WACC approved as part of the revenue stream, the
regulation of the pipeline, the regulators’ role diminishes. From the company's
perspective an assured income is in place. Failure to achieve revenue targets would
mean that the approved return would not be achieved. On the other hand, this situation
is unlikely to arise in monopolistic trading conditions where demand levels are carefully
estimated. Exceeding revenue targets is possible and positive sales volume variances
may add significantly to profits without any risk of being clawed back by the regulator.
Dawson (1999) describes one approach to regulation as Economic analysis through
forward-looking cash flow analysis. Network services can be analysed as Regulated
Services, Excluded Services or Non-Regulated services. The tariffs charged for
excluded services must be "fair and reasonable" but it is assumed that competition
controls the price.

Determination of the Maximum Allowed Revenue (MAR).
This is translated into an amount of money able to recovered through prices on an
annual basis as being: total period costs, and total capital costs. The now well known
formula that is used to express the allowable tariff formula for a period of time, usually
one year, or period is shown by the following well-known formula:
MAR
•

=

operating expenses t + depreciationt + opportunity costt

(1)

operating expensest includes all running expenses; maintenance of the pipeline
to ‘as new’ condition plus marketing and administrative expenses

•

depreciationt is the decline in asset value Vt-1 - Vt over period t and this may be
measured in a variety of ways and
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•

opportunity costt which is the dollar return on capital that might have been
earned had the opening asset value Vt-1 been invested elsewhere for the year
(ACCC 1999a, pp.x-xiv).

The intention of this regulatory mechanism is to reward utility owners for having been
in the business with its associated costs, recognising that over time assets become less
valuable because of the variety of events that make old assets less valuable than new
ones.

Gas transmission assets, that is pipelines, are extremely long lived assets when they are
maintained in ‘as new’ condition and that this level of maintenance helps to prolong
pipeline lives almost indefinitely. However, they are ‘sunk’ assets and may become
obsolete. It is most likely that this would happen if the source of gas they carry were to
be used up. Even this eventuality can be overcome with the development of
‘Interconnect’ pipelines such as have been built in New South Wales and Victoria
allowing gas to go upstream or downstream as demand dictates. Traditionally ‘sunk
assets’ are considered to be at the low end of the valuation spectrum and, as we have
discussed, the NRV of these sunk assets has been excluded from the value bases
considered as suitable to base the regulated revenues on. The fact that the principle
assets of gas transmission companies are pipelines and having noted that they are
“sunk” assets makes the determination of the regulators to reward the owners of these
assets at the level of the WACC on the DORC valuation extremely attractive to the asset
owners. The proportion of the MAR that the WACC on the DORC value of the assets
represents is typically equal to 70-80% (Davis 1999a, p.5; Zauner 2000, p.1). This
means that any increase or decrease in the amount of money that the RAB represents
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results in a significant change in the MAR. Owners are rewarded at a specific rate of
return (WACC) for their use of capital, as would fairly be expected in a rational and
competitive market.

The owners of natural monopolies, i.e., owners of energy transmission infrastructure
assets and regulators have wide discretion but their task is very difficult when there is
no competition. The problem is one of logical circularity in that tariffs cannot be fixed
at levels consistent and fair in relation to market values when in fact those market
values are only determined once tariff levels are set.

The ‘Building Block’ Approach and Incentive Regulation
Incentive regulation is a term developed within regulatory organizations as an
explanatory of the ongoing work of regulation. The term is used by both the ACCC and
State regulators. Regulators have relied on a model claimed to emulate market
determinations and described as the Building Block Approach. This Building Block
Approach includes approving an access arrangement which is described as the sum of
period costs of owning and operating the necessary transmission infrastructure assets
and gives a maximum or upper limit (a ‘price cap’) on allowable period tariff revenue.
IPART describes the Building Block Approach to the regulation of services as based on
determination of the MAR. The MAR is sometimes described as the Incentive Equation.
The notion that the determination of the MAR is a Building Block Approach is
reflective of an alternative method of determining the regulatory revenue stream
achievable by regulated energy distributors. It seems that following on from the
determination of the Initial Capital Base (ICB) and the adoption of the regulatory
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formula taking an Incentive Regulation approach, the regulatory revenue for subsequent
periods would be determined by actual movements in important components of the cost.
The regulators have moved towards the adoption of the MAR in order to modify the
size of the revenue able to be raised by natural monopolies. It is a second step to be
implemented after the ICB has been established. It has the aim of monitoring of costs
and efficiencies, if any, achieved by the companies.

Incentive Regulation has been described by Mark Pearson (1999), a Senior Assistant
Commissioner of the ACCC, as a mechanism that allows a pipeline owner to receive
some payback for better then expected performance arising from actions aimed at
increasing efficiency or growing markets. The Code is considered to embody the
principles of an incentive regulation framework in order to provide services to
customers at an efficient cost. Pearson describes Incentive Regulation as follows:
a means of harnessing the superior knowledge of the service provider and
hence overcoming the information asymmetry problem faced by regulators.
(1999, page 29)
Pearson continues:
Under incentive regulation there is a particular relationship between costs and
revenues not usually found under the rate of return model. As noted, if
regulation simply allows prices and revenues to adjust to changing costs
through regular pass through, along with a 'normal' rate of return on the
capital employed, little incentive is created to be efficient or innovative in
service provision and delivery.
Mechanisms under the incentive regulation umbrella seek to avoid this direct
relationship between revenue and costs to some degree. The use of
benchmarks, yardstick competition and price caps act to decouple costs from
final prices, and hence from firm's profits. (1999, page 30)
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Pearson identifies the Australian approach to incentive regulation as being a price cap
approach based on an index such as the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and some
productivity factor, X, i.e., the CPI-X model.

IPART (1999) describes their approach to the Determination of the initial regulatory
asset base:
The Tribunal has not endorsed any particular asset valuation methodology.
Economic analysis provides important input when valuing sunk assets for
regulation. However it does not suggest that one specific methodology is
unambiguously superior to another. Rather economic principles provide
lower and upper bounds. (1999, p.11)
IPART (1998) in describing their general approach (to regulation) discusses the
implications of regarding the regulatory asset base as representing financial investment
in the firm, and in IPART’s view the physical assets of the firm present them with
choices regarding depreciation and indexation of the asset base. IPART expresses
interest in the physical assets view while recognizing the subjectivity involved in the
determination of values. IPART considers that an appropriate approach is one which:
• generates a flatter cash flow pattern that is likely to lead to stable prices
over time,
• allows the regulated entity to manage its business according to when
capital expenditure is required,
• Has the least problem of intergenerational equity (1988, p.24).
IPART prefers the name ‘Incentive Regulation’ having a focus on approving prices
rather than regulating the more traditional cost of service (or rate of return) regulation.
Key characteristics are:
•

Regulation of prices or revenues rather than profits

•

Use of a medium term price or revenue controls, rather than annual reviews
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•

Incentives for the entity to pursue efficiency gains by providing an opportunity to
retain the benefits of improved profitability for a period of time.

In defining the revenue requirement, whether through price or revenue cap, IPART is
required, under the electricity and gas codes, to assess the future cash flow needs of an
organisation. Thus, IPART attempts to strike a balance between the entity achieving
appropriate financial performance and serving the interests of consumers through the
long run provision of services at prices that reflect efficient costs. This focus on the
regulation of prices and cash flows is expressed by defining a revenue or cash
requirement. The revenue must be sufficient to cover the operations, maintenance and
administration expenses of the entity, plus an appropriate return of and on the capital.
Ergas (2000) states that:
To begin with, if the allowed rate of return is even minimally above the
WACC, the firm will have incentives to accelerate the replacement of
existing assets. This is merely a form of the Averch-Johnson effect, but
preventing it would involve the regulator in close and presumably costly
monitoring of the firms maintenance and investment decisions (2000, p.3)
The Circularity Problem and choice of valuation method
The regulators’ tariff formulae averts the circularity problem by defining entity asset
value in an "accounting" or "balance sheet" approach to the valuation problem. Possible
valuation bases that might have been adopted by the regulators include:
1.

Current market realisable value, possibly scrap value,

2.

Historic or actual cost,

3.

Current replacement cost,

4.

Depreciated Optimised Replacement Cost

5.

Deprival Value - a variation of replacement cost.
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The COAG agreement of August 1994 installed deprival value as the preferred
valuation basis for network assets (IPART 1998, p.35; ACCC 1998a, p.8). Walker et al.
(2000b, p.132) describe the adoption of DV as becoming dominant in Australian public
sector accounting. Although Deprival Value (DV) has been seriously considered by
regulators, the adoption of the DV framework has been rejected because of inherent
references to future cash flows, (or tariffs) and thus the circularity problem. DV may
also arrive at a result whereby the assets of a regulated monopoly are valued at NRV. In
the case of sunk assets, the scrap value may only be a fraction of the Replacement Cost
of the assets.

Davis(1999), notes the "fundamental conundrum" involved in the

valuation process:
by applying a required rate of return to an estimate of existing asset value,
which for consistency should be market value, however this can only be
determined once the required rate of return and future cash flows are
estimated. There is inherent circularity. (1999, p.2)
The avoidance of the problems of circularity and rewarding asset owners above the low
values of ‘sunk’ assets has been achieved by the use of Depreciated Optimised
Replacement Cost (DORC) by Australian regulators. New acquisitions by asset owners
attract the WACC thus new investment is rewarded financially at the same rate as the
reward/return offered on the DORC value of existing assets. However, many existing
assets are not purchased out of current cash but have been owned for a long time. A
regulatory reward that was in line with the status quo or ‘agreed values’ of the past
would avoid the problem of the substantial write up of the assets that the adoption of
DORC entails. This ‘write up’ is only notional in that, as far as annual accounts for
regulated companies are concerned (such as AGLGN), adherence to the use of Historic
Cost for the valuation of its assets in its annual accounts is maintained.
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While DV has been rejected, the regulatory bodies, ACCC, ORG, and IPART (NSW),
have avowed consensus that the single, universally appropriate valuation basis for tariff
setting is Current Replacement Cost or Depreciated Optimised Replacement Cost
(DORC), i.e., the written down replacement cost of an asset is its optimal or most
efficient (in an engineering sense) replacement. How it is written down is another issue
and open to negotiation. The adoption of DORC results in the highest value attaching to
the assets of each of the valuation methods considered. DORC is therefore at the high
(highest) end of the valuation spectrum.

The regulators’ tariff equation does little to discourage suspicions of the prevalence of
an Averch Johnson effect (1962). That is, the suggestion that profit-motivated firms
under a regime of rate of return regulation have interest in maximizing their costs in
order to maximize returns. This is the basic problem of rate-of-return regulation that led
to the promotion of different forms of incentive regulation such as the Building Block
approach referred to above. However, the significant role that the WACC plays in the
regulators’ tariff equation contradicts their argument that ‘Rate of Return’ is not the
overriding regulatory strategy.

Some of the consequences of the prices that result from the imposition of DORC values,
the highest in the range considered, include restriction in the use of the pipeline, and the
hamstringing of present and future Australian national and industrial development by
charging inflated costs to downstream users. Interested parties attempt to sell off the
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income stream that the approval of the access regime represents, for example the sale of
electricity in Victoria and the sale of the MSP to Australian Pipeline Trust.

There is a need for review of the Australian regulators’ adoption of DORC, particularly
the analytical arguments in favour of DORC. The most contentious issue is that
pipelines are 'sunk', fully maintained assets. The rejection of Deprival Value with the
implication that ‘sunk’ values are not to be the basis of regulatory pricing arrangements
further inflates DORC values and the problem of circularity.

The cost of debt and equity
Debt may be long term or short term, and includes current liabilities and accrued
expenses. Current liabilities have no explicit cost, i.e. they do not carry a rate of
interest. The same goes for accrued expenses. There are two main things to note when
considering the cost of debt:
a)

Marginal cost of debt: The rate at which a firm can raise money often

depends upon its leverage, and this changes with every additional unit of debt raised.
The cost of debt therefore is the incremental cost of debt – and not existing debt. The
necessity to consider the incremental cost of raising debt is also reinforced by the fact
that existing debt may have been contracted earlier when interest rates were different.
b)

Adjustment for taxes: Interest paid on debt is a deductible business

expense that reduces the tax liability (or creates a tax asset in a year where there are no
profits). The cost of debt should be considered net of tax, for instance, where debt can
be raised at 10% per annum and the rate of corporate tax is 40%, the effective after tax
cost of debt is 6% per annum.
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Cost of equity is more difficult to determine as share capital carries no explicit cost but
shareholders do expect a certain rate of return when they invest in a company. In a
simplistic scenario, this expectation may be termed as the cost of equity for a firm. The
cost of equity is the amount to be paid to attract investors to invest in the stock of a
company and to keep them interested in retaining their investment. If this return is not
returned to investors, they will abandon the firm’s stock and sell, and such a firm will
not be able to raise future capital without offering substantial discounts. The reward to
investors, over a long-term period, will always equal the cost of equity. Calling the cost
of equity an ‘expectation’, however, does not lead to a quantifiable number. One of the
most significant models used to determine the cost of equity capital is the capital asset
pricing model (CAPM). Broadly, CAPM lays down that the cost of equity capital is
being equal to the return expected on the firm’s common stock. Mathematically, this
can be written as:
Cost of equity capital = The Risk free rate (of return) + Stock’s Beta times
the Market Risk Premium
The risk free rate refers to the long-term return from debt securities regarded as free
from credit risk, for example treasury bonds in a US context, or the return on guaranteed
local currency sovereign bonds in any other country. To this must be added the
shareholders’ risk reward for investing in the shares of the firm. This risk reward has
two components:
(a)

The reward for investing in the stock market as a whole, and

(b)

The reward for investing in the particular firm in question.

The market risk premium represents the reward for investors for taking the risk of
putting their money in stocks generally. Market risk premium is determined for the
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economy as a whole, and for the US economy is around 7% p.a. This represents the
margin by which the market as a whole has surpassed the performance of risk-free
securities over a long period of time. This does not take into account the short term
peaks and troughs of the markets, but considers a more secular trend spanning many
decades. The underlying assumption is that (over a long period) investors would have
driven the prices of shares up or down so as to equate the yield from shares to be equal
to the return below which they would not have invested in the market.

The Beta coefficient
The market risk premium discussed above is a very broad measure that considers the
stock markets as a whole. However, not all companies are equally risky. Investors
would demand more return for making an investment in a risky venture than in a firm
that has stable and predictable earnings. The beta coefficient is an adjustment to the
market risk premium based upon the risk perception for the firm in question. If a firm is
perceived to be no more or no less risky than the stock market as a whole, its beta
coefficient would be 1. Similarly, firms more risky than average will have a beta
coefficient of greater than 1 and firms with less risk will have a beta coefficient of less
than one. The beta coefficient is an individual risk measure for a given firm, identifying
how responsive the stock’s return is relative to movements in the entire stock market.
Beta can be any value, positive or negative, but usually is between +0.25 and +1.75. A
value of 1.0 indicates the stock moves in step with the underlying index. A beta value of
1.1 indicates a 1.10% movement for a 1% move in the index, regardless of direction.
For WACC purposes, both debt and equity must be valued at market prices and not at
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the face values at which they have been recorded in the books. The market price at
which each of these stakeholders should be able to sell their stake in the firm.
The weightage for debt and equity to be used in a WACC calculation, while based upon
the market price, may either represent the current values of each, or alternatively may
represent the target capital structure that the firm is trying to reach. Therefore, if a firm
is in the process of financing its activities with a debt to equity ratio of 1:2, it may use
this ratio instead of its actual situation at the time of the calculation.
Theoretical Foundation of the Tariff equation
The author would like to acknowledge the use of the work of Professor David Johnstone
in revealing the intricacies and the equivalencies between the tariff equation and the
present value equation. Taking the regulators’ ‘Building Block’ approach, the equation
for MAR may be written as:
Operating expensest + (Vt-1 - Vt ) + Vt-1 r
Where r is the regulated periodic or annual rate of return on capital and is realised by an
amount equal to the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC). The assets of a
company are financed by either debt or equity. WACC, as the name indicates, is the
average of the cost of each of these sources of financing weighted by their respective
usage in the given situation.
The regulators set the WACC at a percentage rate for the duration of the decision period
and do not seem to vary the rate in response to the particular profile of the company
being regulated. For example AGLGN at the time of the IPART 1999 decision was not
paying the full rate of company tax on its dividends. Therefore a lower actual return
would have adequately rewarded the company as compared with the WACC earned by
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any company paying the full rate of company tax. Johnstone describes the regulators’
problem with setting the rate of the WACC:
Again there is an issue of logical circularity since the market required riskadjusted return on investment in energy transmission assets hinges on the
regulators’ choice of, and commitment to, a given figure for WACC, and on
the (systemic) risk of changes to regulatory arrangements in the future
(known as “regulatory risk”). (2002, p.5)
Other issues such as market rates of return of similar assets are relevant; however, the
regulator must make a judgment about the rate of WACC in the face of the selfinterested claims of the companies.

Exhibit A demonstrates how this tariff formula can be rationalised in terms of present
value (PV), using a formal reconciliation between cash and ‘accruals’ measures of
capital costs.
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Exhibit 1 - Present Value rationalisation of the Tariff Formula (Johnstone, 2003)

The tariff formula can be rationalised in terms of present value (PV), using the
formal reconciliation between cash and “accruals” measures of capital costs clarified
by Peasnell (1981, pp.53-4; 1982, p.365) and Edwards et al. (1987, pp.12-31), and
first arising in Hotelling (1925) and Preinreich (1938).1 Specifically, after being reimbursed for their periodic operating expenditures (e.g. wages etc.) asset owners
receive net cash (tariff) flows in period t equal to
(RAB t−1 − RABt) + RABt−1 WACC.
Discounting this cash flow sequence at rate r=WACC, the discounted present value
(PV) of the tariff stream to asset owners is
T

( RABt −1 − RABt ) + RABt −1WACC

t =1

(1 + WACC ) t

PV = ∑

Where t=T represents the time at which the regulatory asset base is fully depreciated
(RABT = 0).
Simplifying this equation as follows

PV =

( RAB0 − RAB1 ) + RAB0 WACC
(1 + WACC )
..... +

=

1

+

( RAB1 − RAB2 ) + RAB1 WACC
(1 + WACC ) 2

+ .....

( RABT −1 − RABT ) + RABT −1 WACC
(1 + WACC ) T

RAB0 (1 + WACC ) RAB1 (1 + WACC ) − RAB1 (1 + WACC )
+ .....
+
(1 + WACC )
(1 + WACC ) 2
..... +

RABT −1 (1 + WACC ) − RABT −1 (1 + WACC )
(1 + WACC ) T

= RAB0

−

RABT
(1 + WACC ) T
(4)

This rationalisation leads to the following conclusion:
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The Net Present Value of the regulated tariff stream (calculated at the discount rate
equal to the regulated WACC is equal to the initial (t=0) RAB.
Johnstone (2003) identifies the following three results:
1.

Any upward revaluation agreed to by the regulator amounts to a NPV "gift"
or windfall gain to the asset owners. The regulator has not explicitly treated
upward revaluations as a gift to providers. If they had done so then the tariff
equation would have been expanded as follows:
MAR = OpEx + Depreciation + Opportunity Cost - Revaluations.

2.

Any new investment offers owners a NPV equal to the increase in the RAB
by the cash invested in new capital expenditure (or capex). One assumes that
any new investment is an optimal choice of asset by management and has
been purchased at replacement cost.

3.

NPV is constant regardless of the time pattern of depreciation. Johnstone
emphasises the importance of this by referring to a few of the many
contributions to the literature over the years repeating this point; e.g.
Edwards and Bell (1961, pp68-69), King (1997, p6), Newberry (1997, p.3)
Whittington (1998a pp.97, 100) and Davis (1999a, pp.7-8; 1999b, p.2).

Importance of the RAB

The difference between the previous ‘agreed’ regulatory asset base and the new
DORC value is a gap. The arbitrariness of the decision process whereby the
regulators arrive at the figure for DORC is a cause for uneasiness. It seems to be a
‘judgment’ figure rather than the estimated cost of replacement adjusted for wear
and tear or the problem of obsolescence. Johnstone (2001) recognises that new
investment is brought into the balance sheet at Actual Cost (AC). AC represents
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the cost of replacement of assets at the time of replacement. However, in respect
of assets that are unlikely to be replaced in the near future the asset owners are
able to receive an amount of revenue that equals the WACC on the DORC rather
than revenues equal to the WACC on the previous agreed value. The amount of the
‘gap’ between previously agreed values and DORC values in the recent decision
by IPART in respect of AGLGN is shown in Exhibit B. DORC values agreed to by
IPART, were $1550m as of July 1, 1996. Table 8.3 on Page 118 of the Final
Decision shows AGLGN’s rolling forward of the ICB as the result of new capex,
less depreciation and disposals. Applying the MAR to the DORC-based ICB and
comparing the result with the WACC that would have been the MAR if the
previous agreed values had been the regulated ICB shows the extent of extra
income able to be achieved by the regulated company. The AGLGN ICB based on
DORC values and rolled forward to the commencement of the five year regulatory
period compared with previous ‘agreed’ values.
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Table 6 - AGLGN Initial Capital Base rolled forward

1996/97

1997/98

1998/99

Opening DORC Balance

$1550.0

$1567.2

$1576.9

New CAPEX

$ 70.5

$ 67.4

$ 87.7

Less Depreciation

$ 48.6

$ 50.4

$ 52.4

Less Disposals

$ 4.7

$ 7.2

$

Net adjustments to opening balance

$+ 17.2

$ +9,8

$ +32.8

Closing Balance

$1567.2

$1576.9

$1609.8

2.5

The total of net adjustments, accepting the IPART figures for depreciation:
Net Adjustments:

$17.2 + $9.8 + $32.8 = $59.8m additional

Previously agreed DAC values
Add Difference
Estimated 1999 DAC value of Assets

$1022m
59.8m
$1081.8m

Approved DORC valuation Minus adjusted DAC “Agreed Value” = $528m.
The period of the Access Arrangement is from July 1999-2004
If the agreed value of the assets had been $1081.8m then the WACC would have been
WACC on $ 1081.8m at 7.75% p.a.

$83.8395m

WACC on $1609.8 at 7.75% p a

$124.7595

Difference in the approved WACC for 1999

$40.9205m

In addition, in each year of the five year Access Agreement AGLGN have approval to
adjust the value of the assets by the percentage change in the CPI thus increasing the
value of the assets for the purpose of calculating the WACC able to be earned.
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Accounting Treatment of Asset Revaluations

The IASB standard relevant to the accounting treatment of assets is found at IAS 16, 37,
which states:
When an asset’s carrying amount is increased as a result of a revaluation, the
increase should be credited to equity under the heading of revaluation
surplus. However, a revaluation increase should be recognized as income to
the extent that it reverses a revaluation decrease of the same asset previously
recognized as an expense (2003, p.133).
This standard is well understood by the accounting profession as the accepted treatment.
Thus an increase in asset values is transferred to an Asset Revaluation Reserve and an
equal amount is transferred to equity in the balance sheet. Under the balancing system
adopted by the UK regulator, the amount of depreciation that relates to the increased
asset valuation is set off against this revaluation surplus account and depreciation
expense that relates to the old or ‘agreed’ value of assets is written off against revenue.
The effect reduces the regulated revenue and does not recover the capital cost of assets
that were not purchased by the regulated company.

‘Building Block’ approach versus Rate of Return regulation

In the light of the discussion above that shows the Tariff formula as giving a return
equal to the WACC to a regulated utility based on the DORC value for assets, it is
difficult to regard the regulation process as anything other than Rate of Return
regulation. The difficulty that has arisen in the case of the IPART (NSW) 1999-2004
AGLGN decision is that the major issue relating to the decision was the determination
of the amount of the valuation to be agreed to by IPART on the Initial Capital Base
(ICB). AGLGN wanted a full DORC valuation. After much consultation IPART agreed
to a modified DORC valuation in respect of AGLGN’s transmission assets and a
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Depreciated Indexed Historic Cost (DIHC), valuation in respect of AGLGN’s
distribution assets. Thus the final figure agreed to as the RAB was a composite figure. A
further irregularity in the regulation process was that these values were determined as at
July 1, 1996. The regulation access arrangement was to relate to the five-year period
from July 1, 1999- July 2004. The figure agreed to in respect of July 1, 1996 was
increased by the amount of new capital expenditure (Capex), and subtracted from by the
amount of disposals and depreciation between July 1 1996 and July 1 1999. As a result
the figure that was approved as being eligible to earn the WACC in the access period
bore little final resemblance to the modified DORC value in 1996. The details as to the
method used to determine the ICB were a compromise between the DORC figure
supplied by AGLGN and the DAC of the assets.

Conclusion

Recognition that the capital costs included in the regulated pricing structure are about
60-70% of the price charged to customers, (Davis 1999), demonstrates that the RAB
and the value placed upon it are of the greatest importance to the regulatory decision.
From the customers’ perspective the variable costs are of lesser significance. The
example described above shows the connections between the use of rate of return as the
regulatory style and how adoption of a RAB based on DORC valuations is increased by
changes in the CPI for purposes of calculating the MAR. One could argue that the use
of the CPI to increase the RAB destroys any notion of the DORC value representing a
modern equivalent asset (MEA). Instead it is an old asset at a judgment figure upgraded
to somewhere between replacement cost and actual cost and generously increased to
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correspond with changes in the CPI. The changes in the CPI may have no relevance to
the MEA.

From the above it is clear that the calculation of DORC for the assets of a company is
pivotal to the determination of the amount of revenue able to be collected from
customers. A brief history of the regulation of major utilities reveals that replacement
cost for asset valuation has been prominent through legal precedent, and in Victoria,
DORC values for electricity and gas have been enshrined in legislation while Deprival
Value (DV) has been abandoned as a valuation rule.
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Chapter 6
The regulators concept of ‘depreciated or used’ assets and return of
capital using the Regulatory Tariff Formula

Introduction

This chapter examines the regulators’ treatment of depreciation as part of the tariff
equation. Optimised Deprival Value (ODV), or Deprival Value (DV), is the preferred
valuation model of COAG and the NEC for regulated businesses ACCC (2002). This
overrides other valuation models that have found favour with regulators.
In essence the regulators’ task is to
•

Determine the size of the WACC to be approved as part of the process

•

Determine the amount of capital to be returned to owners by way of
depreciation.

The regulators’, (i.e., the ACCC and state regulators) problem is the essential circularity
of Optimised Replacement Cost (ORC), the preferred valuation model, when used as
the base valuation for determining the Maximum Allowed Revenue or MAR to be
approved to be earned by a regulated business.

The regulators’ solution has been to find mechanisms that allow an estimation of the
second hand or ‘used’ value of the assets to be found. The regulators have tried to
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establish a measurable relationship to ORC that is robust. Two main avenues of inquiry
have been explored:
1. The transformation of ORC to DORC, or ORC ‘used’, using an annuitised
concept of the value of ORC.
2. Determination of the return of capital by developing the concept of
‘Competition Depreciation’.
The regulators (ACCC, 1999), in implementing the tariff formula explain how the
Optimised Replacement Cost (ORC) value of assets becomes the second-hand or ‘used’
value of the ORC value, i.e., DORC value. ORC ‘used’ assets are those that have
attributes of obsolescence or ‘wear and tear’. This transference from ‘new’ to ‘used’ is
the regulators’ argument to overcome the objection that pricing decisions based on ORC
values are inherently circular. A variety of writers [Bell, 1997, Ergas, 2000, Johnstone,
2002, King, 2001] have discussed the problem of the determination of DORC,
particularly in relation to contestable markets, the impact on possible new entrants and
the relationship between DORC and prices that would encourage owners to scrap
existing assets and replace with new ‘Optimised’ assets. While DORC has gained some
recognition as a valid valuation concept it represents the upper level of value to be
applied to the Regulatory Asset Base (RAB). RAB decisions made by regulators
frequently fall short of a full DORC valuation for assets, however the maximum
approved revenues (MAR) are subsequently impacted by changes in the CPI as well as
the regulators’ use of ‘Competition Depreciation’. This has the effect of approving a
revenue or cash flow of substantial proportions that is not easily referenced back to the
regulators’ tariff formula.
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The regulators’ use of ‘competition’ depreciation as part of the Tariff Equation includes
an examination of the regulators’ choice of Straight Line (SL), depreciation. Other ways
of looking at depreciation are considered, [Bell and Peasnell, 1997, Commonwealth
Dept. of Finance and Administration, 1996, Horngren, 1999, Prienreich, 1996], in
particular, annuitised concepts, including Deprival Value Depreciation. Views on the
nature of depreciation and performance are reviewed in the context of the tariff formula.
Depreciation theories examined include the annuity method, Prienrich’s view of
depreciation and abnormal profits, and the recent exposure draft on impairment of
assets. Exposure Draft 104 (ED104), Impairment of Assets, published by the Australian
Accounting Standards Board concludes:
Measurement of the recoverable amount as the higher of the asset's net
selling price and its value in use (as per IAS36) rather than fair value (as per
ED99) was agreed by the Board as being the appropriate methodology for
measuring the recoverable amount. (2002, p.89)
The regulators’ choice of depreciation method combined with changes in the CPI has a
substantial upwards effect on the size of the approved Maximum Allowed Revenue
(MAR). Under the tariff formula, the owner’s budget for repairs and maintenance is
approved under the heading of operating expenses. The stated aim of the owners is that
transmission networks be maintained in “as new” condition. Discussing the distinction
between maintenance and enhancements is outside the domain of this study; however,
there is a history of contention on this issue. The sum of repairs and maintenance, plus
all other variable operating expenses provide the ‘floor’ of the allowed revenues above
which the return of capital and return on capital are built.
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Studies of non-regulated businesses include repairs and maintenance in the revenue
flows used for the determination of discounted future cash flows. The necessity to
include this item in studies of non-regulated businesses is a complicating factor that
studies of regulated businesses are able to avoid.

It is thought that the regulators tariff formula as used for regulatory decisions is
generating a sizeable cash flow to infrastructure owners.
•

A DORC valuation frequently represents a substantial margin over
previously agreed asset values

•

DORC values for the RAB are increased by annual changes in the CPI

•

Competition ‘depreciation’ increases the amount of the cash flow

The centrality of the issue of Depreciation has several prisms each of which impact on
business and its many interest groups including consumers, shareholders and managers.
Views of some of the many theorists, who have contributed to our understanding of the
nature of depreciation, will also be considered in this section. IPART (NSW)’s
regulatory decision demonstrates that DORC values that have been adopted are
‘judgment’ figures or ‘legislation’ determined numbers.

Their methodology for

determining depreciation to be allowed during the decision access period is calculated
on DORC values annually adjusted for expected increases in the CPI.

The Deprival Value Approach to the determination of ORC and DORC

The ACCC recognises the fundamental role of the valuation methodology to the
calculation of the return on capital and the return of capital and recognises the
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limits placed on their use of valuation methods resulting from the NEC’s
preference for ODV:
The NEC requires the Commission to give consideration to the Optimised
Deprival Value (ODV) methodology.15
And
Given that the NEC requires the Commission to consider ODV, service
providers will be given the opportunity to identify at the start of each
regulatory review those assets that are subject to by-pass risk and to nominate
a more appropriate asset base valuation. If a DORC is performed and assets
are stranded, they will be optimised out of the regulatory asset base without
any return of investment to the network. However, assets that have been
identified by the service provider as at risk of by-pass will be subject to
accelerated depreciation prior to removal from the regulated asset base. The
Commission may also write down part of the transmission system below
DORC in recognition of evidence suggesting that the regulatory asset base
valuation currently exceeds the ODV of the system (ACCC 1999, p.11).
In the ACCC draft report, they give two definitions of what DORC attempts to measure:
• One interpretation of DORC is that it is the valuation methodology that would
be consistent with an efficient new entrant into the industry, and so it is
consistent with the price that would prevail in the industry in long run
equilibrium.
• The second interpretation is that it is the price that a firm with a certain service
requirement would pay for existing assets in preference to replicating assets.
and,
ODV amounts to an extension of the DORC concept, by recognising that, as
a result of being deprived of an asset, the economic value foregone may be
less than its DORC value. In principle, the difference relates to the accuracy
of the assumed depreciation profile in reflecting the decline in the service
potential or the demand for the service potential provided by the existing
system. With this qualification, the two concepts are consistent (ACCC 1999,
p. 39).

15

ACCC 1999 p.x, Clause 6.2.3(d)(4)(iv) of the NEC states that the Commission must have regard to the
agreement of the Council of Australian Governments of 19 August 1994, that deprival value should be the
preferred approach to valuing network assets.
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In the situation where DORC values are greater than the ODV values, then the
difference would be excluded from the asset base and the ODV value would become the
new DORC. This ascendancy of DORC over ORC is quite a real possibility. New
technology in the building of power stations and telecommunications networks are
likely to result in cost savings over the DORC value of existing assets. The situation
with gas transmission pipelines is complicated by the very long lives of such assets,
whether the pipeline is a covered pipeline or whether the gas field that services the
pipeline may be exhausted before the end of useful life.

The Office of the Regulator General (ORG) in Victoria, now the Essential Services
Commission (ESC), have this additional comment about implications flowing from the
ACCC definition,
Depreciation is implied – the value of an asset in a competitive market is the
net present value of future income from that asset, which will be lower for an
asset that is part way through its life. Similarly, assets which have a lower
remaining life will need to be replaced earlier than new assets, implying that
a new buyer would pay less for older assets (ORG 1998, p. 58).

Optimised Deprival Value (ODV) or Deprival Value (DV) is the preferred valuation
model of COAG and the National Electricity Code (NEC) for regulated businesses. This
overrides other valuation models that have found favour with regulators. The ACCC
Draft statement of principles (1999 page 38) describes the building block approach to
the setting of the value of fixed assets that is central to the calculation of return, of and
on, capital, under an access pricing arrangement. The Draft also describes how the
NEC provides the Commission with the right to independently verify the opening asset
values through a process agreed to by the National Competition Council (NCC). The
National Electricity Code (NEC) (clause 6.2.3(d)(4)) provides the Commission with the
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maximum value that may be allowed for existing assets (assets in place on 1 July 1999)
described as ‘sunk’. The maximum value may not exceed deprival value and the value
is to be determined by the jurisdictional regulator.

The NEC describes ODV as the cost of the most efficient method of providing the
services of the current asset. Where service capacity is excess to requirements as a result
of changes in demand or over-investment in the past, then DV is recommended and is
defined to include references to optimised replacement assets. The value to the owner
of an asset depends on the loss the firm would suffer if ‘deprived’ of the asset.
DV = minimum loss if business was deprived of the asset. DV is
conventionally expressed in the following rule, [Solomans, (1966), Parker,
(1969)],
DV = min {RC, max (NRV, PV)},
Where RC is the replacement cost, NRV is the net realisable value and PV is the
discounted value of future cash flows attributable to the asset. The rule can also be
broken down as follows:
DV = minimum loss if business was deprived of the asset. DV may be RC.
If asset would not be replaced, then
DV = min {RCt, EVt}
EVt = MAX {PVt, NRVt}16

Rewriting deprival value (DV) as optimised deprival value ODV, and RC as optimised
replacement cost (ORC), then
ODV = min {ORCt, EVt}
16

Peasnell 1976 points out that RC is always greater than NPV because if NRV>NPV then asset would
be sold and the difference would be realised. Therefore DV is the lower of RC and NPV.
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This is asserting that ODV is a form of DV, the only difference being the use of
the term ‘optimised’ – which implies
•

efficient – the most efficient replacement of the asset, and

•

Discourages inefficient investment because regulators will revalue
inefficient assets down to their optimised replacement cost.

IPART (2000) have their own definition of Optimised Deprival Value (ODV)
which they define in the following terms:
ODV = min (DORC, max [NPV, NRV])
NPV = EV (present value of future cash flows)
NRV = disposal value
In determining ODV, allowance must be made for:
• Factors constraining cash flow
• Potentially competitive energy sources as substitutes. (2000, p.96)

Bell and Peasnell, 1997, writing about the valuation of the assets of a business, in
general as opposed to regulated assets, describes how the application of the DV rule is
straightforward in principle if an active second-hand market exists in which a
replacement asset of the same age and in the same condition can be acquired.
Unfortunately a second hand market does not exist for transmission networks, although,
it might be argued that the price paid to acquire a network business implies a second
hand value for the assets. However the complicating factor is that if there is an access
arrangement in place, the approved maximum allowed revenues (MAR) tends to
determine acquisition price.

The ACCC’s DV rule allows the determination of value at a point in time if the value of
new assets is available while the absence of second-hand assets complicates matters
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since allowance must be made for the decline in the asset’s efficiency. From the
ACCC’s methodology and the above description of the application of the DV rule,
similarities between the two approaches emerge. This chapter aims to demonstrate the
extent to which the ACCC’s methodology, and its operationalisation in the transference
from ORC to DORC as described by King, (2001), Johnstone, (2002), and Davis,
(1999), is in agreement with the main findings of Bell and Peasnell (1997) in their work
on Deprival value when applied to the valuation of the assets of the business.

The linking of ODV values with depreciation has been considered by Bell and Peasnell
(1997) in writing about a Deprival Value Approach to Depreciation. Bell and Peasnell
established links between the deprival value (DV) of assets and the development of
deprival value depreciation (DVD). They then applied deprival reasoning for the two
settings:
•

a single replacement cycle with unequal horizons

•

Identical infinitely recurring replacement cycles.

From this they show how the insights obtained from the infinite-replacement case might
be applied in a single-replacement setting by treating the deprival value depreciation
formula as a model of used-asset pricing. The contribution of Bell and Peasnell (1997)
in linking the determination of DV with DVD is unique and may usefully be compared
with the ACCC’s methodology for determining ‘competition’ depreciation.

Bell and Peasnell examine the logic underlying the deprival value approach to
depreciation and find that replacement cost (RC), is defined by reference to the price
obtainable from the relevant used-asset market. Since used-asset markets are likely to be
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thin or non-existent, they have used an extended version of deprival value calculus,
previously expounded by Baxter (1971) in terms of HAVE and HAVE-NOT budgets.
Bell and Peasnell describe this shift, from values to budgets as essential to a proper
understanding of deprival value depreciation.
Baxter solves the problem by converting both the HAVE and HAVE-NOT
budgets to values at the balance sheet date through the process of
discounting, and we follow him here. To see what is involved for the nondepreciating asset, or the depreciating asset which can be traded in active
markets we rewrite equation
DV = min [RC, max (NRV, PV)]

(1)

as

DV = VO – max [(VO – RC),0)].
(2)
Value to the owner (VO for short) refers to the maximum amount recoverable
by an existing owner of the asset through sale or use (i.e. the greater of PV
and NRV). (1997, p. 127)
Then VO is the value of the assets that are currently owned, the HAVE budget, while
the second part of the equation, max (VO – RC),0), represents what a non-owner who
has been deprived of the asset would gain from purchasing or replacing it – the HAVE
NOT budget (lower bound of zero).
Recalling the Sandilands rankings in the normal case of NRV<RC, equation 2 above
can be rewritten as follows:
DV = VO – max [PV – RC), 0]
Thus indicating that the DV of an existing asset is equal to the excess of the asset’s VO
over any net PV attributable to replacement.
Bell and Peasnell describe deprival value depreciation as simply:
The decline in asset values during the period: DVDt = Vt-1 -Vt
From there they develop a recursive relationship for the pattern of depreciation through
time where depreciation takes the form of an annuity. Bell and Peasnell (1997) have
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developed a DV model of Depreciation that requires consideration of the cash flows and
examine the subtle differences between their deprival value depreciation model and the
standard internal rate depreciation (IRD) model. Both are grounded in the logic of
capital budgeting. In both cases, the pattern of depreciation charges is a function of both
the discount rate and the pattern of revenue. IRD depends on IRR and the change in
current revenue; DVD charges have the same general functional form, except that
revenue n periods hence takes the place of current revenue.

Bell and Peasnell (1997) describe the solution to the revenue allocation problem that
was offered by Baxter as concentrating on the costs side of the story. They developed a
numerical example of depreciation book values and excess income according to
deprival value principles. This model provides a functional form for the equivalent
annual costs of the investment outlay, Ko, and the servicing burden So, (EAK and EAR
respectively):
Ko = Pni EAK and So = Pni EAR

Where Pni is the value of an n-year annuity of $1 discounted at rate i. Bell and Peasnell
describe their contribution as being to show how Baxter’s many cycle model (of DVD)
can be collapsed into a single-cycle one by interpreting the resultant book values as
used-asset prices (or, equivalently, the depreciation charges as the capital elements of
notional lease payments). They describe another interesting feature of DVD as being its
relationship with excess (or residual) income.
It was proved many years ago that the net present value of the cash flows
associated with an investment also equals the present value of the excess
income stream where this is defined as revenues minus all costs including
interest on the beginning book value of the investment each year, Edwards
and Bell, (1961), Brief, (1996). These costs are shown to be constant each
year. We can therefore write excess income (EI) in year t as
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EIt = Xt – (EAK + EAR)

(1997, P. 134)

In the above equation X represents revenue and where this changes over the life of the
asset for economic reasons not associated with the ageing of the asset – excess income
will change by exactly the change in revenue.

The Regulators construction of DORC from ORC

The methodology the ACCC has proposed for calculating DORC involves three stages
and begins with the determination of a valuation of a transmission system. The standard
approach has been for these three steps to comprise:
•

Optimisation –determine the optimal configuration and sizing of
transmission assets;

•

Replacement Cost – a modern engineering equivalent (MEE) is established
for each asset in the optimized system and a standard replacement cost
(SRC) established;

•

Depreciate those assets (usually straight line) using the standard economic
life (SEL) of each asset together with an estimate of the remaining life
(RL) of each asset. (1999, p. 42)

King, (2001), examines the regulatory framework, The National Third Party Access
Code for Natural gas Pipelines (the Gas Code), as well as the ACCC methodology
described above under which a DAC and DORC represent the boundaries within which
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the regulator must determine asset values. King identifies the third step as most
problematic, i.e.
•

Depreciate those assets (usually straight line) using the standard economic
life (SEL) of each asset together with an estimate of the remaining life
(RL) of each asset.

In commenting on the report on Agility Management’s paper The construction of
DORC from ORC, King (2001) argues as follows:

As an alternative to purchasing new capital equipment, the new firm could
purchase the assets of the existing firm. DORC may be interpreted as the
maximum price that a new entrant would be willing to pay for these existing
assets rather than purchase new assets. Transformation of ORC to DORC
must then leave the new firm indifferent between buying the existing assets
and purchasing new assets. To transform ORC to DORC, DORC = the NPV
of the annualized costs of the new Assets after the life of the existing assets is
deducted from ORC. Put simply the DORC is simply equal to the present
value of the flow of new asset cost that is avoided by purchasing the existing
assets rather than the new assets. (2001, p. 9)

An assumption in the above is that, generally, regulated assets, where a DORC
valuation is being considered, have well specified lives and there are no relevant
expected changes in either demand or technology impinging on the relationship between
ORC and DORC. By focusing on the difference in the NPV of ORC compared with the
NPV of existing or older assets, changes in asset values hold place of honour. This has
echoes in the new standard on impairment of assets, Exposure Draft 104 (ED104) that is
being discussed by the Accounting profession.

In referring to the gas code, King (2001), describes how a DORC valuation has been
justified; “it is the valuation methodology that would be consistent with the price
charged by an efficient new entrant into the industry” thus “replicating the outcome of a
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competitive market,” even though such a market cannot exist. A second justification is
that DORC “is the price that a firm with a certain service requirement would pay for
existing assets in preference to replicating the assets”.

King (2001), in discussing the transformation from ORC to DORC considers the
‘maximum price’ interpretation, annualized new asset costs where the DORC value of
existing assets will be the maximum value of P (existing assets at price P) that just
makes the new firm indifferent between the two alternatives of investing in new
technology with a cost of Vn and an expected life of Tn, or it can purchase the existing
assets at price P. In either case, when the relevant assets reach the end of their life, the
firm will purchase new assets to continue serving the market. When comparing the
ORC and DORC geometric series, King (2001), argues that the difference is given as
the net present value of the annualized cost of the new assets after the life of existing
assets is deducted from the ORC.
In summary, if DORC is justified by either claim that it represents the
maximum amount that a new entrant would be willing to pay for the existing
assets, or if it is justified as reflecting a perfectly contestable market, then the
adjustment from ORC to DORC is given by deducting from ORC the net
present value of the annualized cost of the new assets after the life of the
existing assets. Equivalently, DORC is the net present value of the
annualized cost of ORC over the remaining existing-asset lifetime (2001,
p.10).
A comparison with the Bell and Peasnell determination of value compares exactly with
this analysis by King.

The Circularity Problem

Repeated again, the regulators’ task is to
•

Determine the size of the WACC to be approved as part of the process
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Determine the amount of capital to be returned to owners by way of depreciation.
The main economic principal for assessing the economic value of any assets is that their
value to investors is equal to the net present value of the expected future cash flows
generated by those assets. Here the draft decision recognises that the practical difficulty
in making this assessment for regulated monopoly business is that the future revenue
derived from the assets is itself determined by the regulator. The first task, above, relies
on the valuation placed on the Regulatory Asset Base (RAB). Since DORC is the
valuation base used by regulators, the determination of the RAB’s DORC valuation
directly impacts on the size of the return or WACC to be achieved. A DORC valuation
adopted by the regulators may best be described as a valuation methodology that
describes the upper bound, or ORC, and lower bound, usually DAC, for the valuation of
existing sunk assets:
The main economic principle is that the value to investors is equal to the net
present value of the expected future cash flows generated by those assets
(ACCC 1999, p.39).
This exemplifies the essential circularity of the regulation process that the regulators
attempt to overcome by implying that the assets are ‘depreciated’. Another apparent
contradiction to the notion that DORC values represent ‘sunk’ values, is the assertion
that this apparent circularity may be overcome by arguing that the DORC values and
hence prices, should reflect the forward looking costs of service delivery such that
DORC prices are defined as consistent with those of an efficient new entrant, or long
run equilibrium prices. Another description, mentioned previously, of DORC, one that
is not inconsistent with the notion of ‘sunk’ values for the assets, is that DORC
represents the market price of second hand assets.
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The regulators’ problem, (i.e., ACCC, ORG, IPART, etc.), is the essential circularity of
ORC, the preferred valuation model, when used as the base valuation for determining
the MAR to be approved to be earned by a regulated business.
Problems inherent in the use of ORC:
1.

Accusation of circularity in that regulated prices are seen to move in a
direct relationship with underlying values.

2.

Difficulty in determining actual obsolescence and ‘wear and tear’.

3.

The notional and arbitrary nature of ORC and DORC values as shown
above mean that the costs faced by a new entrant are unlikely to be
bounded by either of these values and as a result neither ORC nor
DORC is any use in the determination of the new entrant exclusion
zone.

The regulators’ solution has been to find mechanisms that allow an estimation of the
second-hand or ‘used’ value of the assets to be found. The regulators have tried to
establish a measurable relationship to ORC that is robust. Two main avenues of inquiry
have been explored:
1. The transformation of ORC to DORC, or ORC ‘used’, using ‘Competition
Depreciation’ as the explanation.
2. Use of Tobin’s Q asserting that the Q of a regulated monopoly is ORC
‘used’.

The ACCC’s stated justifications for DORC include their claim that it represents the
maximum amount that a new entrant would be willing to pay for the existing assets, or
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if it is justified as reflecting a perfectly contestable market, then the adjustment from
ORC to DORC is given by deducting from ORC the NPV of the RC of the assets after
the life of the existing assets. Alternatively DORC is the NPV of ORC over the
remaining existing-asset lifetime. That is, a shorter time span using a different set of
assets, a modern engineering equivalent (MEE) in fact.

The national third party access code for Natural Gas Pipelines Systems (Gas Code),
nominates DAC as the floor and DORC as the ceiling for valuation. For gas utilities
regulated by IPART, DORC asset values represent a substantial premium over DAC
values while being a ‘judgment’ figure significantly below the owners’ estimation of
DORC values. In the IPART Final decision Chapter 5 there is a section showing:
As included in the Draft Decision, the Tribunal decides
• The regulatory capital base should comprise capital assets (i.e. fixed
assets including system and non system assets) plus net working
capital.
• A real return should be allowed on the regulatory value of capital
assets whereas a nominal return should be allowed on net working
capital.
• The level of net working capital should exclude taxation assets and
liabilities (i.e. taxation provisions, deferred income tax liabilities and
future income tax benefits) and provisions and parameters underlying
such forecasts.
• A depreciated actual cost (DAC of $1,002m (capital assets) and a
depreciated optimised replaced cost (DORC) value of $2,101m
(including system assets of $2,009m).
• The ICB for AGLGN’s network would be re determined at 1 July
1996. The re determined figure would then be rolled forward to the
start of the revised Access Arrangement (2000, p. 71).
It is worth noting that the IPART Final Decision retrospectively allocated a valuation to
AGLGN’s network assets in their Final Decision, (2,000, p. 72) of $1,550m at 1 July
1996. Compared with the value included in the Draft Decision this figure represents a
substantial reduction, well below AGLGN’s proposal containing DORC values
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estimated to be within the range of $1,600m - $2,800m). An estimation of the
Optimised Deprival Value (ODV) had been submitted by AGLGN as being between
($1,885m-$1,985m). IPART considered these submissions and concluded:
Based on alternative valuation methodologies, the Tribunal concludes that the
range $1,500m-1,700m represents a best estimate of the ODV of AGLGN’s
distribution assets (2000, p.78).
In the final decision IPART decided to value AGLGN’s initial capital base (ICB) for the
four covered pipelines at 1 July 1996 at $1,550m. This figure was described as a
‘balanced’ figure taking into account various interests and representing approximately
70% of AGLGN’s estimate of ORC. The initial capital base (ICB) may be affected by
CPI changes or an industry specific index and adjusted in the next regulatory period of
new investment in regulatory assets. Alternatively the regulatory assets may be revalued
every five years. The Commission’s preference is to revalue and optimise every five
years but the dilemma is when to commence.

The new entrant exclusion zone

One of the notions central to the ACCC’s use of DORC is the theoretical reliance placed
on the validity of ORC as the value of the idealised cost of replacement of the assets
that comprise the regulated business. The replacement cost of the assets of the regulated
business is recognised as the costs a new entrant to the business would have to pay in
order to compete with the existing business. Since the regulated business is a monopoly
provider of the goods and services it produces, it is socially undesirable for a new
entrant to duplicate the business of the existing business. Therefore the regulator has
the responsibility to ensure that monopoly rents are avoided.
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It is considered that monopoly rents are avoided when the assets of the regulated
business are valued at the point where the return is below the return that would be
expected to be achieved by a new entrant who has acquired substitute assets. Another
version of substitute assets is the value that equals the second-hand or depreciated ORC
value of the assets. Thus second-hand ORC values are referred to as ORC ‘used’.
However, when DORC values are determined at a level that represents a substantial
margin above the DAC values, a credibility gap is created such that a new entrant might
find the opportunity to set up business by investing in assets at a cost below the DORC
value.

Defining ORC as the ‘new’ cost of existing assets valued at DORC sets the upper limit
for the NPV of the income stream. By adjusting ORC down to DORC the regulators
have attempted to overcome the problem of circularity that adoption of an ORC
valuation implies. The ACCC has attempted to explain the gap between the ORC value
of the asset and the DORC as being the ‘competition depreciation’ area whereby the fall
in value is recognised as being equated to the return of capital by way of depreciation
that takes into consideration the factors relevant to the cost of replacement, in particular,
recognition that the optimal choice for replacement would be the modern equivalent
asset or MEA. The MEA would reflect current prices.
The Regulators’ Depreciation theories and practice

The centrality of the issue of depreciation above has several prisms each of which
impact on business and its many interest groups including consumers, shareholders and
managers. The ACCC has issued instructions on how Depreciation is to be determined
using the Straight Line method. A (real) straight line approach is recommended (ACCC
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1998b, pp 44-5; 1999a, p47) as stipulated in the National Gas Code. The example given
by the ACCC is remarkably simple as is demonstrated by the following example:
Exhibit 2 - ACCC Instructions on how depreciation is to be determined using straight line method

A1 = RAB at the start of the regulatory period of five years.
•

A6 is the RAB at the end. A6 is a conceptual DORC valuation taking account
of likely changes in replacement costs over the period, adjusting for identified
asset redundancies and increased age of the assets.

•

Depreciation = (A1 - A6)/5 each year

•

Depreciation on new capital expenditure is calculated as follows:
1. Actual expenditure = $15m. DORC value at the end of the regulatory
period is $10m.
2. If asset is in use for 2.5 years then depreciation is calculated as
follows: $5m/2.5 years i.e. $2m per year.

The impact of inflation:
1. Firstly the value of the assets resulting from inflation is adjusted to
include and recognise inflation.
2. Secondly the ‘real’ inflation adjusted depreciation is now to be part
of the return on investment included in the net revenue stream.

The following comments relate to an actual DORC valuation and an actual ACCC
statement:
A DORC valuation may be performed as part of the regulatory review. If this
were used as the basis for A1 rather than the value based on depreciation of
previous asset values there may be a windfall capital gain or loss involved.
This is not intended; rather the preferred approach is to use the DORC
valuation as the basis for reassessing A6 in the above analysis. In this way
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the RAB experiences a smooth transition to its assessed long-term path with
changes in value reflected appropriately in depreciation allowances. Where
the depreciation allowances involved create price shocks which are
considered inappropriate, the regulator may use its discretion to allow
transition over a number of regulatory periods. In some cases the allowance
for depreciation may be negative reflecting an augmentation of asset value.
(ACCC, 1999a, p47)

What is ‘Competition Depreciation’?
Competition depreciation’ is the term adopted by the Australian Regulators to describe

near constant real tariff streams. By recognising the impact of inflation on the RAB and
the increase in real income that results from this, the return of capital as Depreciation is
biased towards the end of the useful life of the assets. This ‘competition depreciation’
has some difficulties. Firstly, depreciation is being included in the regulated cash flow
attributable to the DORC value of assets as well as notional increases in replacement
cost represented by the inclusion of the inflation rate. If the inflation rate is at zero,
depreciation retains its linear character.

Johnstone (2003) and King (2001) seem to be agreed on the formulation of a present
value model which defines the competition exclusion limit on a regulated asset. This
formulation corrects the regulatory theory assumptions that a new entrant might be able
to pay DORC for second hand assets. Because such assets are not available, logically,
the new entrant must buy new optimized assets that would vary from the previous view
of ORC by two factors:
(i)

Technological advances that commonly reduce cost below previous levels of
ORC.

(ii)

The (technology dependent) growth rate of the replacement cost of the
regulated assets, given the notation (g), by Johnstone and King such that
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DORCt represents the value at period end and becomes the new entrant
exclusion bound on the regulatory asset base (RAB).
Johnstone (2003, p.19) argues that re-setting of RABt at the end of each year to its
maximum possible, new entrant exclusion level Pt makes sense of the regulators’
argument for DORC. The Agility Management (2000) submission to the ACCC
subsequently clarified by King (2001) requires that DORC be re-defined dynamically,
specifically as the time-dependent new entrant tariff threshold Pt.
Exhibit 3 - Implied depreciation
1

Johnstone 2003 p 21 gives the following analyses of Implied Depreciation. Definition of
DORCt as the competition exclusion limit Pt implies a scheme of depreciation where the
period t write-down, Pt−1 −Pt , is from (7)
T −(t −1) 
T −t
  1 + g
  1 + g

 

ORC t −1 1 − 
 − ORC t 1 − 

 .

  (1 + WACC )  
  (1 + WACC ) 

Simplifying this expression gives period t depreciation
T −t +1


 1+ g 
Pt −1 − Pt = ORC t −1 WACC 
g
−


1 + WACC 





g
WACC
= ORCT 
−
.
 (1 + WACC ) T −t +1 (1 + g ) T −t +1 

(8)

The consequences for the determination of depreciation, according to Johnstone:

If the economic logic underlying regulatory asset valuation is to continually
re-set RABt over all t ≤ T to the theoretical maximum no-new-entrant level,
any other depreciation pattern (e.g. straight line) is inadmissible. This point
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of economic logic is stressed by King (2001a) in his commissioned report to
IPARC (Independent Pricing and Regulatory Commission) responding to the
Agility submission:
No other form of adjustment from ORC to DORC is consistent with the
economic justification for DORC (King 2001a, p.10).
Although not by design, equation (8) with g=0 coincides with the ACCC
(1999a, p.66) definition of “annuity depreciation” (a special case of their
“competition depreciation”; see above). The term “annuity depreciation”
arises for the reason that when g=0 the tariff stream ensuing from
depreciation defined by (8) is an annuity (2002, p. 21).

Johnstone then shows that when g=0, depreciation is an annuity. That is, tariffs are
constant over all periods t< or =T,
Period t tariff is a constant (ORC * WACC) is where ORC is the
initial and constant (since g=0) optimised replacement cost of all new assets.
This is in effect the same result as if the asset owner postponed all
depreciation until asset expiry date T. A full return of ORC would be
reimbursed at that time T, which from today’s (time t) perspective would
have effectively zero present value (again assuming large T−t). (2002, p. 21).

Bell and Peasnell (1997), argue that their model of Deprival Value Depreciation
(DVD)17, behaves in exactly the same way as annuity depreciation and that the same
effect is observed with Internal-Rate Depreciation (IRD), provided the following three
conditions hold:
(a) the internal rate of return is equal to the cost of capital
(b) any period-to-period changes in cash flows over the life of the existing
asset are wholly attributed to what we have called ‘repairs’ (i.e., vintagerelated differences between used and new versions of the asset); and

17

Bell and Peasnell bring into their model the issue of whether or not repairs are constant through time.
Since in the regulatory situation, all repairs are allowed as part of operating expenses, the complication
that consideration of whether or not the item ‘repairs’ is constant does not have any bearing on this
discussion.
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(c) Replacement in the event of deprival would be with an asset with an
identical lifetime repair profile (1997, p.134).
Numerical versions of the EI model have been used by Baxter (1971) and others mainly
as a pedagogic device to illustrate the forward-looking character of deprival value
reasoning, whereby depreciation reflects the worsening of a cash prospect, as outlays on
replacement, repairs etc., are brought nearer in time. When it comes to implementation,
Baxter notes:
Thus the cash flows stretch far out into the future in a somewhat repetitive
pattern … the owner can make allowances for predicted change in the size of
the items and the length of cycles. But in general he has no alternative to
treating the cycles as a perpetuity (1971, p.53).
Perpetual replacement with assets identical to the initial investment is a very strong
assumption. What is needed is a deprival value model that retains the cost focus of the
perpetual-replacement model but which has less demanding forecasting requirements
and assumptions.

Deprival value depreciation DVD is simply the decline in asset value during the period:
DVDt = Vt-1 –Vt. It is straightforward to develop a recursive relationship for the
pattern of depreciation through time. The assumptions of this model imply that revenues
are constant from period n+3 onwards; in which case, depreciation charges grow at the
rate of interest through time. I.e., depreciation takes the form of an annuity. Bell and
Peasnell (1997) continue:
Another interesting feature of the deprival value model is its relationship with
excess (or residual) income. It was proved many years ago that the net present
value of the cash flows associated with an investment also equals the present
value of the excess income stream where this is defined as revenues minus all
costs including interest on the beginning book value of the investment each
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year. These costs are shown to be constant each year. We can therefore write
excess income (EI) in year t as EIt = Xt - (EAK + EAR)18 (1997, p.134)

The portion of revenue that represents ‘return of capital’ or depreciation is part of the
MAR. The regulatory process does not attempt to split depreciation expense allowed
between the prices actually paid for assets, DAC, and the agreed regulatory RAB.
Competition depreciation has been described as increasing the nominal rate of return
and recognition of the increased value of the assets resulting from inflation. The ACCC
considers the increase in the Optimised Replacement Cost of the assets. The WACC
may, for example have been set at 10% ‘Real Linear’. When the inflation rate is 5%,
Johnstone (2002) demonstrates the impact of this as follows:
The nominal WACC becomes 1.10 x 1.05 - 1 = 0.155 or 15.5% (2002, p. 9)
However, the NPV of the RAB is the same as if there was no inflation while the
incidence of depreciation contained in the cash flows is slightly increased showing the
effect of the inflation. See Table (from Johnstone, 2003, p.11) follows:

18

Bell and Peasnell write that the deprival value model can be better understood if the investment outlay,
K0, and the servicing burden, S0, are each written as a function of their equivalent annual cost (EAK and
EAR, respectively)
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Exhibit 4 - Building Block Model Example Calculations

Time

0

1

2

3

4

5

Zero inflation
ORC
DORC
Depreciation
Return on capital (10%)
Total cash flow
Present value (r=10%)
Total present value

100.00
100.00

100.00
80.00
20.00
10.00
30.00
27.27

100.00
60.00
20.00
8.00
28.00
23.14

100.00
40.00
20.00
6.00
26.00
19.53

100.00
20.00
20.00
4.00
24.00
16.39

100.00
0.00
20.00
2.00
22.00
13.66

105.00
84.00
16.00
15.50
31.50
27.27

110.25
66.15
17.85
13.02
30.87
23.14

115.76
46.31
19.85
10.25
30.10
19.53

121.55
24.31
21.99
7.18
29.17
16.39

127.63
0.00
24.31
3.77
28.08
13.66

30.00

28.00

26.00

24.00

22.00

100.00

5% Inflation – all values nominal
ORC
DORC
Depreciation
Return on capital (15.5%)
Total cash flow
Present value (r=15.5%)
Total present value

100.00

100.00

Real cash flow (time 0 dollars)

All that the recognition of inflation does, compared with non recognition, is to return to
asset holders a capital sum increased, in real terms, by the impact of inflation. It does
not recognise any change in the cost of replacement due to technological change.
The ACCC has tried to explain the difference between ORC and ORC ‘used’, or
DORC, as resulting from depreciation, competition depreciation no less. In the ACCC
draft Statement of principles:
…the approach to depreciation which integrates both of these features
(smoothing of revenue paths designed to avoid anomalous pricing associated
with the vintage of the assets employed, and adjustments to reflect the impact
of future potential stranding) is called competition depreciation. For overall
consistency of the proposed regulatory framework it is important that
depreciation of ORC to obtain the DORC valuation should adopt the same
approach (1999, p.47).
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The overriding relationship between DORC and ORC is that ORC is equal to the net
present value of the expected future cash flows generated by the assets when new, i.e.,
the ORC value of the assets.
Johnstone describes the issues of regulatory depreciation as:
The two main issues are: (i) to what extent are existing assets already
depreciated, or put another way, how is the initial (t=0) asset value
RAB0=DORC0 to be found from ORC0, and (ii) by what algorithm is DORC0
to be written down from that time onwards? (2003, p. 8)
In the hands of the utility, depreciation received is part of the cash flow described above
as a ‘near constant real tariff stream’. The depreciation component reduces the RAB
and has the potential to reduce the income stream because the capital base is declining.
This poses the question of how to maintain the income stream equal to the WACC on
the asset values contained in the original RAB, preferably enhanced by the cumulative
impact of inflation. The clue is that businesses must either invest in assets that will earn
a return equal to the WACC or return the capital to their shareholders.
Two issues arising from the above:
1.

The notion of ‘near constant real tariff stream’ as including return of capital
albeit the latter is biased towards the end of the useful life of the assets. This
has echoes with theorists such as Prienreich’s views (see later in this
Chapter).

2.

The generosity of the Australian regulators in setting the WACC at around
.075p.a. and continuing to increase the WACC in real terms to reflect
inflation. The size of the regulated WACC makes the task of managers
extremely hard in finding alternative avenues for investment that match the
returns earned from the existing regulated assets.
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An alternative view of the CPI-X model

Davis (2002a) describes the good and bad features of the depreciation implied in the
‘current cost accounting’ depreciation schedule complicated by the use of the CPI-X
model. Davis argues that the need for a return on capital to incorporate an allowance
for inflation is achieved through the use of ‘current cost accounting’ depreciation
schedule. Taxes are allowed for implicitly through the estimated (real pre tax) return on
capital. The WACC model used for the gas industry was based on 'real, pre tax, cash
flow to entity,' principles. The ‘real’, recognises the impact of inflation on the return of
capital. The use of CPI-X removes much of the relevance of this issue.

Davis (2002a) considers the Regulatory Depreciation Schedules and although more
concerned to comment on competition depreciation emphasizes that the choice of r, or
the size of the WACC, is critical to the outcome for the firm. The NPV will only be zero
if the determination of cash flows and the discounting process both use the same value
of r. Deferring the write down of the asset value, or back-loading of depreciation has the
effect of increasing the amount of excess returns. Davis recognizes that the timing of
cash flows has an impact on r when he observes that:
The "pattern of cash flows" might be of concern if the time path of potential
output and demand for the product does not match the time pattern of
allowable cash flows implied by the chosen depreciation schedule.
"Competition depreciation" suggested by ACCC tries to match "economic
depreciation" in a competitive industry.
Regulators’ Model uses a CPI-X approach which smoothes cash flows over
time. The point here is that the cash flows are affected by the X factor so that
the PV of the series c1....cN equals C1......Cn. (2002a, p.7)

The regulators’ model of depreciation assumes that if an asset becomes obsolete,
redundant or stranded, then it should prompt a special write off. To date, the regulatory
204

model adopted in Australia has used a ‘current cost accounting’ basis for the
depreciation schedule in conjunction with a real cost of capital where the entire original
cost is written off over useful life. The return of capital (depreciation) is adjusted each
year by the inflation rate. Within a portfolio of assets the total revenue stream can
absorb the gradual writing down of the stranded asset. The cumulative dollar value of
the return of capital over the life of the asset equals the initial outlay.

Davis (2003) argues that if the appropriate parameters for the cost of capital are used in
the model the choice between nominal and real depreciation does not matter and
recognizes that if cost of capital is too high, "back end loading" of depreciation will
increase the NPV of the cash flow stream. Introducing the complexities of the tax
situation faced by an individual company Davis argues that:
The pre tax,' is problematic as models of the WACC are not well suited to
indicating the nature of the appropriate adjustment. If one were to value
franking credits generated per period for inclusion in the cash flows a clearer
picture of the actual return would be achieved. As it is the Net Cash Flows
containing return of capital and return on capital may be too high. (2002a,
p.11)
Davis’s final paragraph is illuminating:
One characteristic of regulatory models is that they are based on Zero Net
Present Value Formulation, which implies that the market value of the assets
(business) involved should be equal to the replacement value of the assets
used in determining the allowable cash flows. The experience of the
Victorian Gas Industry, where significant multiples of DORC asset value
were paid by winning bidders in the privatisation process is indicative of
problems in setting appropriate access prices using the "real pre tax"
approach. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the cost of capital
allowed by the regulators was too high. A target revenue model based on
"nominal post tax" approach, in which tax issues are clearly identified and the
"conversion problem" avoided is likely to lead to better social outcomes.
(2002a, p.13)
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This indicates that the revenue stream offered to buyers of the Victorian Gas Industry
was based on maximum income streams and these values drove the underlying DORC
values of the assets. Part of this income stream is the accompanying return of capital by
way of depreciation as well as the effect of the variability of tax rates paid by
companies.

Carrying the cost of depreciation on revalued assets

Whittington (1998), in discussing the general approach of the 1997 MMC report on
British Gas writes on Depreciation
Does the depreciation schedule approved by the regulator have an incentive
effect? It is argued that depreciation schedules need to be tied to current
replacement costs to ensure that:
(i)
There are sufficient funds available to replace the asset at the end of
its useful life; and
(ii)
There are minimal price shocks for consumers.
It is preferable that this [full depreciation (i.e. the same as is charged against
regulatory income) is deducted] based on RAB rather than some larger CCA
valuation, but the articulation between the income statement and the RAB
should ensure that shareholders do not gain in the long term, whatever
depreciation schedule is adopted.
And later
This and the other conclusions are all derived from the fundamental
assumption that the RAB, and the return on it, are supposed to reflect the
investment in the firm in the regulated activity. (1998, p. 10)
The idea of a 'fundamental' assumption about investment in the firm implies a form of
moral authority about the setting of prices relative to the underlying assets which relate
to the actual prices paid for those assets, i.e., the RAB. In an earlier article 'Accounting
for State Regulated Enterprises: an Agency Perspective', Whittington (1985) discussed
the agency problem of constraining management to serve the needs of both the
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taxpayer/stockholder and the consumer. He argued that if a 'commercial' rate of return
target was set and revised regularly, the prices of the products of state owned enterprises
would be likely to become instruments of general taxation. The regulators do not intend
that the full RC of the assets be recovered through the revenue charged to customers. In
the UK, the CCA Depreciation is split into two sectors as shown: The margin of profits
between ‘commercial’ and ‘break even’ prices may not be used by management for
reinvestment purposes so that the consumer must meet the cost of replacement on
retirement of assets at a later date. Splitting depreciation between the RAB and CCARAB is implemented by British Gas in the UK using a two part method of depreciating
assets where flotation price is below CCA.
Table 7 - Two part method of depreciating assets where flotation price is below CCA.

•

Depending on the long run price profile required, the discount at privatization
can either be carried through indefinitely, or written out at abated current cost
depreciation charges in order to be equivalent to indexed acquisition costs (the
latter is the preferred Competition Commission method ), i.e.,

•

Dr Profit and Loss Account with indexed cost depreciation

•

Dr Revaluation Reserve (discount at privatization) CC less AC depreciation
charge

•

Cr Provision for Current Cost Depreciation

Utilities in the UK, particularly gas, report using HC with CC supplementary
statements. This book entry above is quite simple and is part of a gradual movement
towards full CCA pricing.

Whittington (1998) suggests that British Gas p/c perceived that they have greater sway
with regulators when presenting CCA statements. SSAP16 had ‘value to the business’
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as its valuation base in the UK, based on deprival value. Although exact calculations of
value were not required in assessing recoverable amount and the use of indices was
permitted in estimating replacement costs SSAP16 compliance declined and was
withdrawn as an accounting standard. Regulated businesses in the UK produced CCA
reports only as supplementary data or for regulatory purposes because the use of CCA
valuations resulted in reporting lower profits and helped in getting regulatory approval
for higher prices.

Whittington writes that the Market to Asset ratio or MAR* has never reflected the
replacement cost of the assets of British Gas. In this context the MAR* is the ratio of
the market or flotation price of the shares and often included a substantial discount on
the replacement cost of the assets of the business. The regulator would only allow a
reasonable return on the flotation price of capital so that the aggregate present value of
the business is below replacement cost of the assets. This is reflected in the so-called
market-to asset ratio being less than one, i.e., the aggregate current cost, or deprival
value of the business is much lower than the CCA value reported in the accounts. The
reported RAB of the regulated business does not compare with current prices of
replacement assets as he explains below:
The use of the Retail Price Index (RPI) to restate RAB in current prices was
adopted by the MMC in its 1997 British Gas report.
The alternative index, favored by the MMC in its earlier report on British Gas
and by OFGAS in its earlier years, is a current cost (CC) index, which
attempts to capture changes in the current cost of changes in services
embodied in the specific assets underlying the RAB. (1996, p. 6)
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The issue of the depreciation scheme in use

In theory, that portion of revenues earned which is offset by depreciation expense is the
return of capital and available for re-investment. Depreciation is the way that the initial
cost of the asset is returned to the shareholders. The closer in time the event of purchase
is to the depreciation of the asset, the closer and, therefore, more equal the dollar values
of these two transactions will be. Pipeline assets have long lives and so the problem of
depreciation is more difficult than if these assets had a shorter useful life. Seventy years
is quite realistic as the life of a pipeline. Even this figure may be underestimating useful
life because the maintenance that is carried out on pipelines is, necessarily, of a very
high standard and the pipeline is frequently described as being maintained in ‘as new’
condition. Gas is a dangerous substance and unless these high standards of maintenance
are in place, the likelihood of a gas explosion increases. Hopkins (2001) writes that
neglect of maintenance and abandonment of previous high standards of technical
supervision were causes of the Longford disaster. Since maintenance is such a
commitment on the part of pipeline owners, then changes in gas deposits, or
extinguishment of such deposits may be the ultimate cause of obsolescence. Predicting
obsolescence is possible in the short run rather than in the long run.

Annuity based depreciation methods

In NPV calculations, the timing of depreciation (return of capital) is irrelevant19. The
only point to notice is that, in terms of the firm as a going concern, unless returned
capital is invested at an IRR equal to the present IRR, the impact of the reinvested

19

See Johnstone (2003), Preinreich (1938), Edwards and Bell (1961, pp.68-9), Schmalanesee (1989),
King (1997, p.6), Newberry (1997, p.3) Whittington (1998a, pp.97, 100) and Davis (1999a, pp.7-8;
1999b, p.2).
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capital, if invested at an IRR below the previous level will pull down the value of the
firm.

Edwards, Kay and Mayer (1987) emphasise the annuity nature of depreciation when
they describe the actions required to ensure that the ARP is equal to the firm’s IRR:
Only in exceptional circumstances will the ARP = IRR; i.e., when the
accounting depreciation charge is computed along the lines described by
"Hotelling" as the change in the present value of remaining net cash flows
discounted at the IRR. In this case IRR must be known. Even using cost of
capital instead of IRR to discount remaining net cash flows, will not yield a
depreciation figure such that the ARP = IRR. (1987, p.59)
The example given by Edwards, Kay and Mayer (1987) of annuity depreciation shows a
project where there is a five year term with uneven cash flows, an IRR/ARP of 20%,
and where the book value of the only asset is at $100 at the beginning of the five year
period and nil at the end. The project’s IRR must be known to calculate the depreciation
schedule which makes its ARP constant and equal to IRR.

Horngren, Foster and Datar (2000), in their chapter on managerial performance
evaluation recommend an annuity approach to the recognition of depreciation be taken
where a manager is being evaluated on the success of projects that have been adopted
using IRR hurdle rates. Horngren, Foster and Datar argue that only when annuity rates
of depreciation are used will the accounting results mimic the outcome found using
NPV calculations. The projects of both Edwards, Kay and Mayer (page 22) and
Horngren, Foster and Datar (2000, p.487) show projects where the cash inflows vary
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widely over the life of the project. Edwards, Kay and Mayer (1987) describe conditions
where a firm grows in a way said to be ‘steady state’.
The ARP for a firm will be constant if the following one of two conditions
holds:
1.
Either the ARP on the firm’s individual investments must be
constant both over the lifetime of the investments and between
investments, or
2.
The relative weights in the average must be constant. This latter
condition in general requires that there should be a fixed
proportion of investments with a given time pattern of returns in
each year and that the firm should grow exponentially,
increasing investment in each different type of asset by the
same proportion each year. (1987, p.22)
Condition 2 above stresses the importance of constant re-investment in order to
maintain the base on which the IRR is earned. For a regulated company this means that
a regular annual profit earned, that is equal to the WACC, should be accompanied by
investment in new productive assets more or less equal to the depreciation written off in
that year. Thus return of capital by way of depreciation is re-invested and facilitates the
maintenance of the regulated revenue.
Because of the ‘guaranteed’ nature of the WACC (near enough to the IRR for regulation
purposes), Johnstone (2003) argues that the owners have an incentive to delay
recognition of depreciation as it has the effect of eroding the asset base on which the
WACC is calculated.

Since assets are maintained in (as new) condition, only

enhancements to the system would be considered new capital expenditure. However,
this draws attention to the need for monitoring of depreciation expenses compared to
new capital expenditure (Capex) from the regulators’ point of view. Where new Capex
over the regulation period equals depreciation expenses allowed, then the problem of
excess cash sloshing around seeking an investment avenue, as an alternative to being
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returned to shareholders, is avoided. Re-investment in new capital assets also solves the
intergenerational problem in that future generations do not have to build a system from
new, the replacement cost of which had been paid for by the previous generation, but
where the money had been spent on other purposes.

The cash flow advantages of receiving a return of capital via depreciation write offs is
in conflict with the reduction of the regulatory asset base this causes. Fundamental to
this issue is the need to maintain the financial capital of the regulated business because
only in such circumstances will the investor invest. Maintenance of financial capital
means maintenance of physical capital so that the return of capital by way of
depreciation expense must find a re-investment opportunity within the firm or be
returned to shareholders thus recognising that the business is unable to make as good a
use of the returned capital as that remaining invested in the business. In other words
such a business would place itself in a situation of voluntary liquidation over time.

Cash Flow implications and the ‘retirement’ method.

The postponing of all depreciation until the asset expires and is then replaced, describes
the practice common during the height of the American railroads in the 19th Century.
Sivakumar and Waymire (2002) describe, in their discussion of enforceable accounting
rules and income measurement by early 20th century railroads, how the use of mandated
depreciation rules and asset valuations was used by managers to smooth income in the
inflation free era of the early years of the 20th century. The Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) promulgated new accounting rules mandating depreciation accruals
for equipment and placed tighter restrictions on the expensing of costs that were, in fact,
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asset betterments. Compared with today the practice with regard to the writing off of
assets was unusual. The railroads were regulated businesses and managers were
conscious of the need to maintain the size of the regulatory asset base for the purpose of
maintaining the amount of revenue able to be charged to customers. When trading
conditions were strong, and thus managers were contemplating a better then average
profit result, management might decide to replace an item of capital prior to the end of
the financial year. Under the ‘retirement method’ the full cost of an old asset was
expensed when replaced. The new asset was entered in the books at the actual price
paid. In this way the goals of capital and financial maintenance for regulatory purposes
were achieved.

Sivakumar and Waymire (2002) identify possible factors contributing to the emergence
of the 'Retirement Method’:

First, by deferring charges for fixed assets until assets are retired, firms were
able to report positive earnings, pay dividends, and raise capital more readily
in the early years of their existence. Secondly, more mature railroads were
often able to report lower earnings during the late 19th century after being
subjected to rate regulation under various state laws (2002,p.9-10).
Prior writers describe how the immediate expensing of asset betterments
inflates maintenance expenses and creates "hidden reserves" that understate
railroad income. In addition the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) also
required that the costs of asset renewals be expensed only up to the carrying
value of the original asset; any increment above cost was to be capitalized
(2002, p. 11).
Brief (1993), describes in his unpublished 1964 thesis how an American writer
describes the practices in American railroads in 1852.
In a majority of cases that [financial] policy pursued is to extract a dividend at the
earliest possible moment; to pay that dividend to the last farthing of surplus over
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working expenses; and to trust to the increase of traffic for providing, when the
emergency may arrive, for the deterioration of the permanent way, and the
rebuilding or replacement of worn-out stock. Very few companies, indeed,
systematically provided for the renewal of perishable parts of their property...
Utilities in England also pursued similar financial policies.
In accordance with generally accepted practice among public utility companies
operating in this country, the Association made no provision for depreciation in its
accounts. Expenditure for renewals was charged against revenue as it was incurred,
and since substantial sums were involved when the periodic renewal of major
items of gas-works equipment took place, there were quite serious fluctuations of
profits for particular half-years and ...down to 1850 the Association used to
distribute in dividend almost all its profits and had no fund of retained profits with
which to fund capital expenditure (1993, p. 257).

Preinreich (1938) describes this ‘Retirement method’ as the fourth in his list of
depreciation methods. The other three are Straight Line, Annuity (or Sinking Fund with
a single rate of interest), and the Diminishing Balance method. Preinreich suggests that
the:
search for the true depreciation method has apparently ended in failure,
because the only clue which could be found is the rate of profit itself. (1938,
p.239)
Preinreich criticises his use of the word “true” saying that it implies accuracy of
foresight. This is, according to him, best disclosed by a formula of capital value based
entirely on the books. Preinreich’s formula is given as:
Capital value equals the book value, plus the discounted excess profits (1938,
p.241).
This remarkable theorist, who considered himself to be ‘afflicted’ by theory thus
encapsulated in his formula the concerns of the investing shareholder with traditional
accounting practices and those market events that result in changes in the value of the
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shares, i.e., excess or abnormal profits. It is interesting to note that Sivakumar and
Waymire (2002) described capital replacement decisions as occurring when trading
conditions were strong, or perhaps when ‘Abnormal Earnings’ were in prospect.

These concerns have been a base for much modern research because they focus on the
issue of share price as the most important measure of capital. Economic Income, Clean
Surplus research, Economic Value Added, Free Cash Flow, the Discounted Dividend
model and so on have been worked on to try and establish reliable connections between
Stock prices and economic income.

Two studies are called upon to support the researchers’ view that forecast abnormal
earnings (AE) exhibit a superior explanation of variation of current security prices.
They are those of Bernard (1995) and Penman and Sougiannis (1998). Penman and
Sougiannis:
Using a sample of five-year forecasts for nearly 3,000 firm-year observations
over 1989-93, we find that the AE value estimates are more accurate and
explain more of the variation in security prices than do FCF or DIV value
estimates. Our explorations of the sources of the relative superiority of the AE
model show that the greater the reliability of the AE estimates is likely driven
by the sufficiency of book value of equity as a measure of intrinsic value, and
perhaps by the greater precision and predictability of abnormal earnings.
(1998, p. 376)
The authors conclude that abnormal earnings is the fundamental attribute to be valued
in looking at the market value of equity. This is pretty remarkable when one considers
Preinreich’s views on capital and excess profits. Preinreich asserts that it is unrealistic
to consider depreciation of a single asset because all the assets represent a composite
whole and the firm as a whole is appraised by the market so that stock market
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quotations for the firm’s shares are the real and most important manifestation of capital
value. This view has been supported by Francis et al whose study using the Value Line
annual forecasts of the elements in these models to calculate value estimates for a
sample of publicly traded firms followed by Value Line during
1989-1993.

The Francis et al study provided empirical evidence on the reliability of intrinsic value
estimates derived from three theoretically equivalent valuation models: the discounted
dividend model, the discounted free cash flow model, and the discounted abnormal
earnings model. It contrasts the reliability of value estimates in terms of their accuracy
and in terms of their explainability. Accepting the importance of AE in the scheme of
returns, changes the role of depreciation included in the regulator’s tariff formula from
one of return of capital to a more general revenue as approved under the tariff formula.
Davis reached a similar conclusion when he writes that if the cost of capital (i.e., the
regulators’ WACC) is too high then ‘back end loading’ of depreciation will increase the
NPV of the cash flow stream. Put another way, the deferral of the write down of the
asset value increases the amount of excess returns.

New exposure draft on impairment of assets

A new standard, Exposure Draft 104 (ED104) is being discussed by the Accounting
profession. This is a capital maintenance concept and is based on IAS36, similarly
titled, The Impairment of Assets, and aims to:
(a) prescribe requirements on whether the recoverable amount of an asset must
be determined
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(b) prescribe requirements for the recognition and measurement of
‘impairment losses’ and reversals of the same, and
(c) Prescribe certain disclosures of requirements about impairment and
reversals of impairment losses.
In determining whether or not an asset has been subject to impairment loss the value is
determined as being the greater of Recoverable Amount or Value in Use (i.e., Net
Present Value).

The ED emphasises that the discount rate applied must be a pre-tax rate (14% is
recommended), must be applied to the asset in order to determine the Value–in-Use or
NPV of the asset.

At section 6.8.1., The Written Down Current Cost (WDCC)

represents the lowest cost at which those gross economic benefits of that asset could be
obtained in the normal course of business. This description of the WDCC, as defined,
corresponds with prices that reflect the cost structure of an efficient new entrant.

Under impairment accounting, when the NRV > carrying amount, the loss must be
written off. Reversal of an impairment loss requires determination of the recoverable
amount. This increase may arise because of any of the following events:
•

the market value of the asset has increased

•

there has been a technological breakthrough

•

There has been a decline in interest rates.

The benefits of the new standard are described as being:
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(a) a single accounting standard that addresses the accounting for impairment
of assets measured at cost in the context of the Australian financial
reporting environment
(b) a significant improvement in the quality of the financial information
included in general purpose financial reports through specific requirements
relating to impairment of assets (which will improve the ability of users to
make decisions about the allocation of resources), and
(c) Because ED104 substantially conforms to IAS 36, this should enhance the
ability of Australian entities to operate in an international setting.
The relevance of this new ED is that it is recognising the centrality of the determination
of values for assets in the measurement of income. That is unrecognised losses, or
profits, as measured in accordance with changes in the NRV or NPV must be brought to
account if income is to be determined. By recognising profits or losses in this way
recognition is given to the reality that asset measurement holds central place in the
determination of income.

The ED gives particular emphasis to the problems of

determining these asset values but there is support for the concerns expressed by Davis
and Prienreich’s ‘retirement’ method of depreciation and the related issue of a formula
of capital value based entirely on the books.
Certain questions are raised as a result of the regulatory process:
•

Do the cash flows returned to owners, amount to excess returns?

•

Are regulators able to ‘claw back’ excess revenue resulting from over-generous
regulatory decisions?

•

Is the level of capex in regulated businesses sufficient to replace existing assets?

218

Conclusion

This chapter contains a spectrum of theories and practices relating to depreciation. As
part of the exercise of regulating a monopoly business the answers to questions of when
why and how much have particular relevance in regulatory decisions. This is because
the decision allows the monopoly provider of energy to charge customers at a price that
includes a return of capital that is deprecation.
The chapter considers the theories of depreciation that have recently been part of the
discussions surrounding regulation. These include the pronouncements of the regulatory
bodies themselves, particularly the ACCC and IPART, and two major contributors to
the theory of regulation Professors Stephen King from the University of Melbourne and
David Johnstone from the University of Sydney. These two researchers have generally
supported the views of the regulators and their use of Competition Depreciation where
they agree that economic logic requires the regulator to continually re-set the RAB to
the maximum no-new-entrant level in order to determine the appropriate amount of
depreciation to include in the maximum allowed revenue.

Moving from the lens of economic theory and the regulators view, the chapter addresses
the views of Baxter as elaborated by Bell and Peasnell (1997), who have taken a
Deprival Value approach to the determination of depreciation. Their views are
supported by Edwards Kay and Mayer that annuity based depreciation methods have
validity in two distinct areas, maintaining the economic value of the firm and the linking
of the net present value of the cash flows with ideas of excess earnings (sometimes
referred to as abnormal earnings).
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Notions of excess or abnormal earnings (AE) have concentrated the thinking of many
accounting theorists including Baxter, and Preinreich. Support has been found for the
view that the determination of AE is the fundamental attribute to be valued in looking at
the market value of equity. Linkages have been made between AE and the ‘Retirement’
method of recognizing depreciation that was popular with the regulators of the US
railroads in the early part of the 19th Century when the maintenance of capital and the
need to maintain the flow of dividends to shareholders held pride of place. Binding
economic arguments to accounting reports is the art of examining the outcome of past
decisions given form in published annual accounts with expectations relating to future
cash flows resulting from regulatory decisions. The certainty of the past compared with
the uncertainty of the future. Baxter’s linkages between the NPV of cash flows as being
equal to the revenues minus all costs including interest on the beginning book value of
the investment each year touches base with the grounded nature of accounting reports
admittedly backward rather than forward looking.

The discussion about theories of depreciation recognizing that, from the perspective of
NPV calculations, the timing of depreciation is irrelevant, has led to an understanding
that the total revenue stream is the relevant flow when considering the ultimate value of
the RAB. The distinction between profits and depreciation does not have information
content. The conditions whereby the IRR is equal to ARP are discussed as well as the
view that ‘true’ depreciation can only be found as the impairment of assets. This has
been recognized in the recent Australian Accounting Standards Board Exposure Draft
(ED104), ‘The Impairment of Assets’ designed to ensure that accounting reports give
recognition to falls in the value of assets.
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Chapter 7
The regulators use of Tobin’s Q

Introduction

In Chapter 6 the study examined the regulators approach to regulation of utilities based
on a deprival value approach to the construction of the Depreciated Optimised
Replacement Cost (DORC) of assets from the optimized replacement cost (ORC) value
of assets. This has lead us to the following:
DORC = PV of ORC – PV (of modern equivalent asset (MEE) or
Optimised Replacement Cost (ORC) of a regulated asset) part way through
useful life.
The adjustment in the regulatory asset base (RAB) whereby ORC becomes DORC and
the issue of the regulators approach to depreciation were considered. The critical issue
in regulatory decision-making is the size of the revenues that are approved as the
maximum allowed revenue (MAR) as this determines the resulting income that may be
earned by the regulated utility, i.e., return on assets plus return of invested capital, i.e.,
depreciation.
An argument that has been favoured by regulators in the determination of DORC is the
adjustment to the value of ORC, that is, the markets’ assessment of the second-hand or
‘used’ value of the regulatory assets. A theory that has been adopted is that of Tobin’s
q in order to make this transition from ORC to DORC. The market based notion known
as Tobin’s q is based on the determination of the market value of the assets expressed as
a ratio of the replacement cost of the assets. The determination of a firm’s q value is
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dependent on the level of risk faced as well as the market’s perception of managerial
efficiency. This chapter will consider the following issues:
•

The regulators’ acceptance of Tobin’s q ratio as the value of second hand assets
to the replacement cost of those assets, i.e., DORC compared with ORC

•

Tobin’s q as the market’s assessment of the company’s ability to add value to
the assets valued at replacement cost (RC)

•

Problems posed by misuse of depreciation notions, such as ‘Competition
Depreciation’, by owners’ representatives whose interest is in increasing DORC
valuations in order to increase prices above the present level.

•

Argument made by Australian Pipeline Association advocate, KPMG, against
reliance on Tobin’s q

•

Asset owners’ preference for ORC as the regulatory asset base (RAB), (report
by Agility Management)

•

Connections between research into Q, Economic Value Added, Free Cash Flows
and performance.

The Australian regulators approach to their task and their view of their
responsibilities.

In Chapter 6 the return of capital or depreciation linked to inflation was discussed. It
was argued that at the end of the day, it is the amount of, or size of, the cash flows that
flow through to the owners of the networks that is critical. Preinreich’s (1938) view of
the value of the firm is given as:
Capital value equals the book value, plus the discounted excess profits.
(1938, p241)
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From this it becomes apparent that the aim of regulators must be to find that capital
value and set revenues at the level whereby excess profits are avoided. The opposite
view is held by asset owners who perceive their interest to be in maximising either the
value of the assets and or the WACC, in order to maximise the wealth of the firm. The
regulators, that is, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, the Essential
Services Commission (ESC), previously the Office of the Regulator General ORG
(VIC), the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, (IPART, NSW), see their role
as having three main tasks. Firstly, they must decide on the amount of the value
attaching to the assets under regulation, the Regulatory Asset Base (RAB). Secondly,
they must decide on the size of the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC), they
approve as return on the RAB. Thirdly, they must decide on a scheme of depreciation
allowances whereby capital is returned to asset owners.

This approach by the Australian regulators is described by Littlechild (2002), as a neoclassical approach to regulation. This approach involves:
1.

Setting maximum price caps

2.

Adjusting prices at regular intervals, and

3.

Waiting for competition to arise before removing such price caps.

His argument is that this approach relies on an inappropriate concept of business and
competition, i.e., that all companies have the same cost structure, the neo-classical
concept of competition.

A variety of experts have advocated the adoption of replacement cost (RC), as the best
basis for the valuation of infrastructure assets. The regulators have accepted the view

223

that the net present value (NPV), of some quantum of the ORC of the assets, as the
capital of the regulated business, and have inserted this notion of capital into their
regulatory formula for regulated tariffs, i.e.
MAR = operating expenses (Opex), + return of capital and return on capital.
The figure for capital used in the regulatory formula, is based on a version of the RC of
the regulated assets called DORC. ORG (VIC) has determined their DORC values
through legislation while IPART (NSW) in the Final Decision in respect of AGLGN gas
Networks 1999-2004 have adopted a judgment figure for their DORC values that is part
way between the depreciated actual cost (DAC), or previously agreed asset values, and
the estimate of ORC. The estimates of ORC were below the estimates of DORC.

Even while adopting arbitrary numbers on which to base the MAR, the regulators have
expressed a loyalty for the notion of ORC as their ideal regulatory value. This has led
them to attempt to logically link ORC with DORC. The regulators also have the
objective of trying to set the MAR at a point that is just below the level of return that a
new entrant would require in order to compete with the existing monopoly provider.
This means that the regulators have two objectives tied up in their notions of DORC.
Firstly, loyalty to the notion of ORC as the ultimate benchmark for the setting of
regulatory revenues, and secondly, trying to find in relation to ORC, a benchmark that
will determine the level of capital that will identify the new entrant exclusion zone.

Optimised Replacement Cost (ORC), has been accepted as the maximum investment
level required to deliver the level of service required by the consumers. The revenues
that would deliver an NPV equal to the ORC is therefore the maximum level of the
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MAR. This notion of maximum revenues has been seized upon by asset owners (see
KPMG (2002), on behalf of the AGA and Agility Management), as that amount they
require in order to be adequately compensated for providing the service, even though
second hand or used assets are in place.

Associated with the regulators’ loyalty to ORC as the regulation benchmark, is their aim
to link ORC to DORC in order to solve the dilemma of the new entrant exclusion zone.
This is a very narrow view of the regulatory problem because regulators are faced with
a variety of infrastructure businesses with differing levels of unused capacity. Unlike
geographically small countries such as the UK, Australia’s extreme distances make a
decision to invest in assets such as a new gas transmission pipeline, one that is not taken
lightly. For example, the proposed link between Papua New Guinea (PNG) and
Queensland has been in the planning stages for some years without resolution. There
has however, been a definite decision to build a new pipeline to carry LPG between the
East Timor Sea and Darwin, (announced 15th June 2003, ABC News). The plans to
build this pipeline were first made public in 1989, and it has taken 14 years to finalise
and negotiate the plan.

Differences between regulated businesses and the industry’s

reluctance to invest in large new investment projects should discourage regulators from
adopting a one size fits all solution. Rather, regulators have adopted a notion from
economics that tries to establish a rational link between ORC and DORC. Regulators
assume that the establishment of this link between ORC and DORC will provide them
with a rational direction applicable to every situation. King (2001) describes the
regulators’ commitment to DORC as follows:
Economic argument is that when RAB = DORC this emulates rational market
settings and results in the highest possible tariffs short of those at which a
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new entrant might be encouraged to duplicate the existing provider’s
infrastructure. i.e., DORC … is consistent with price charged by a new
entrant into the industry. This theory is built around a construct called
Tobin’s Q. (2001, p.15)
The use of Optimised Deprival Value (ODV) has been compromised by the regulators’
adherence to ORC as the base from which they derive their asset values. The ESC,
(previously ORG, Vic) has described the value placed on the RAB as being ORC
‘used’. This derivation of ORC is then described as DORC and becomes the base on
which the WACC is based. There is a gap of unknown dimensions between ODV and
DORC. The ‘status quo’ of asset values for regulatory purposes was the Depreciated
Actual Cost (DAC) where known, or the ‘agreed values’ where the DAC was not
known. In Victoria, legislation has been introduced that includes values known as
DORC values to be used for regulatory purposes, while in NSW ‘judgment’ figures
have been used to establish DORC values.

Generally DORC values represent a

compromise between the values placed on assets by asset owners and previous DAC
values. Considerable negotiation and debate has ensued over these DORC values.

The regulators dilemma in setting the New Entrant Exclusion Zone

The dilemma is that the level of revenue earned by asset owners must reward asset
owners. However, the level of reward must be low enough to discourage a new entrant
from setting up business and by so doing replicate the natural monopoly. In a market
where there are few participants there is a role for regulators in controlling prices in
order to avoid monopoly rents. Under-utilisation of resources makes the need to
discourage new participants an imperative. It is wasteful and inefficient to duplicate
capital assets that are not fully utilised. Therefore, there is a need to prevent such
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duplication in the market. A sign of regulatory failure is a regulated regime with
significant unused capacity where the prices are set at a level that encourages a new
company to enter the market.

The first issue is the regulators’ stated adherence to the valuation notion of ORC, or
some version of ORC, as representing the value of the RAB whereas in actual
regulatory decisions the RAB is determined by either legislation or the use of
‘Judgment’ figures. The second issue is the notion of setting prices, or MAR, based on
DORC (instead of ORC) as a benchmark that is sufficient to deter a new entrant from
entering a market where there is a regulated provider and significant under- utilisation
of existing capital.

The first issue, adherence to ORC, by adjustment to DORC, allows the owners of
regulated businesses to argue that the full RC of the assets should be the RAB. (See
later arguments made by Agility Management.) The second issue, sometimes called the
New Entrant Exclusion Zone, has prompted other groups, for example the AGA
advocate, KPMG, to use the statements of the Productivity Commission in favour of
ORC to support their claim that only when the RAB is equal to ORC will a new
business enter the market. They also perpetuate the notion that new investment is both
necessary and desirable.
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The regulators adoption of Tobin’s Q and its contribution to the debate.

Tobin’s Q is understood to be the market’s assessment of a company’s ability to add
value to the assets valued at RC, thus Q = M/RC. The Oxford Dictionary of Economics
(1957) defines Tobin’s Q as:
A ratio used to explain investment. q is the ratio of the valuation shareholders
put on a firm to the market value of its assets; at the margin the shareholders’
valuation is shown by the share price. The theory is that if q>1 a firm should
invest; if q <1 the firm should run down or sell off its capital equipment.
•
•

large Q is associated with monopoly profits, (although it may also contain a
measure of managerial efficiency in managing assets under their control)
Tobin’s Q is the ratio that claims to
(a)
measure the level of the monopoly power of the firm, and
(b)
assess the market for further investment possibilities

The Victorian regulator, ESC, (previously ORG, VIC), have interpreted Tobin’s Q as
follows:
It can be argued that in a competitive market, if a supplier charges a price
above minimum efficient cost of supply, then new entrants will be attracted
into the market by the abnormal profits that are available; as a result, market
prices for output, and the market value of business enterprises supplying
those outputs will tend towards cost. … The above propositions are
consistent with the theory of the relationship between the market value of
assets and their replacement cost developed by the economist James Tobin.
The ratio of the market value of the company’s debt and equity to the current
replacement cost of the assets is known in the finance literature as Tobin’s Q.
…Tobin argued that when Q is greater than 1 (that is, when capital
investment is worth more than it costs to replace), firms have an incentive to
invest, and that they will stop investing when Q is less than 1 (when
equipment is worth less than its replacement cost). …On this basis, it is
accepted, in principle, that the use of (optimized depreciated replacement
cost, author’s use of italics) ODRC asset values and a market based estimate
of the WACC is intended to mimic the outcomes of a competitive market
(ORG 1998, p 5).
The ACCC and state regulators have tried to employ the theory of Tobin’s Q to
overcome some of the circularity problem inherent in the use of ORC as their asset
valuation model. However, even the above extract from Tobin’s writings emphasizes
the notions of ‘market value’ and ‘incentive to invest’. The ACCC’s interpretation of q
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seems to be deficient because it does not recognise the market’s assessment of risk and
efficiency in the determination of q. Instead the ACCC takes as given the notion that the
q of a firm below 1 represents the ‘second hand’ nature of the assets.
By 2001, ORG’s views seemed to have widened in relation to Tobin’s Q:
Under other methodologies for estimating the WACC, Tobin's Q is
mentioned. The others are, comparable industry returns, the dividend growth
model and arbitrage pricing theory. ORG notes that ‘As with CAPM, all of
these methods also have theoretical and empirical shortcomings. ...The
application of Tobin's Q requires assumptions to be made about the likely
benefit that investors may see from a firm exceeding performance
benchmarks, which may not be easy to determine, and also is not expected to
remain constant over time’ (ORG 2001, p. 65 [My use of italics]).

The essential point of the above extract is that it is the market’s view of the firm that
determines the future actions in respect of investment in further assets. There are many
reasons why a q may be less than 1. The market’s perception of the level of risk
attaching to investment in regulatory assets is likely to adjust the share price below the
replacement cost of the assets while managerial efficiency has been shown to be a
determinant of a firm’s q value in the case of a firm with a reputation for efficiency over
and above the normal. Tobin’s own conclusions include the following statements
The models discussed here were meant to be illustrative only, and to give
meaning to some general observations about monetary analysis. The basic
framework is very flexible… According to this approach, the principle way
in which financial policies and events affect aggregate demand is by
changing the valuations of physical assets relative to their replacement cost.
Monetary policies can accomplish such changes, but other exogenous events
can too. In addition to the exogenous variables explicitly listed in the
illustrative models, changes can occur, and undoubtedly do, in the portfolio
preferences – asset demand functions – of the public, the banks and other
sectors. These preferences are based on expectations, estimates of risk,
attitudes towards risk, and a host of other factors. In this complex situation,
it is not expected that the essential impact of monetary policies and other
financial events will be easy to measure in the absence of direct observations
of the relevant variables (q in the models) (1969, pp. 15-29).
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Johnstone (2003) describes two new views of ORC. He describes how it is essential
that the regulator determines the minimum or “optimized” value of the RC of the assets
presently being used by regulated businesses. This partially depleted productive
capacity must be distinguished from the other value of ORC described as the
replacement cost of brand new modern equivalent assets (MEE). This distinction is
made by calling the RC of assets in use ORC ‘used’, while the RC of the MEE assets is
called “true” ORC. Johnstone interprets the Australian regulators’ approach to the use
of Tobin’s Q as follows:

To measure q the regulator has to find the minimum (“optimised”) RC of the
firms used assets, or more precisely, of the cost of replacing the partially
depleted productive capacity represented by those used assets. With there
being no second hand markets for the kinds of assets in question (excepting
scrap metal markets), regulators have treated DORC as a proxy for the cost of
used assets, and hence implicitly re-defined Tobin’s q as
q=

M
.
DORC

The final step in the regulators’ program to impose q=1 is to fix the initial
regulatory asset base, RAB0, such that the market value of the entity, M,
equals DORC. . Thinking of M as the PV of the tariff stream, this requires
merely that RAB0=DORC, since PV=RAB0 (2003, p.16).

The final step is taken when the regulators equate DORC with ORC used and re define
Tobin’s Q from
q = M/ORC used,
to q = M/DORC.
Then if q = 1, and the RAB = DORC, the market value of the entity, M, equals DORC
(i.e. both the numerator and the denominator equal DORC). Thus q=1 and DORC = the
RABo, since NPV = RABo. (See earlier reference to the derivation of the NPV of the
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RABo.) Another version of this argument consists of thinking of M as the NPV of the
tariff stream and requires merely that RABo = DORC, since NPV = RABo.

Attitudes to the determination of market risk

Alles, Kenyon and Wills-Johnson (2002) describe the use of the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM), to determine reasonable rates of return on capital employed by the
pipeline owner in the provision of gas transport services. They define a key issue as the
determination of Beta, as gas pipelines are not traded in Australia and hence market
betas cannot be readily calculated from market data. They describe the process as being
subject to rent seeking behaviour by pipeline owners.
Alles et al continue:
The unique problem faced by regulators of gas pipelines in Australia is that
very few of the pipelines being regulated are traded in the market place. This
means that it is not possible to simply turn to stock market data to empirically
determine beta, as the stock price for the firm in question simply does not
exist. In many cases, pipelines are owned by subsidiaries of trans-national
companies, whose stocks trade overseas, or firms own several pipelines as
well as other sector interests. The Australian Pipeline trust, for example,
holds equity in six pipelines. The essential issue is that pipeline owners have
no incentive to provide an accurate estimate of the beta value of the pipeline.
Their incentive is to "talk up" the beta as it is used for determining the price
of access and has no relation to the true risk profile of the firm. Regulators
commonly adopt an "efficient firm standard" whereby parameters are
calculated based on a hypothetical "efficient standard" (rather than the actual
cost structure of the pipeline). This is to prevent the consumers from bearing
the cost of any inefficiencies pertaining to the owners. As such, the lack of
correlation between the beta used in determination of access prices and the
beta of the firm owning the assets is not solely due to information
asymmetries (2001, p.5).
Alles et al suggest that in the context of the regulated gas pipeline market, the cost of
diversification is reflected in cash-flow. As a consequence the regulator, in order to
achieve an efficient allocation of resources, should base access price determination on
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whether the treatment of each risk in beta or cash flow results in the smallest increase in
access price.
The diversity of regulated businesses in their structural, functional ownership makeup
and so on, as described by Alles et al in relation to the ability of the regulator to
determine the ‘beta’ value, applies also to the regulators’ ability to determine the Market
to Asset ratio or Q of a regulated business. Asset owners’ interests lie in maximizing
and ‘talking up’ both the beta and the value of regulated assets in order to maximize
their wealth/return.
Johnstone offers the following example of level of return at which a new entrant would
be encouraged to participate in the market by investing in new capital assets:
The economic logic of q=1 is easily understood in the context of a simple
example. Suppose that a shopkeeper pays a carrier x per parcel for deliveries.
At some point (dependent on volume) x becomes so high that the shopkeeper
can more economically buy a truck and employ a driver. Or a new entrant can
set up and displace the existing carrier. This is the price at or below which the
contractor must work if he is to hold onto his customer base and maximise
profits (return on capital) over the long run. On the basis of this logic, q=1 is
taken to be the definitive feature of an appropriately regulated monopoly,
stripped of monopoly rents (2003, p.16).
Attaching numbers to the above, assuming that the cost of service is $100,000 per
annum, and then the matching investment in order to be efficient would be based on a
transfer of an amount that is sufficient to result in a residual amount equal to the WACC
on the newly acquired truck. Some managers would earn more than the WACC and
others less depending on their abilities. Using Johnstone’s example, if the manager was
able to invest in a new ‘truck’ efficiently, then depending on the level of risk faced and
managerial efficiency, that action would cause the q to stay the same as before, rise or
fall. Johnstone’s example is taking (1) an actual cash outflow in respect of cost incurred
and comparing it with (2) a more complex set of flows comprising cash outflow (to
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purchase the truck and meet expenses) such that the anticipated difference between (1)
and (2) is equal to or greater than the WACC on the cost of the truck.

Tobin’s Q as a measure of monopoly rents

Lindenberger and Ross’s (1981) study develops a comparison between accounting data
and financial data to examine the extent, distribution, and history of monopoly rents and
quasi-rents in the industrial sector. Tobin's q ratio (the ratio of a firm's market value to
the replacement cost of its assets) is used as a measure of the monopoly rents of the
firm. A model is developed which uses the linkage between the two types of data to
construct empirical measures of super-competitive power for individual firms. Results
show a wide dispersion of market power across firms and industries; for the economy as
a whole, market value as a percentage of replacement cost has declined over the two
decades preceding the study. From 1960-77, adjusted market values were about 50%
above replacement costs, while the dispersion of monopoly power did not change
significantly. Sectors having high q ratios were often those with relatively unique
products or factors of production, while those with low ratios were marked by relatively
competitive, tightly regulated, or dying industries.

The necessity to give precedence to ORC in regulatory decisions

Johnstone‘s (2003, p.17) view of Tobin’s logic that when a business‘s q is definitively
measured as equal to 1, this means that the business is an appropriately regulated
monopoly stripped of any economic rents. Johnstone finds support for Tobin’s view in a
quotation from Lindenberg and Ross (1981) who introduce the reasoning that should
monopoly rents be earned, the market will capitalize these rents and impact on the
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market value of the shares, driving the value of q above 1. ORG have added another
dimension to a change in the value of Tobin’s Q when they suggest that a perception of
abnormal profits will encourage other firms to enter the industry and in doing so drive
down prices. They assert:
Tobin argued that when Q is greater than 1 (that is, when capital equipment is
worth more than it costs to replace), firms have an incentive to invest, and
that they will stop investing when Q is less than 1 (when equipment is worth
less than it costs to replace) (ORG 1998a, p 5).
Addressing the issue of risk and how it affects a firm’s Q, it is likely that the market will
continue to price utilities below RC because of the high levels of risk attaching to the
industry.

Johnstone’s (2003, p.18) thinking is that the arguments for DORC are sophistry because
there is no second hand market for a used in situ electricity grid or a gas pipe network.
Hence, provided the DORC value claimed by an existing asset owner is less than the
actual (i.e. “true”) ORC, there is no possibility of competition. However, there is no
guarantee that this is the case. The effects of time and new technological innovation
may result in “true” ORC falling below DORC. On the other hand, if DORC values are
above the actual (i.e. “true”) ORC then there is a possibility of competition. However,
asset owners can value (used) assets at a book DORC up to the value of their true ORC
– that is, book ORC can greatly exceed true ORC. Johnstone claims that such owners
lay claim to a stream of tariffs consistent with all transmission assets being new rather
than used, and that the minimum tariff acceptable to a new entrant is ORC multiplied by
the WACC per period. This is proof of the ability of the incumbent to set its book
DORC up to a limit of actual ORC, and effectively hold it constant at that level over all
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of the years before it replaces its assets, without offering the incentive necessary for a
new entrant. Johnstone’s first sophistry argument follows:
To allow for this market reality, the regulators must substitute true ORC for
book DORC in their measure of Tobin’s Q so that the case of q = 1 occurs
when tariffs are set on an ORC rather than DORC basis. The fundamental
mistake is that the theoretical asset value threshold, up to which there can be
no threat of a new entrant, is not DORC but ORC as demonstrated. The
ACCC argument is that any value in excess of DORC will expose the service
provider to being by-passed (by a new entrant) (2003, p.21).
Johnstone’s second ‘sophistry’ argument is described:
Even though ORC is appreciatively higher than DORC, ORC grossly
underestimates the level required of the RAB to entice a new entrant. The
possibility of a major network by-pass is slight. Even though the incumbent
can always lower prices to reflect the sunk nature of existing network assets.
(2003, p.23)
The question is: How high can DORC go before encouraging a new entrant? Johnstone
(2003, p.25) argues that initial DORC could be set at double-ORC and there would still
be negligible risk of a new entrant. In summary, the Tobin’s q argument for DORC
valuation is theoretically and practically ingenuous. Potential new entrants will not be
attracted to invest unless expected tariffs are considerably higher than those based on
DORC or even RC. Moreover book DORC can equal and probably greatly exceed true
ORC without any realistic threat of competition. Therefore the economist’s use of
DORC is more a product of sophistry than theory.

Argument made by Australian Pipeline Association advocate, KPMG, against
reliance on Tobin’s Q

KPMG (2002) argue that the recent decision by Essential Services Commission (ESC),
(previously ORG (VIC), in relation to Victoria’s gas distribution businesses of a 6.7%
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allowed return (or WACC), is insufficient in the context of the risks borne by the
Victorian gas businesses. KPMG present three arguments in support of their
perspective:
1. The 6.7% does not meet the rates of return required by investors in these
businesses. They suggest that the regulators are allowing a progressively
smaller margin for risk than was apparent in previous decisions, even amongst
those decisions that adopt a post-tax framework.
2. The Productivity Commission's recommendations relating to the possibility that
setting minimum returns by regulators may result in average returns across a
diversified holding of projects less than the cost of capital, have not been
adopted by ESC.
3. Reliance on Tobin's Q framework to support regulatory decisions is an
inappropriate and simplistic analysis of the empirical evidence. KPMG’s
objections are focused around the regulators’ insistence that Tobin’s Q = 1.

KPMG supply two definitions of Tobin's Q at Appendix A (2002, p.38) of their report:
(i) Original formulation = MV of Equities + MV of net debt / Tangible Assets and
(ii) The Federal Reserve's view = MV of Equities/ Corporate net worth.
KPMG (2002, p.37) argue that the application of Tobin's Q framework implies a degree
of retrospectivity in regulatory decision-making and it is not clear that it provides any
helpful guidance in identifying how to mimic the outcomes of real world competitive
markets.
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Section 5 of KPMG’s report accuses the ESC of conservatism expressed by setting the
WACC at this low rate. Limited empirical evidence does not support the ESC's
assertion that the market values of Australian regulated businesses are 'excessive'.
KPMG rely on the emphasis Lindenberg and Ross (1981 p.2.) give the view that the
action of a monopolist as being a business that can successfully bar entry and is not
adequately regulated. Such a business will earn monopoly rents on the employed
capital. The market will capitalise those rents and the market value of the firm will
exceed the replacement cost of its capital stock, that is, q will persist above 1.
KPMG (2002, p.37) raise the following range of reasons why Tobin’s Q might not be =
1 for regulated businesses;
-at a particular point in time
- for extended periods of time
- for the market as a whole
- for particular firms or industries within the market.
KPMG refer to the work of Littlechild (2001, p.4), who argues that the regulatory
approach involving the setting of price caps may be inappropriate for the reasons that
the regulators rely on an inappropriate concept of businesses and competition, a neoclassical concept of competition that all companies have the same cost structure and
with price equal to the cost.

Littlechild suggests that it is more appropriate to look at the conditions of new entry and
remove barriers to competition. The earning of excess profits may be temporary and the
result of efficiencies or innovations rather than a pattern of returns. An argument is
made that the regulators ignore the reverse effect of regulation on the extent and process
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of competition and that excessive controls frustrate the emergence of competition so
that it is more appropriate to look at the conditions of new entry and remove barriers to
competition. This view of regulation and competition ignores the existence of a natural
monopoly where the introduction of ‘competition’ is duplication of the facility.
Littlechild presents a point of view that is based on what he describes as the “Austrian”
approach to competition i.e., the work of theorists such as Schumpeter (1950), and
Hayek (1948). Two of the most interesting objections Littlechild makes to what he
describes as Australian regulators’ neo-classical approach to regulation are the charge of
failure to accommodate innovation possibilities as well as the failure to recognise the
reality that the economy is always changing. Littlechild’s approach to regulation does
not address the issue of whether the reliance on ORC or DORC values for assets is
justified. The Australian regulators approach differs from that used in the UK and in the
USA where in the former, ‘flotation’ price forms the base of regulatory decisions while
in the latter, regulators use depreciated actual cost (DAC). The Australian regulators
‘one size fits all’ approach hinges on the use of DORC values for assets. Therefore if
DORC was abandoned as a regulation principle then a case by case approach would
more likely be taken. In this scenario, Littlechild’s approach to utility regulation would
have greater relevance.

Because they perceived a lack of empirical studies in Australia of Tobin’s Q of
regulated businesses, KPMG conducted their own inquiry, admittedly on a limited
sample and adopting a relatively high level approach. KPMG:
We examined the stock market value-to-regulated asset value of five
Australian utility businesses as at 5 August 2002. Our analysis produced a
range of values from 0.5-2.1 with an average of 1.2-1.5. It is worth noting
that AGL provided both the upper and lower values in this range because two
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approaches were used to estimate the value of AGL. Hence two ‘average’
numbers are also provided. This approach was taken because AGL
undertakes a broader range of activities including non-regulated activities.
The higher end value therefore almost certainly overstates the market value
assigned to AGL’s regulated activities.
To provide an alternative source of comfort for the estimates using regulated
asset values we also examined the stock market value-to-book asset values of
seven Australian utility businesses as at the 5 August 2002. This is a
commonly used approach in estimating Tobin’s Q given the absence of
reliable current cost asset values. This approach provided a range of 0.5 –
1.2 with an average value of 0.9. The lower average ratio of market value-tobook compared to market value-to-regulated asset would appear to be
counter-intuitive, given that the latter might be expected to be closer to
replacement cost. However, the latter excludes the value of intangibles and
only includes assets associated with non-regulated activities20 (2002, p.24).
Since regulatory asset values are usually greater than HC or ‘book’ values the above
result is more properly described as an expected result rather than ‘counter-intuitive’ as
described by KPMG.
KPMG raise the following questions:
•

Do regulated businesses trade in multiples of their regulated asset value (or more
broadly the RC of assets?

•

What are implications of relying on Tobin’s' Q for regulatory decisions?

•

Why would it be that regulated businesses trade at the point where MV>RC?21

20

KPMG also reported as follows (2002 p. 24): The second type of evidence refers to the prices at which
the ownership of regulated distribution businesses has changed hands in private transactions. We
examined 24 transactions involving gas and electricity businesses since 1994, and found that the multiples
of price relative to regulated asset value range from 0.8 (for the Moomba-Sydney Pipeline) to 2.7 (Energy
Partnership’s purchase of Multiunit/IKON Energy in March 1999), with both mean and median
converging around 2.0. All three transactions specific to Victorian gas distribution sector achieved a
value-to-regulated asset multiple of over 2.0, while the latest transaction, the July 2002 purchase by
CKI/HKE of CitiPower achieved a multiple of 1.7.

21

Sandilands (1975), Gee et al (1975) would argue that the rational manager would sell and re purchase
assets where RC<MV in order to achieve a cash advantage.
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KPMG argue that there is a dearth of information in support of Tobin's Q in regulated
businesses in Australia and that the balance of opinion is that there is strong evidence of
a relationship between MV of a firm's assets and RC of assets but typically the
relationship is not 1. They describe two sets of factors that are reasons for this
divergence from 1as:
•

the difficulty of valuing intangibles, capital market imperfections and
diminishing returns to investment all of which impact on the denominator, and

•

Factors that impinge on the numerator are the value of incumbency and market
position, noise, future growth expectations, corporate governance and
adjustment costs.

Some reasons why KPMG consider that the q of regulated firms might differ from the q
of unregulated firms:
•

Regulatory conservatism implying that the q of regulated firms would be above
non-regulated firms. Inadequacies of DORC as representative of RC of assets,
placing regulated firms above non-regulated firms' Q.

•

Regulatory risk would put regulated firms below that of non-regulated firms.

The application of Tobin’s Q framework impacts regulatory decision-making and it is
not clear that it provides any helpful guidance in identifying how to mimic the outcomes
of real world competitive markets. What ‘q’ is effectively describing is the hypothetical
end point of the competitive process.
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Relevance of research into Market Value Added (MVA), Free Cash Flow (FCF),
Economic Profit (EP), or Net Present Value (NPV), and Economic Value Added
(EVA).

Rajan (1999) writes about the term market value added (MVA) and research that
measures the gross surplus of market value (MV) over invested capital. MVA can be
thought of in one sense as determined by the stream of economic profit, or Economic
Value Added (EVA), that the firm is likely to generate in the future. Rajan argues that
this concept is identical to the proposition in corporate finance, that the value of an asset
is determined by the stream of future cash flows it generates.

Tobin’s q also examines the relationship between shareholder value and invested
capital. While Rajan is looking at the performance of managers in increasing
shareholder wealth there is also the concept of present shareholder wealth compared to
assets. He compares the performance of utilities and argues that the CEO’s role is to
maximise the wealth created above and beyond capital investment. He examines the
market values of Northern States Power and Northeast Utilities:
At the end of calendar year 1998 (all market valuations are calculated on that
date), both companies had virtually the same total market value (as estimated
by the market value of shareholders equity plus the book value of debt and
other long term liabilities). In this case that means approximately $7.6 billion
for NSP and $7.9 billion for Northeast. However, the performance of the two
firms has been quite different. Northeast invested $7.9 billion of capital
investment to produce $7.9 billion in value, whereas NSP needed only $5.8
billion of capital to produce $7.6 billion in value.
Investors at Northeast Utilities are just breaking even. Their wealth remains
unchanged. By contrast, the investors in NSP now own a company worth
$1.7 billion more than the cash they put in (or left in) the business. As a
group they are truly better off. Their additional worth is measured by MVA
(1999, p.2).

241

Rajan explains the above results as follows:
When a company makes a new investment, the firm's capital base expands by
the amount of the investment. The company's total value increases to reflect
both the increased investment and the market’s estimate of the present value
of the project future cash flows. The net change or MVA, expands or
contracts to reflect the stock market’s favourable or pessimistic assessment of
the net present value (NPV) of the project. As the difference between market
value and invested capital, MVA simply is the market’s estimate of the NPV
of all past and planned capital spending projects. Taking on positive NPV
projects increases MVA and shareholder wealth (2002, p.2).
The essential parallel between MVA and Tobin’s q is demonstrated by the following
passage:
America's most able wealth-creating utility is Duke Energy, with an MVA of
$15 billion, followed by Southern Co. ($10 billion) and Con Edison ($6.3
billion) (1999, p.3.).
One way to look at capital efficiency is to divide MVA by the amount of
capital employed. Such a "standardised" MVA indicates the rate at which
wealth is being created per unit of capital. A caveat is in order. The objective
of management is to maximise MVA not standardise MVA (1999, p.4).
Any project that produces positive MVA adds to shareholders’ wealth, and
should be undertaken even if it brings down the ratio of MVA to capital.
Standardised MVA is useful as an indicator of capital efficiency, but
maximising it should not be viewed as a goal in itself. Wealth-creation
depends not only on capital efficiency but also on the size of the capital base
to which this efficiency applies.
Duke Energy is the only clear winner on both measures. (MVA and capital
invested). Not only has the company invested a lot of capital, but it has done
so efficiently for the most part (1999, p.5).

MVA simply is the market’s estimate of the NPV of all past and planned capital
spending projects. Compared to the definition of Tobin’s q supplied by the OED the
difference is slight and compares with q as the ratio between the valuation shareholders
put on a firm to the market value of its assets; at the margin the shareholders’ valuation
is shown by the share price. Tobin and Rajan would seem to be describing the same
theory. The notion of efficiency is demonstrated by the different results Vis a Vis
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comparable movements in share price for equivalent investments in assets. All that is
being asserted is that a firm’s q is affected by the level of risk attaching to investment in
that particular industry as well as the demonstrable expertise, or lack of it, by managers
based on expected future returns from investing in that industry.22

The Stern Stewart Consulting group, Stewart (1990), a New York consulting firm, have
developed the concept of Economic Value Added (EVA) that describes the after-tax
cash flow generated by a business minus the cost of the capital. It resembles the
performance measure called Residual Income (RI) except that in calculating EVA
consideration is given to the changes in asset values that may have occurred during the
year other than through sale or acquisition. Probably one of the most significant changes
is the change in the current value of the assets at the end of the period compared with
the current value at the beginning of the period. This change in asset values represents
the increase in the economic value over the period measured. Proponents of EVA argue
its superiority over other performance measures such as return on investment (ROI) and
Earnings per Share saying that the calculation of EVA brings in share price and thus
recognises investors’ estimates of risk.

EVA has been marketed by Stern Stewart with the purpose of promoting valuemaximizing behavior in corporate managers. The task Stern Stewart addresses is that of
adapting accounting-based measures of performance such that they are systematically
related to economic value. O’Hanlon and Peasnell (1998) consider the adjustments to

22

It is worth noting Rajan’s findings regarding the outperforming utility in America as being Duke
Energies International (DEI), the company who recently built a new pipeline from SA to NSW, are
indirectly competing with AGLGN, and have recently, Sept 2003, announced the sale of all their assets in
Australia.
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GAAP-based accounting advocated by Stern Stewart in order to produce a more
economically meaningful version of residual income which might serve as an effective
indicator of single-period performance. They review how residual income creates such
a link, before considering the rationale of EVA. Stern Stewart market EVA as an
accounting-based performance measure which yields the same discounted presentvalues as free cash flow, thereby retaining the focus of accounting profit on the
matching of costs and revenues without losing value-relevance. O’Hanlon and Peasnell
(1988), consider the portion of profit that goodwill represents as unrecorded profit.
Performance measurement may be achieved by using regularly revised present values
and comparisons of actual with planned cash flows instead.

Abdullah (2002, pp.60-71), and Hall (2000), follow the approach taken by the applied
study by Griliches (1981) who, using a Tobin’s Q approach, essentially considers that
the market value of the firm is related to the value of tangible and intangible assets.
In this context, the term q allows for the fact that the market valuations may vary across
firms and time, and that there may also be 'noise' in such valuations.
Rappaport (1986), Bacidore et al (1997) compare EVA with a new measure which they
call REVA for Refined Economic Value Added. REVA subtracts from periodic profit a
capital charge based on the opening market value of the entity.

Stern Stewart's approach is to work with the grain of conventional accounting practice
rather than an explanation of the underlying income construct. EVA is intended to be
an annuitised measure of the advantages of the 'sinking fund' method', by which
O’Hanlon and Peasnell (1988, p.442) think they mean an 'annuity depreciation method'.

244

EVA becomes an annuitised NPV, if the periodic net cash flows associated with the
asset are themselves constant. Grinyer's 1985 approach of 'matching' Earned Economic
Income (EEI), has accounting depreciation computed so that book value is a constant
proportion of economic value throughout the life of the asset and RI is proportional to
cash flows.

While the conceptual equivalences of EVA and NPV approaches to valuation are well
known, recent extensions of the discounted cash flow (DCF) concepts to security
valuation using so-called “free-cash-flow” techniques have resulted in the application of
DCF techniques to practical business problems. Shrieves and Wachowicz (2000)
rigorously demonstrate the linkages between the problems of security valuation,
enterprise valuation, and investment project selection, in a manner that relates directly
to the use of standard financial accounting information. The Free Cash Flow (FCF)
approach focuses on the periodic total cash flows, obtained by deducting total net
investment and adding net debt issuance to net operating cash flow whereas the EVA
approach requires defining the periodic total investment in the firm.

Shrievers and Wachowicz (2000), discuss the relationship between Economic Profit
(EP) and EVA as a restatement of total firm valuation such that “reallocates” investment
expenditures from the periods in which they are made to periods over which their
resulting benefits occur. Adopting the term Net Operating Profit after Tax (NOPAT)
they summarise their computation of Economic Profit at time ‘t’ (EPt) as:
NOPATt
+difference between tax depreciation and EVA depreciation
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-capital charges on EVA operating assets
= economic profit”
In considering project evaluation, economic value is the stream of EP that results from
the project and equals the NPV of the project. While the discounted free-cash-flow
valuation is logically equivalent to the discounting of economic profits under EVA
approach, there are a myriad of adjustments necessary to the accounting information
required for this equivalence.

This affirmation of the connections between EP and NPV is further affirmed by Francis
et al (2000)23 in their empirical research of over 500 large firms in the US during the

five year period 1989-93. These researchers have built on earlier research, in particular
Penman and Sougiannis (1998, p. 47), who used portfolio value estimates based on
realised attributes whereas Francis et al used individual security value estimates based

on forecast data.

Empirical estimates of Tobin's q ratio are used by Lang (1989), to determine a group of
over investing firms, in order to distinguish between the predictions of the cash flow
signaling hypothesis and the free cash flow hypotheses. An average q less than one will

23

Francis et al (2000): Most firms in their sample were listed on the NYSE or the NASDAQ and had a
mean market capitalization of $2.6 billion and a mean beta of 0.97. The authors were looking at the
reliability of intrinsic value estimates derived from three theoretically equivalent valuation models: the
discounted dividend model (DIV), the discounted free cash flow model (FCF), and the discounted
abnormal earnings model (AE). Their analyses required use of data on historic book values (from
Compustat), market prices and proxies for the market’s expectations of the fundamental attributes from
Value Line. Value Line provides annual forecasts of a broad set of variables found in the elements in the
three models forecast during the period 1989-93. Francis et al., have developed the model of discounted
abnormal earnings (AE) by adopting valuation techniques introduced by Preinreich (1938), see above,
Edwards and Bell (1961), and Ohlson (1995). Their valuation of equity model can be stated simply as
follows:
MV at time F = Book value at end of year t + the sum of AEt/(1+rF)t.
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imply over-investment if a firm's investments are scale-expanding and exhibit
decreasing marginal efficiency of capital. The over-investment hypothesis predicts that
the average return in response to announcements of sizable dividend changes will be
larger for over-investing firms than for value maximizing firms. Tobin's q ratios are
used to divide the sample firms into 2 groups: over-investors, and value maximisers and
marginal over-investors. Lang’s (1989) results of the analysis are consistent with the
hypothesis that dividend changes for over investing firms signal information about
investment policies. The results are also consistent with the conditional cash flow
signaling hypothesis when investors anticipate large dividend increases for firms with
average q's greater than one.

Economic aspects of the impact of regulators’ decisions

Whittington (1996, p. 18)24 discusses the problems of excess returns that are the result
of misjudgment by the regulator in setting the price cap for regulated businesses. He
identifies two main areas of concern. Firstly, where excess returns have been achieved,
the length of the time period over which the regulator drives the expected rate of return
down to the minimum level. Secondly, where cash flow forecasting is part of the
process of setting the price cap, as a substitute for the more traditional accrual
accounting method of the RRR (Regulated Rate of Return), RAB (Regulatory Asset
Base) variety. Whittington (1996) discusses the problem of accruals relative to a cash
24

Whittington mentions the idea of 'circularity' in relation to asset valuation and prices. The choice of
'price cap', with resulting cash flows available to shareholders funds, i.e. regulatory asset base. This
process is now a routine aspect of regulation in the UK. The regulatory system recognises that it is
concerned with establishing an appropriate return of (in the case of depreciation) and return on (in the
case of profit) capital. A distinction is drawn between an appropriate valuation of shareholders' funds
rather than valuation of specific assets, or net assets, of the business. The difference between the two is
the market to asset ratio (MAR). Holding gains and losses affect shareholders (RAB), the shareholders
investment in the firm.
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flow alternative recognising the insight that a cash flow analysis gives into transactions.
Whittington:
There are two crucial gaps in the description of cash flow regulation given
above. First, that costs of financing which are allowed must relate to the
capital sum which they are servicing, i.e., to something resembling the RAB.
Second, cash flow projections over a fixed regulatory period of, say, five
years are not sufficient to establish whether shareholders have been given a
reasonable reward in terms of dividends….the value of RAB at the end of the
regulatory period (1996, p. 20).
The characteristic of regulatory models is that they have the implication that the market
value of the assets involved should be equal to the replacement value of the assets used
in determining the allowable cash flows.

There is circularity when the regulator

determines cash flows and also determines the value of the assets. Presently there have
been no instances where the regulator, either the ACCC or state regulators have taken
steps to ‘claw back’ excess revenue resulting from overgenerous regulatory decisions.
Some commentators have suggested that the ACCC should exercise its powers under
the Trade Practices Act 1974 to demand information post decision that might shed light
on issues such as this. An associated question relates to the level of new Capital
expenditure presently being undertaken by regulated firms. Whether the level is
sufficient to meet demand in the near future must be viewed on a business by business
basis.

Ergas’s (2000) provides a defence of HC for reporting purposes and argues that
accounts have information value to investors:
To begin with, if the allowed rate of return is even minimally above the
WACC, the firm will have incentives to accelerate the replacement of
existing assets. This is merely a form of the Averch-Johnson effect, but
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preventing it would involve the regulator in close and presumably costly
monitoring of the firms’ maintenance and investment decisions (2000, p.3).
Achieving a return above the WACC implies increased return of capital. How the firm
handles this increased cash flow will be influenced by levels of risk, expected returns
and managerial efficiency.
In practice the ACCC seems to place very little weight on ensuring
consistency between the process of determining allowed revenue in any
period and the entity’s overall balance sheet. In telecommunications, for
example, the Commission has deferred capacity costs as between periods
without any consideration of how the costs thus being deferred will ever be
recouped. Seen more generally, this lack of attention to investor’s balance
sheet position seems to reflect a disregard for the constraint of capital
maintenance (2000, p.10).
Ergas argues that the valuation approaches adopted by the ACCC are necessarily
inconsistent with capital maintenance because the ACCC has not as yet sought to
construct a set of control tools. Therefore an outcome consistent with capital
maintenance cannot be assured. Control tools are required to reconcile DORC and even
Total Service Long Run Incremental Cost (TSLRIC) with capital maintenance.

There are problems posed by misuse of depreciation notions, such as ‘Competition
Depreciation’, by owners’ representatives whose interest is in increasing DORC
valuations in order to charge higher prices than the regulated prices. One such owner
representative is Agility Management(2000) who in their paper ‘The Construction of
DORC from ORC’ quote a number of definitions from ACCC and the Office of the
Regulator General (ORG) that support the view that DORC sets the upper limit to the
maximum price the firm would be prepared to pay for ‘second hand’ assets. Another
interpretation they offer is that DORC is the valuation methodology that would be
consistent with the price charged by an efficient new entrant into the industry. Agility
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Management (2000 p. 6) argue that the Notation and Formula given by the ACCC in the
Draft Principles (p. 66) are designed to demonstrate that DORC values are found by the
exercise of judgment rather than by applying depreciation rates to ORC, or the costs of
a New Entrant.
By definition, the value of the new entrant’s assets is ORC, and the price
charged by the new entrant must be such as to ensure that the NPV of the
future income stream over the life of those assets is equal to the ORC.
Having determined the income stream for the new entrant’s assets, the DORC
value for the existing assets is then determined as the NPV of the first L years
of that stream, where L is the remaining life of the existing asset (2000, p.6).
By this Agility are arguing that the NPV of the DORC should be the same as that of the
ORC although the former has a term equal to the remaining life of the assets. Then if
ORC has a value greater than that of DORC, the amount of WACC contained in the
revenue stream would be greater and therefore the NPV would be greater.

Agility (2000, p.7) agree that the NPV calculations assume a discount rate equal to the
WACC, but then argue that the higher the discount rate is the closer the DORC values
align with ORC values. This seems to be an example of flawed thinking because the
discount rate applying to the ORC would be the same as on the DORC. Agility describe
a dynamic relationship between DORC and ORC where DORC values represent a low
of less than 10% of ORC values at the beginning of useful life and, as end of life
approaches, that DORC values become close to ORC values. As shown by Johnstone
(2003 p.10), at the end of useful life DORC values are at Zero while ORC values are
equal to DORC values at the beginning of useful life plus the impact of inflation25.

25

Johnstone’s (2000, p.10) examples shows examples where Inflation is at zero
and at 5%.
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Acceptance of the view of ODV as representing the ‘most efficient method of providing
the services of the current asset’, regulators have focused on theorising on how to move
from ORC to DORC, or ORC’used’. Agility Management portrays the situation where
DORC equals ORC less “competition” depreciation:
It appears that the construction of DORC proposed in the Draft Statement of
Principles, where DORC equals ORC less “competition” depreciation, results
in a move away from, rather than towards, the correct value of DORC (2000,
p.10).
Agility concludes that in order to be consistent with the statement of principle in the
ESC and ACCC decisions, the DORC value for existing assets must be constructed as
the net present value of the future income from those assets, however recognising that
the income stream for the DORC valuation relates to the estimated useful life of those
assets.

In addition, if the DORC values fall below the ODV of the assets, then the

DORC values would be adjusted downwards. Agility’s arguments should be seen as an
attempt to convince the regulators to increase the MAR that they as managers of the
Moomba to Sydney Pipeline (MSP), should be able to charge their customers. Agility
concludes:
The common assumption, that DORC equals ORC less depreciation, is
incorrect and significantly understates the proper value of DORC (2000 p.
11).
The above has tried to prove that the aim of the ACCC in trying to derive a valuation of
DORC based on ORC values less depreciation has not been successful. Agility
Management have tried to argue that not only is it realistic to tie DORC values to ORC
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but that the present approach of the ACCC underestimates DORC values. They argue
that the overriding impact of ODV should be remembered.
Conclusions and Suggestions

Since investment in gas transmission pipelines requires very large amounts of capital
and have a correspondingly long life the industry would probably prefer a way of
depreciating its assets that only occurred when replacement assets were purchased. The
‘Retirement Method” of depreciation as described in Chapter 6 has much to recommend
it. An outcome to the regulatory debate regarding depreciation consistent with capital
maintenance cannot be assured.

The private sector, in the UK in the 1970's and 80's, also in Australia and in New
Zealand, rejected the use of Replacement Cost purpose of reporting. However there is a
long history of debate for and against the adoption of replacement cost and its close
ideological relatives Depreciated Replacement Cost and Deprival Value. Subjectivity
makes the adoption of Replacement Cost methods very problematic and thus very
unlikely to be adopted by the accounting profession for financial reporting.
(Whittington 1994).

In a similar way the adoption of Depreciated Optimised Replacement Cost (DORC), is
equally unlikely. DORC is unauditable. Some of the reasons being:
•

The asset definition problem

•

Optimisation or asset maintenance agenda

•

The variance quotation problem expressed by each valuer giving a different
result.
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•

The aggregation or non-additive problem in that the Replacement Cost of
individual assets is not equal to the sum of the Replacement cost of a
conjunction of assets.

In the USA, where asset valuation for tariff setting has a 100 year history, Replacement
Cost has been rejected - or not taken seriously - Bonbright et al (1937). This chapter has
argued against the regulators definition of Tobin’s q as having relevance to the
determination of the regulatory asset base. Instead the complexity of the business
environment for utilities suggests that the regulators’ model is inappropriate for
application to such companies.

The Australian regulator's argument in favour of DORC comes from Tobin's Q and
from this definition of DORC, economists argue that the RAB = DORC. They argue
that the use of DORC for regulatory purposes emulates the rational market settings by
producing the highest possible tariffs short of those at which a new entrant might be
encouraged to duplicate the existing provider's infrastructure, (and compete for those
tariffs)(ACCC 1999). Perhaps it is time the regulators moved away from this ‘one size
fits all’ regulation formula and made each regulatory decision based on the profile of the
business and consideration of the ODV as well as the ‘Sunk’ value of its assets.

Chapter 8 will describe how the adoption of a DORC valuation by a state regulator
provides existing asset owners with windfall gains. This occurs because every extra $
by which the RAB is increased by the Regulator results in an income stream.
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It is suspected that there are political motives behind the ideological support for DORC,
on the part of regulators. User groups have expressed dissatisfaction with regulatory
decisions by ACCC, ORG and IPART (NSW), with suspicion of lack of impartiality
and political interference. Regulators are bound by the National Electricity Code (NEC)
and Council of Australian Governments (COAG) direction that Optimised Deprival
Value (ODV) is the overriding valuation principle. The realisable or ‘sunk’ value of
assets should be seen through the regulators’ spectacles when arriving at valuations.
Depreciation allowed as part of a regulatory decision in respect of regulatory asset base
valuations should be ring fenced for new capex so that at the end of the useful life of
existing second hand i.e., DORC valued assets, replacement assets are in place. This
should be a gradual process of replacement and renewal. Businesses exhibiting signs of
excessive Free Cash Flows should be required to reduce prices and make a capital
repayment to shareholders
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Chapter 8
The anatomy of a regulatory decision by IPART (NSW) in relation to
the access arrangement for AGLGN gas networks 1999-2004

Introduction

This chapter will have a particular focus on the regulatory decision by the Independent
Pricing and Review Tribunal of New South Wales (IPART ), in relation to the access
arrangement for Australian Gas Light Gas Networks (AGLGN),1999-2004, which will
be referred to as ‘the decision’. In this study the various chapters so far have discussed
major topics;
Chap 3: the history of Current Cost accounting within the accounting profession;
Chap 4: principles of regulation espoused by the regulatory bodies;
Chap 5: the regulator’s tariff formula;
Chap 6: the construction of DORC from ORC; and in
Chap 7 discussed the regulators adoption of Tobin’s Q for the purpose of justifying their
adjustment in asset values from ORC to DORC. Emphasis was placed on the
importance of the total revenue stream to the regulated company. Chapter 7 also
considered the regulators’ actions using a ‘one size fits all’ form of regulation.
Chapter 8 uses a case study approach to look at the process of regulatory decisionmaking in respect of AGLGN’s gas transmission and distribution system in NSW. This
system is composed mainly of transmission pipelines as well as their (mainly Sydney
area) distribution system. The role of IPART and its Federal reference body the ACCC
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are discussed. The definitions of coverage of the pipeline, access arrangements, and the
vertically integrated nature of AGLGN and AGLGN’s relationship with both regulators
and contract customers are explored. In particular the chapter examines the centrality of
DORC as the basis of the decision by IPART relating to the Access Arrangement of
AGLGN gas distribution and transmission networks in NSW for the five-year period
1999-2004. The process whereby a decision was made is examined. The contributions
from interested parties, including customers and the new competitor Duke Energy
International (DEI), are examined.

The determination of the asset base includes long-term assets, some portion of working
capital and excludes tax assets.

Contributors consider that there are substantial

difficulties in obtaining valuations of any practical value. Valuers themselves cannot
agree. The regulation of transmission pipelines in Australia is undertaken by the ACCC
while, in the main, the regulation of Distribution networks is the domain of State based
regulators. The need for regulation stems from the perception that the owner of a natural
monopoly will extract monopoly rents from customers for whom there is no substitute
service/product.

The “essential facility” doctrine

The Hilmer Review recommendations paragraph 50, refer to the “essential facility”
doctrine on the basis of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act 1890 (USA). This requires:
(1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist;
(2) a competitor’s inability to practically or reasonably duplicate the essential facility;
(3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and
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(4) The feasibility of providing the facility.
The section of the Trade Practices Act relevant to whether or not a gas transmission
business is a natural monopoly is described in Sections (a), (b), (c), and (d) of s 1.9 of
the National third Party Access Code for Natural Gas Pipeline Systems.
King (2000) describes Hilmer’s underlying economic principles as follows:
The Hilmer committee recognised that competition is not always desirable.
For example, if a final good or service is most efficiently produced using a
'natural monopoly' technology then, by definition, competitive supply of that
good or service will be socially wasteful (2000, p.5).
And again:
An essential facility must produce an input to further production that passes
two essentiality tests in addition to involving a natural monopoly technology.
For an input to be essential it must:
1. Be used to manufacture a specific good or service and there must be no
alternative input or process that enables a competitor to produce an
equivalent final good or service at a comparable cost; and
2. There must be no alternative, substitutable final good or service that can be
manufactured and sold at a comparable price without using that input.
To see the implications of these two essentiality tests, consider a factory that
is supplied by gas via a natural monopoly transmission/distribution system. If
the factory can easily switch from gas to another fuel source and the
alternative fuel is available at a comparable cost to gas then the gas
transmission/distribution system is not an essential facility (2000, p.7).
Commonwealth and State Regulators

In Australia there are two different kinds of networks, transmission networks and
distribution networks. The National Competition Council (NCC) has the power to
arbitrate whether or not a transmission network should come under coverage and thus
be subject to an access arrangement. The ACCC typically has responsibility for the
regulation of transmission networks while state regulators have responsibility for
distribution networks. The AGLGN Natural Gas System in NSW decision was unusual
because the network system comprises both transmission and distribution networks. It is
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more usual for a pipeline facility owner to separate transmission business from
distribution business.

Application for an Access Arrangement

The mechanism of regulation is that the facility owner makes an application for an
Access Arrangement to the appropriate regulatory body26. Access Arrangements are
contracts entered into by a facility owner and the National Competition Council (NCC).
Any facility owner or person may approach the NCC asking the Council to recommend
that a particular service be declared, (s44F1) as being one subject to coverage. Coverage
means that the business is subject to an access arrangement. NCC sets certain tests that
the service must pass before recommending declaration to the relevant state or federal
minister. Upon declaration the facility owner and the access seeker(s) negotiate an
access agreement which is simply a commercial contract between the parties and,
contrary to the original recommendation of the Hilmer committee, does not have to be
registered (although it can be if all the parties to the contract and the ACCC agree,
(s44ZW). The NCC does not provide access pricing principles, however, if negotiations
break down parties can approach the ACCC to make the decision and this may be
appealed to the Australian Competition Tribunal (ACT).
Under the Gas Supply Act 1996 IPART regulates gas pricing through establishment of
gas pricing orders, under which, charges for natural gas supplied to customers are fixed.

IPART must assess proposals in accordance with the National Access Code which came
into effect in August 1998 with the enactment of the Gas Pipelines Access (NSW) Act
See the ACCC publication October 2002 Regional development of natural gas
transmission pipeline.

26
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1998. The latter gives backing to the National Third Party Access Code for Natural Gas

Pipeline Systems. Gas tariff regulation continues under the Gas Supply Act.

The Gas code requirements identified several factors which should be considered in
establishing the initial capital base (section 8.10), but does not specify any particular
asset valuation methodology at the same time suggesting that the initial capital base
(ICB), should normally lie somewhere between depreciated actual cost (DAC), and
depreciated optimised replacement cost (DORC). In contrast, the Electricity code
requirements distinguish between:
•

the valuation of assets in service before 1 July 1999 ('sunk assets') and

•

The valuation of assets brought into service after 1 July 1999 or the revaluation of
'sunk assets.

In regard to sunk assets the code provides that the jurisdictional regulator, in this
instance IPART shall:
provide a fair and reasonable risk adjusted cash flow rate of return on
efficient investment [where sunk assets] are valued at a value determined by
in Jurisdictional Regulatory or consistent with the regulatory asset base
established in the participating jurisdiction (1999, Clause 6.10.3(e) (5)).
However in any subsequent valuation of assets the Jurisdictional Regulator must have
regard to the agreement of the Council of Australian Governments of 19 August 1994,
that deprival value should be the preferred approach to valuing network assets.

The

effect of the above seems to be that the Regulator has considerable discretion about how
assets are to be valued and under the electricity code has the scope to revisit asset
values. The ACCC has expressed an initial preference to revalue the assets under the
electricity code on the basis of optimised deprival value (ODV) to establish the initial
capital base (ICB). This establishment of an ICB would then be altered by the
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application of an indexation factor to it each subsequent year thus eliminating the need
for revaluation as would be required under DORC.

The framework for the regulation of monopolies has several arms
-

The relevant sections of the Trade Practices ACT of 1974,

-

Sections (a), (b), (c), and (d), of s 1.9 of the National third party access
code for natural gas pipeline systems

-

Section 2.2 of the gas code for natural gas pipelines

-

The recommendations of the Hilmer review

Facility owners have strong incentives to craft and negotiate access terms and
conditions to maintain monopoly profits regardless of the degree of final market
competition. While the ACCC is the reference authority for dispute resolution, the
NCC or the ACCC could issue guidelines that would constrain the outcome of access
negotiations before becoming legally binding. Access in telecommunications and for
some infrastructure, such as the Moomba to Sydney Pipeline (MSP), precedes the
National Competition Policy reforms. A key feature of National Competition Policy is
that it provides a unified structure to the microeconomic reform path and prevents
stalling on interstate differences.

Regulation problems with vertically integrated firms

King (2000, p.12), describes how the owner of an essential facility can manipulate the
vertical chain of production to maximise profits when the facility owner is vertically
integrated and can prevent any potential final product competitors from buying the
essential input. In this situation the owner of the essential facility becomes a final
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product monopolist by the design of access prices. King expresses skepticism about the
regulators ability to curtail the ability of an essential facility owner to seize substantial
monopoly profits, either by vertical separation or downstream competition.

King writes about the actions of a facility owner while under coverage;
There are obvious incentives for a vertically integrated facility owner to stall
access negotiations. Consider the owner of a declared gas reticulation
network who is currently a monopoly gas retailer. While access negotiations
are stalled, the owner of the reticulated network can continue to reap
monopoly profits from gas sales. Successful access negotiations will lead to
retail gas competition. At best, the facility owner will continue to achieve
monopoly profits through sales of reticulation access but, more likely, the
profits that flow to the facility owner will fall. Agreement is not in the facility
owner's interest (2000, p.12).
The substantial corporate presence of AGLGN Ltd., one of Australia’s oldest and
largest companies, is a vertically integrated company and is presently in dispute with
the ACCC in combination with two corporate partners, over its proposal to purchase
Victoria’s largest electricity generation plant at Loy Yang. The ACCC has
unsuccessfully opposed this acquisition. The December 2003 decision by the Australian
Competition Tribunal (ACT) overturned the previous decision of the ACCC preventing
AGLGN and its partners from negotiating the purchase of Loy Yang.

An examination of the Table Chronicle of Events – overview of 1963-2003, in this
chapter shows that AGLGN have sought a delay to the proposed revision to Access
Arrangements for the Moomba to Sydney pipeline (MSP), from 1 July 2003 to
December 2003. Although the final decision was delayed the ACCC announced their
decision on 3rd Oct 2003, (Sydney Morning Herald), that the fee for transporting gas
through the pipeline be cut by 22 per cent, to 52c a GJ from 66c at present, although
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there is provision for adjustment of the price to take inflation into account, which is
expected to see the price average 53c over the five-year term of the ruling.
Robins from the Sydney Morning Herald writes that an ACCC official said that:
The proposal would lead to a reduction in charges users of the pipeline could
expect to pay and, eventually, gas prices. However, any cut to the gas price
may take a while, since Australian Gas Light, the dominant supplier of gas in
NSW, has a fixed term contract with the pipeline's owner, Australian Pipeline
Trust, the owners of the MSP which binds AGLGN, its major customer, to a
price agreement for a five year period ending in 2006 (Robins 2003, p.5).
.
Australian Pipeline Trust was spun off from AGL in 2000, with the gas company
retaining a 30 per cent stake.

Major industrial projects facilitated by the availability of gas or electricity and the
capability of an economy and that of its industries to carry out energy intensive projects
have a major impact on society. Decisions that result in overpricing have the potential to
inhibit industrial development and underutilize assets such as gas transmission
pipelines. On the other hand, under pricing of product may lead to waste or expectations
that new capital investments may be able to provide additional units of energy at
equivalent prices; this has not been observed.

Residential and commercial customers have their voting power to influence election
outcomes and energy decisions. Modern societies depend on access to increasing energy
consumption and politicians know that voters would cast their votes for politicians
promising continuation of supply. Power failures across the worlds’ major economies
have been headline news over the past few years. Presently Australia is grappling with
the results of shut down at the Santos owned gas production plant in the Cooper Basin
after an explosion on 1st January 2004. Italy is recovering from a weekend power failure
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that blacked out the entire country (September 2003), while failures in London and New
York have focused the minds of utility owners and regulators on the challenges ahead.
Few politicians or regulators are unmoved by the identification of possible under
investment or lack of maintenance that might lead to power failure or gas explosions.27

Background and history of the Moomba to Sydney Pipeline (MSP)

1963 Cooper Basin in N/E South Australia, Gas discovered. Cooper Basin Producers
Santos Ltd. principal member.
1964 Gippsland Basin, in Bass Strait. Producers in the Gippsland Basin are related
companies of BHP and ESSO.
1971 Australian Gas Light Company (AGL) selected the Cooper Basin producers as
the preferred long term source of supply of natural gas to Sydney, negotiated a
letter agreement with Cooper Basin Producers to that effect. AGL was a
statutory monopoly supplying gas to Sydney.
The MSP is 1,299 kms long and goes from Moomba in Victoria to Wilton (near
Sydney), in New South Wales. The MSP was constructed by a Commonwealth
Statutory Authority, the Pipeline Authority, and sold in 1994 to East Australian Pipeline
Limited (EAPL) who is the owners and operators of the MSP. Originally, AGL was the
substantial owner of EAPL. However, in June 2000, all the shares in EAPL were
purchased by Australian Pipeline Trust (APT) a listed unit trust. AGL holds 30% of the
shares in APT. The marketing of the transportation services offered by MSP are
27

It is claimed by Dr. B. Moselle, Ofgem’s managing director that recent London power cuts were not the
result of low levels of investment. The cause was new equipment failure. Moselle claims that since
privatisation £16 billion pounds has been invested in the electricity network.
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undertaken by EAPL, a subsidiary of APT. The MSP pipeline is physically operated by
Agility Management Pty Ltd, a subsidiary of AGL. This net of ownership ensures that
AGL retains control of the MSP. Under the sale of the MSP to EAPL Act of 1994, the
owner of the MSP was required to provide access to shippers and in the event of dispute
as to access, the Trade Practices Commission was nominated as the arbitrator.
Subsequent to the establishment of the Gas Pipeline Access Law of 1998, the MSP
became a covered pipeline under S 1.1 of the National Third Party Access Code (the
Code) for Natural Gas Pipeline Systems.

In 1976, AGLGN completed the transmission pipeline from Wilton to Horsley Park, a
length of 52km that connected the MSP to Sydney metropolitan area. After this pipeline
was completed, lateral pipelines were constructed from the MSP to Wollongong,
Newcastle, Dubbo, Orange, Lithgow, Oberon, Griffith, Wagga Wagga and Canberra. It
is the extensions of the MSP from Wilton that are owned by AGLGN and are subject to
the IPART decision. The MSP is subject to regulation by the ACCC. AGLGN Gas
Networks is both a transmission and a distribution pipeline. Because the regulation of
the networks occurred at the time when it did, IPART are the regulators.

1999/2000 Access Arrangement review - AGL Gas Networks (AGLGN)

In January 1999, AGLGN submitted proposed revisions to its Access Arrangement
(originally established in 1997). The proposed revisions covered an access arrangement
period from 1999/2000 to 2003/04.
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Table 8 - Milestones in the review process
•

Under s2.9 of the National Gas Code, IPART issued two notices.
Subsequently, AGLGN submitted revised Access Arrangement
Information and further supplementary information in February and
April 1999.

•

Public hearings were held in Sydney on 31 March and 1 April 1999.

•

Arrangements were made in June 1999 to continue the existing Access
Undertaking (including prices and terms and conditions) until
finalisation of the current access review.

•

The draft decision was released on 28 October 1999. IPART proposed
not to approve AGLGN’s proposed revisions to the Access Arrangement.
A number of requirements had to be met by AGLGN to enable a final
decision to be made.

•

In February 2000, AGLGN submitted additional documents to reflect
prices, terms and conditions under the draft decision.

•

On 10 and 24 February 2000, public forums were held to discuss various
issues arising from the draft decision.

•

On 3 March 2000, IPART released the operating cost information based
on the fully distributed cost methodology under s42 (2) of the Law.

•

Public submission on this review closed on 31 March 2000.

•

Release of its final decision on 21 July 2000.

On 14 September 2000, IPART approved the revised Access Arrangement and Access
Arrangement Information for AGLGN relating to the natural gas distribution system in
NSW. These revisions came into effect on 1 October 2000. IPART says they have
considered the interests of all stakeholders, and the risks faced by AGLGN.
AGLGN provided all customer responses to IPART; some customers also provided
their views directly to IPART. Non-confidential submissions were received from
Country Energy , Public Interest Advocacy Center, Incitec, Caltex and Energy Markets
Reform Forum.
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Contract customers transport large quantities of gas from places such as the Cooper
basin to major ‘Heads’ such as Wilton, for distribution. AGLGN provides for seven
price zones on the trunk pipelines for the capacity reservation and managed capacity
reservation services available to the contracted market:
Wilton-Newcastle:
Contract customer numbers 419 in 1999/00 falling to 418, 2000-04.
Tariff Customer numbers rising from 686,313 in 1999/00 to 781,364 in 2003/04

Table 9 - AGLGN's regulatory zones

•

Zone 1: Wilton to south of the Campbelltown TRS

•

Zone 2: Campbelltown TRS to south of the West Hoxton TRS (first off
take point for the Sydney area)

•

Zone 3: West Hoxton TRS to north of Plumpton TRS (last off take point
for the Sydney area)

•

Zone 4: north of the Plumpton TRS to south of Gosford TRS

•

Zone 5: south of the Gosford TRS to north of the Wyong TRS

•

Zone 6: north of the Wyong TRS to the end of the trunk in Newcastle

•

The demand forecasts presented by AGLGN demonstrate a pattern of maximum daily
quantity (MDQ) (booked) gigajoule (GJ)28 that shows falls in the demand forecasted by
Zone 1 over the five year period of 31% with smaller expected falls in demand for the
other zones.
28

Gigajoule: a measure of the heat content of gas (an average residential customers in NSW consumes
approximately 20 GJ of gas per year).
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Wilton-Wollongong:
Contract customer numbers 20 in 1999/00 falling to 16, in 2000-2004.
Tariff Customer numbers rising from 45,436 in 1999/00 to 53,291 in 2003/04.
•

Zone 7: Wilton to Wollongong TRS (Final decision page 177)

The demand forecasts presented by AGLGN demonstrate a pattern of Maximum Daily
Quantity (MDQ) (booked) Gigajoules (GJ) that shows falls in the demand forecasted by
Zone 7 over the five year period of 75% mainly due to the falling number of contract
customers.

IPART, in making their regulatory decision, decided to value the ICB of the
transmission assets at DORC (IPART‘s Final Decision, 2000, p.172). This has resulted
in the DORC value attaching to the transmission network assets in this decision being
$127.4m while the distribution system was valued at $1322.6m.

Distribution networks distribute gas to the greater Sydney Metropolitan region
including coastal centers between Newcastle and the Hunter region in the north, and
Wollongong and Shellharbour in the South. There are other outer areas and a further
3,000km of network growth is planned.

The AGLGN network in NSW serves approx 755,000 customers made up as follows:
•

Contract customers

•

Industrial and commercial

•

Residential

500,

using 70% of gas consumed;

24,500

using 11% of gas consumed;

730,000,

using 14% of gas consumed.
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Other information flows are relevant to the decision-process:
•

Demand forecasts supplied by owners

•

Expert reports from technical experts
–engineers
-valuers

•

Research reports from finance and economics academics

•

Input from major customers regarding
prior capital contributions
future demand
comparative pricing structures

•

Input from residential consumer groups

There are reasons to think that the regulation process is influenced by owner’s managers
and representatives forming alliances with the regulator in the hope and expectation that
this will promote better understanding and more favourable treatment of the business
being regulated. In the USA, Beder (2003), giving an example of regulatory capture,
describes how commissions became 'dumping grounds' for hacks. There is also the
possibility of political interference from the highest levels. The NSW government have
often expressed interest in selling off utilities, in particular electricity, that remain in
public ownership. This gives rise to a conflict of interest between state premiers and
their constituents, as their interest is to maximize sale proceeds, while their constituents’
interests lie in retaining cheap prices for utility products. A further problem is the
likelihood of cross subsidization of the costs of the regulated transmission business with
those of the downstream retail outlet. Post decision there may be an attempt to disguise
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the impact of the decision by the company working to obfuscate the actual results of
business and not using accepted financial reporting processes to report business results.

The contract customers who are mainly other companies

Contract customers typically consume 70% of all gas transported through gas
transmission networks and are the most significant customers. They are the customers
mainly affected by pricing decisions arrived at by regulators, though residential
customers are also affected when prices rise. In response to the recent decision, contract
customers expressed particular disquiet that their capital contributions to the building of
the network received no recognition by way of pricing concessions and this has resulted
in resentment.

Section 4.2 of the Draft Decision Access Arrangement gives an overview of the
Tribunal's approach. It states that over 60-70 per cent of AGLGN's gas distribution costs
relate to capital costs. In considering the controversial nature of the determination of the
asset base and rate of return, the Tribunal, consistent with the objectives and
requirements of the Code, has adopted a process that involves assessing operational and
capital expenditure and analysing financial indicators. The Tribunal says it has not
endorsed any specific methodology for the determination of the initial regulatory asset
base, including depreciated optimised replacement cost (DORC). However it regards
economic analysis and principles as providing lower and upper bounds within which
regulatory discretion may be exercised.
The Table below contains information has been found on the IPART website
www.ipart.nsw.gov.au and from the recent decision of the Australian Competition

269

Tribunal (ACT), in respect of the application by Duke that the decision that the EGP
should be a covered pipeline was overturned. Table 10 - Chronicle of events – an overview of 1963-2003.

Date
1963
1964
1971

Active party
Cooper Basin
Producers Santos
Ltd.
BHP/ESSO

January 1999

AGL. Statutory
monopoly
supplying gas to
Sydney
IPART becomes
regulator of MSP
AGL gas Networks

1999

EAPL to ACCC

31March and
1April 1999
June 1999

IPART (NSW)

1998

28 October
1999
7th January
2000
February 2000
10th and 24th
February 2000

IPART (NSW)
IPART (NSW)
AGL ENERGY
Sales and
Marketing Ltd
AGLGN

3rd March 2000

IPART Public
Forum re issues in
Draft Decision
IPART (NSW)

28th April 2000

EAPL

NCC
June 2000

Australian Pipeline
Trust AGL Holds

Action Taken
Discovery of gas in the Cooper Basin in N/E
S.A.
Gippsland Basin in Bass Strait, Gas
discovered.
Selected the Cooper Basin producers as
preferred long term source of supply of
natural gas to Sydney.
GAS pipeline Access laws makes the MSP a
covered pipeline under s1.1 of the CODE
Submitted to IPART proposed revisions to
its Access Arrangement
Submitted proposed Access Arrangements
for MSP.
Public Hearings
Arrangements to continue existing Access
Undertaking until finalization of review
process
Draft Decision not to approve AGLGN’s
proposed revisions to Access Arrangement
Application to NCC that pursuant to 1.3 of
“the Code” that the EGP be a covered
pipeline.
Submitted to IPART additional documents re
issues raised from Draft Decision.
(See Views expressed in Chapter 7.)
Release of operating cost info on fully
distributed cost methodology S42 (2) of the
Law.
Applied to the National Competition Council
to revoke coverage of portion of the MSP:
the main pipeline, Moomba to Wilton as well
as lateral pipelines branching off it.
Recommended that coverage of the MSP not
be revoked. Minister agreed.
Purchased all shares in EAPL
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3rd July 2000

30% of all shares in
the trust.
NCC

21st July 2000
14th September
2000

IPART (NSW)
IPART (NSW)

19th December
2000

ACCC

4th May 2001

Australian
Competition
Tribunal

30th June 2003

AGLGN

26th February
2003
14th March
2003 and 31st
March 2003

AGLGN
IPART (NSW)

Made a recommendation to Senator Minchin,
the Minister that the EGP be a covered gas
pipeline as the NCC was satisfied that all
four criteria in s1.9 of the Code were met.
Release of Final Decision
Approved Revised Access Arrangement for
AGL Gas Networks re natural gas
distribution system in NSW
Draft decision re EAPL that arrangements
would not be approved except that there
would be a substantial decrease in price for
transportation of gas in the MSP.
Dukes EGP Pty Ltd re Matter No 3 of 2000.
Decision that the EAP be covered in
pursuant to section 38(1) of the code was
overturned.
Required to submit to IPART (NSW)
proposed revision to Access Arrangements
from 1 July 2003
Sought delay of above until 31 December
2003
After considering customer responses and
requirements of the Code, IPART agreed to
this delay to the revision to the Access
Arrangement.

Advice and Reports offered to the Tribunal.

The New South Wales Government's stated aim IPART (2000) was to put in place a
regime for more open access to the state's natural gas distribution networks. To achieve
this outcome the Gas Council requested that AGLGN (NSW) Ltd. supply a replacement
valuation for its transportation network. The valuation, in Australian dollars, was to be
dated as at 1 July 1996 and based on an optimised transportation system and to be
supplied in zones, Sydney, Newcastle, Wollongong Western District and Southern
District. Valuers' professional guidelines prioritise Market Values ahead of DORC. The
International Valuation Standards Committee (IVSC), use the term Highest and Best
Use (HABU) as a guiding principle in establishing International Valuation Standards.
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The latest IVSC standards, as at 30 April 2003, endorse Market Value (MV), as their
preferred valuation standard or principle.

The valuation firm of J.P.Kenny was commissioned by the Gas Council to audit the
AGLGN’s asset documentation and comment on the reasonableness of the results
contained in the documentation and the approach taken by AGLGC in its preparation of
the documentation. This was done co-operatively with quite a lot of concurrence
between AGLGN and J.P. Kenny with the assistance of available software such as
PIPESIM. It was noted in the Kenny (1996) report that historical construction costs,
whilst not readily available were not seen to be of much value to the work at hand.
Earlier construction costs were described as more expensive than those of today because
of a steady fall in costs in the early 70's to the late 80's. The Kenny (1996), report gave
an ORC valuation of $2438m in June 1996. This figure of $2438m was subsequently
used by AGL, (1996), in lodging a DORC valuation of $1450m based on straight line
depreciation or $1850m based on “economic depreciation”. What was considered a
more plausible figure, $1200m, was derived by IPART projecting “sustainable”
revenues and discounting the required cost of capital. According to Johnstone (1999, p
2), IPART adopted the lower of the two figures put forward by AGL, on the grounds of
plausibility because the amount fell between the DAC and DORC valuations.
Johnstone (1999) describes how AGLGN in their 1999 Revised Access Arrangements
switched from their previous DORC valuations to a NPV analysis based on presumed
pricing paths for contract and tariff customers and arrived at a valuation remarkably
close to the previous DORC valuation. Johnstone writes:
Arrival at this NPV figure requires the plotting of revenues and costs to 2026.
At the time there is a figure of $3,992m included as a residual. Technically,
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this figure is meant to capture the PV of the remaining cash flow stream after
2026. Such estimates can only have the status of guesses to say the least, and
for this reason are hard to rely on. Generally, the NPV analysis presented
(p.73 Revised Access Arrangements) is not detailed enough or well enough
explained to warrant confidence (1999, p 3).
The Kenny (1996), valuation was only one of the reports considered by the Tribunal in
arriving at its conclusion. Kenny’s Table 5.4 on page 76 of his 1996 report shows the
range of values from Connell Wagner’s valuation on behalf of BHPP for presentation at
the public forum that was lower than AGLGN’s own estimate for ORC and DORC as
well as a new entrant ORC that was lower than both. Connell Wagner in their technical
report considered the insertion costs incurred by AGLGN in its Goldline project as an
alternative replacement cost for AGLGN’s system at $1905m as well as accumulated
depreciation of approximately 20%, giving an asset valuation of approximately $1500m
as at 1 July 1996.

The post draft decision valuation prepared for AGLGN by

PPK/Kinhill, concluded that the 1996 DORC valuation was within the range $2389m $2719m and most likely around $2502m.

To quote from the IPART Decision:
Submissions from users mainly comment that DAC should be reconsidered
given the history of regulatory experience in the USA. The Tribunal
acknowledges that there are advantages and disadvantages on using DAC and
DORC for price regulatory purposes. Different approaches to establishing the
regulatory capital base have been adopted in countries like the USA, Canada
and UK. Economic principles do not provide an unambiguous answer
regarding the most appropriate asset valuation methodology (1999, p. 79).
The Tribunal concluded that the adoption of DAC may reflect past decisions but there
are also problems in adopting a DORC valuation for sunk costs where there are
concerns about economic efficiency. This led the Tribunal to reject both DAC and
DORC as the basis of valuation and has instead reviewed its analysis in estimating
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Optimised Deprival Value and maintained the range $1500m - $1,700m. (Page 82
Section 5.7) The Tribunal's final decision bestowed a value of $1550m as the Initial
Capital Base arguing that this would reduce AGLGN's revenue stream and profits but
would allow for continuation and a reasonable revenue stream. The adoption of a partial
DORC valuation gave rise to considerable debate. In particular, Johnstone (1999),
argued that there is mixed support for the valuation of the assets of energy service
providers based on current replacement cost.

The significance of the adoption of a valuation base other than Depreciated Actual
Cost by the regulatory bodies

By adopting a modified DORC valuation for the RAB, the regulatory body put in place
an asset valuation well above the DAC. Thus the regulator approved a revenue stream
significantly greater than would be required to return the WACC on the DAC value.
This demonstrates the circularity of the connection between the approved RAB and
approved revenue. Whatever valuation base is adopted the MAR will be determined in
relation to it. If the valuation base is DAC then the MAR will be sufficient to return the
WACC on the DAC; if DORC then the MAR will equal the WACC on DORC. Any
increase or decrease in the RAB causes a corresponding increase or decrease in the
MAR that must be earned in order to return an amount of cash equal to the WACC.
Other methods of determining regulatory revenue seem to have been rejected by IPART
even though Johnstone (1999) writes about the
Clear precedent in UK regulatory practice for alternative methodologies, such
as, for example, models drawing on the projected and historical time series
behaviour of a set of financial benchmarks, particularly cash based measures.
The “sustainable revenue” model of IPART’s 1997 Determination on AGL is
among such alternatives (1999, p. 6).
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A difference between DORC and DAC valuations represents an increase in the capital
value of the regulated monopoly. By locking in to a DORC framework in line with the
ACCC and ORG regulatory processes it has become difficult for future regulators to
abandon this framework at later access determinations.

'Rate of Return' regulation

A key component of the 1999 Draft Decision by the IPART is the approval of the tariff
formula based upon the determination of the ICB. The ICB was established after much
discussion by adopting an arbitrary percentage of the DORC valuation of the regulated
assets. Amendment 6 of the IPART Final Decision shows the allocation of the ICB
between the Covered Pipelines:
(a)
(b)
(c)

Wilton to Newcastle:
Wilton to Wollongong
NSW distribution system including central West
distribution system (comprising system assets
($1,371.4m) and non system assets ($51.2m)
Total
(2000, p.88)

$117.3m
$ 10.1m
$1,422.6m
$1,550m

IPART, the regulator then nominated a rate of Weighted Average Cost of Capital
(WACC), to be achieved in relation to those assets. In addition to this capital
component operating and administrative expenses are approved for that level of
revenue, as well, return of capital by way of depreciation.

The major criticism of Rate of Return regulation is that once the RAB has been set, and
the rate of WACC approved as part of the revenue stream, the regulation of the pipeline
is considered completed. From the company's perspective an assured income is in place
and the result is an incentive vacuum although failure to achieve market share results in
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failure to achieve approved return. This situation is unlikely to arise in monopolistic
trading conditions where demand levels are carefully estimated. In the case of AGLGN,
IPART NSW made a final decision that would 'Set' the Maximum Allowed Revenue for
AGLGN until 2004. Then while the rate of the WACC may be revised, the Initial
Capital Base as established in 1999/2000 will have become an entrenched value. The
IPART regulatory decision demonstrates that the DORC values that have been adopted
are ‘judgment’ figures. Their methodology for determining depreciation to be allowed
during the decision access period is calculated on values annually adjusted for expected
increases in the CPI.

Estimates of useful life or regulatory assets

The IPART final decision (2000, p. 90), discusses Economic Asset Life (years), and
estimates the range as being from 80 years for mains to 50 years for valves and stations,
and to 15 years for meters.

Section 6.4.1 specifies how depreciation is to be

determined, and in particular says:
Regulatory depreciation should be calculated in accordance with economic
asset lives for transmission pipelines with ICB valued at DORC (2000, p.90).
This combination of different depreciation rates, as well as the recognition of remaining
economic lives, explains why the amount of depreciation written off appears to be
greater than expected. IPART explains that:
Under the cost of service model, the capital base (including future new
facilities investment) and depreciation indexed by the CPI and a real rate of
return will be allowed on the regulatory asset base (2000, p.121).
Because the term of useful life for assets is relatively long the return of capital takes a
long time. One of the characteristics of a gas transmission pipelines is that they are
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maintained in ‘as new’ condition. The costs of maintenance are considered expenses
and are written off in the period in which they occur. Another point is that parts of the
pipeline may be replaced on a rolling basis so that complete renewal is not a practical
reality, say at the end of eighty years of useful life. What is important though is that the
capital returned through depreciation should be approximately equal, say over a fiveyear period, with new capital expenditure. A deficiency of capital replacement would
have a long-term effect of running down the capital asset. Issues of cash flow show the
level of volatility experienced by asset owners. It has been argued, McDonald (1986),
that increased volatility delays the decision to replace infrastructure assets because it
increases the value of the “option to wait”

The following tables (are taken from the FINAL DECISION Access Arrangement for
AGL Gas Networks Limited by IPART (NSW) (Tables 8.2, 8.3, 8.7, and 8.8 page 112
and page 120).
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Table 11- Rolling forward of the regulatory capital base

AGLGN’s rolling forward of the ICB to 2001 (nominal $m)
1996

1997

1998

Asset base as at 1July 1550.0 1572.4 1591.1
- add capex
70.5
67.4
87.7
- add indexation
- less depreciation
48.1
48.4
49.6
- change in working capital
Closing Asset Base
1572.4 1591.4 1629.5

1999

2000

2001

1629.5 1704.9
86
88.9
40.7
42.6
51.3
54.1
1704.9 1782.3

1782

-

Source: AGLGN's Supporting Information for Draft Decision Prices,
Services, Terms and Conditions Document.

Roll forward of regulatory capital base from 1996-99 (nom $m).
1996/97 1997/98 1998/99
Opening balance
- add revaluation of assets
- add capital expenditure
- less depreciation
- less disposal
Closing Balance
Comparison with AGLGN's proposal

1550.0 1567.2
70.5
67.4
48.6
50.4
4.7
7.2
1567 1576.9
2032

2044

1577
87.7
52.4
2.5
1610
2067

Note: The value of asset disposal is based on AGLGN’s financial accounts. The
majority relate to system assets. Figures may not add due to rounding.
Inflation forecast (CPI)
1999/2000 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04
CPI inclusive of ANTS impact
2.5
6.0
3.0
3.0
3.0

Note: The CPI for the year 2000/01 includes the GST as a once off impact on prices
derived from the market expectations and economic modeling of the impact of inflation.
Projected Roll forward of the regulatory capital base from 1999-04 (combined
pipelines, nominal $m).
1999/2000 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04
Opening balance
- add revaluation of assets
- add capital expenditure
- less depreciation
- less disposal
Closing Balance
Comparison with AGLGN's proposal

1609,8
1667.3
40.2
100
77.0
87.3
55.0
59.5
4.7
4.7
1667 1790.4
2138

2213

1790
53.7
80.5
63.9
4.7
1856

1856
55.7
74.4
67.9
4.7
1914

1914
57.4
74.9
70.0
4.7
1971

2286

2357

2430
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Impact of the 'Real Linear' WACC on actual WACC
using 1.075 * 1(+%change in CPI) -1
1999/2000

CPI change
Effective WACC

2000/01

0.025
0.1019

2001/02

0.06
0.1395

2002/03

0.03
0.10725

2003/04

0.03
0.1073

0.03
0.107

2001/02

2002/03

Constructed Table showing Depreciation plus
(Regulated) Return of Capital AGLGN 1999 - 2005 $m
1999/2000
Opening balance (from Table 8.8)
Effective WACC
Reg. Return at WACC 'Actual'
Plus Depreciation (from Table 8.8)

2000/01

2003/04

1609.8
0.1
164
55

1667.3
0.14
232.59
59.5

1790.4
0.11
192.02
63.9

1856.1
0.11
199.07
67.9

1914
0.11
205.22
70

219

292.09

255.92

266.97

275.22

Cash Flow from WACC plus Dep.

Constructed Table showing Depreciation plus
(Regulated) Return of Capital AGLGN 1999 – 2005
Where the DORC Opening Balance from Table 8.8 = 100
1999/2000
Opening balance (from Table 8.8)
Opening balance = 100
Reg. Return at WACC at actual rates
Plus Depreciation (from Table 8.8)

2000/01

2001/02

2002/03

2003/04

1609.8
100
13.6
3.42

1667.3
100
17.52
3.57

1790.4
100
14.29
3.57

1856.1
100
14.38
3.66

1914
100
14.38
3.66

17.02

21.09

17.86

18.04

18.04

Cash Flow from WACC plus Dep.

Table 12 - Constructed Tables showing returns

The above tables have been constructed from the regulatory decision. Firstly the Table
‘Impact of the ‘Real Linear’ WACC on actual WACC using 1.075 * 1+the change in
the CPI –1. This calculates the effective WACC that will be found in the regulated
MAR. The second table shows the Cash Flow achieved when the WACC is added to
depreciation. The third table shows the effective total Cash Flow as a percentage of
return plus depreciation.
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The tables demonstrate the magnitude of the cash flows that the IPART decision is
bestowing on AGLGN.
Regulators’ treatment of Net Working Capital

KPMG Consulting in their October 1999 report to IPART The treatment of net working
capital in establishing the regulatory asset base for AGL Gas Networks Limited found

that certain working capital items should be included in the regulatory Capital Base.
Goodwill and unidentifiable assets should be excluded from the Capital Base, as well as
cash, overdrafts and other short term borrowings, investments and any other assets and
liabilities of the following nature: interest payable, investment income accruals,
dividends payable, income tax assets and liabilities. The point at issue is whether or not
working capital items should be included in the Capital Base for the purpose of
determining the Base on which the WACC should be earned. In examining AGLGN
1998 assets and liabilities KPMG considered that the Current Assets total of $51m
consisting of Accrued Unbilled Revenue of $32m, Other debtors of $13m, Inventories
of $2m and ‘Other’ items of $4m should be added while Current Liabilities consisting
of Trade and other creditors of $34m should be deducted from Current Assets to give a
Net Working Capital figure for inclusion in the Capital base of $17m. Quite often Net
Working Capital when estimated would result in a net liability, or Credit, and would
have the effect of reducing the RAB.
.

Incentive Regulation

IPART prefers the name ‘Incentive Regulation’ rather ‘Rate of Return Regulation’, as
the former has a focus on approving prices rather than regulating the more traditional
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cost of service (or rate of return) regulation. Key characteristics have been identified
by IPART as being:
•

Regulation of prices or revenues rather than profits

•

Use of a medium term price or revenue controls, rather than annual reviews

•

Incentives for the entity to pursue efficiency gains by providing an opportunity to
retain the benefits of improved profitability for a period of time.

In defining the revenue requirement (whether through price or revenue cap) IPART is
required under the electricity and gas codes to assess the future cash flow needs of an
organisation. They attempt to strike a balance between the entity achieving appropriate
financial performance and serving the interests of consumers through the long run
provision of services at prices that reflect efficient costs. This focus on the regulation of
prices and cash flows is expressed by defining a revenue or cash requirement. The
revenue must be sufficient to cover the operations, maintenance and administration
expenses of the entity, plus an appropriate return of and on the capital. These concerns
of IPART show that their focus is on the preservation of the asset base.

The gas code appears to endorse the ‘rate of return’ method of regulation where it
Provides for the rolling forward of the capital base. IPART (2000) expresses this as
follows:
Regulatory capital base = Initial capital base + New facilities investments
(excluding speculative investment) - Depreciation - Redundant capital (2000,
p.113).
However the code describes as 'acceptable' a methodology which provides a real rate of
return on an inflation indexed capital base. This would seem to open the door to the
adoption of the use of the Financial Equity model and the adoption of DORC as the
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preferred method of establishing the Initial Capital Base (ICB), and from the ICB, the
continuing value for the regulatory asset base (RAB). From the valuation of the ICB the
revenue stream would follow in accordance with the above formulae.

Writing in the Australian Financial Review, Ergas (2003, p.63) asks whether the WACC
as awarded in Australian regulatory decisions is adequate. He claims that in his survey
of more than 100 regulatory decisions making international comparisons of WACC
decisions, as included in his submission to the Productivity Commission Review of gas
access regimes, shows that the regulatory rate of return in the US is more generous than
that in Australia. Similarly, returns in the UK, while superficially comparable to those
in Australia are significantly higher once differences in market risk are taken into
account.
The chairman of the ACCC, Samuel contradicts Ergas’s view ((2003, p.63), that the
regulatory Rate of Return is frequently too low for utilities to recoup investments and if
this continues the "lights will go out". Samuel is quoted as saying:

That since 1995, when the (regulatory) regime came into operation, more
than $3Billion has been invested in gas Transmission Networks. The
transmission network has expanded from 12,000 kilometers to 20,000. In
electricity, data shows unprecedented investment in transmission facilities.
The ACCC has undertaken empirical analysis of returns required in the stock
market for regulated industries. This suggests that the returns approved by the
ACCC are above the market's requirements. Moody's rate Australian gas and
electricity transmission and distribution companies one notch above the UK
counterpart. Moody's believes Australian regulators have shown willingness
to let companies earn returns above the weighted average cost of capital
(AFR, 2003, p.63).
Samuels refers to the Parer Committee report (2003) which found:
Our gas and electricity prices are now competitive with the OECD member
countries, market signals are working effectively to boost investment, new
282

gas resources are being found and exploited, additional pipelines are being
constructed and there is greater consumer participation in the energy market
through choice of retailer (AFR, 2003).
Regulators have excluded Easements from their calculation of the RAB

The regulators’ exclusion of easements is something of a mystery. Easements
consist either of land over pipes, or under power transmission lines.

Since

easements are ‘land’ they probably do not deteriorate or lose any of their initial
value making ‘return of capital’ unrealistic in most instances. This does not mean
that easements have no value. Presently easements that have been granted to
owners are not included in the regulatory asset base (RAB). However, the
regulators seem to be in favor of including new easements when acquired into the
RAB for purposes of calculating the eligible return on assets. Their rationale for
this is that:
The valuation remains comparable to costs faced by a potential entrant while
maintaining cost of service pricing which takes full account of the social cost
of the resources employed (ACCC 1999, p. 46).
Nonetheless, the situation remains that where a regulated company has not paid to
acquire easements they are not included in the RAB. Johnstone (2002, p.34), uses
IPART documents to highlight the inconsistency that this treatment of easements
gives to the concept of DORC as the regulators’ rational choice for a valuation
base for assets as follows:
The rationale provided for this decision is revealing. Rather than conceding
that there is any general absurdity about DORC-based tariffs for existing
assets, IPART distinguished easements from other assets on the basis that
they will never be replaced and hence will never present asset owners with
any additional cost (2003, p. 34).
For the incumbent, existing easements formerly acquired will not need to be
replaced. Hence, such costs will not form part of the forward looking costs of
maintaining and replacing existing capacity (IPART 1999d, Vol.1, p.60).
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Johnstone (2003, p.?) suggests that one explanation for the regulators’
inconsistency may be their view that since easements are, in fact, land, they will
not require any future capital maintenance or other replacement as less permanent
assets would. Another explanation is that IPART’s view is that:
To include a market value for easements in the initial asset base would be of
no economic benefit. …The restrictive nature of easements (i.e. being an
easement for electricity distribution lines only) may mean that they have no
value to any other entity (1999f, p.52).
This does not recognize the substantial costs that would be faced by any new
entrant when acquiring land for the purpose of new capital investment in power
lines. This failure to include easements in DORC values renders invalid the
regulators’ overriding valuation principle for the determination of values being
that DORC should somehow represent the ‘costs faced by a potential new entrant’.
The National Electricity Code (NEC) encourages revaluations of the RAB in order
to achieve the purpose of assessing obsolescence (technology advances), and
removal of redundant assets. The NEC valuation rule that the ‘sunk’ value of the
RAB is the one to be used by regulators is technically incompatible with the
above. The NEC:
The second task of the regulators in determining the amount of depreciation
to be returned to owners is tied to the initial DORC value placed on the RAB
and method of depreciation adopted by the regulators (1999, p14).

IPART made available two days where parties with an interest in the outcome of their
decision were invited to express their views. A very lively meeting ensued about the
proposed decision by IPART in relation to the adoption of the draft decision for the
284

regulation of the AGLGN as the monopoly provider of gas to Commercial, Contract and
Residential customers of gas in NSW.
Industry’s arguments against IPART’s use of DORC

IPART defended their regulatory decision in relation to the application for an access
arrangement by AGLGN. Negotiation between IPART and AGLGN and the level of
agreement between them gave an appearance of unity. Some participants gained that
impression. Groom (an IPART representative), defended the IPART decision by saying
that the AGLGN decision was based on a fully distributed cost model. He introduced
the afternoon session by addressed the need for flexibility from AGLGN, and the
problems AGLGN faced in determining growth forecasts and sales in order to address
the issue of competition29.

Mr. Groom described the distribution network as a supply

chain. Altogether twelve representatives of major customers made substantial input into
the discussion. Four issues received the greatest amount of critical comment and inquiry
and the following is a summary of the views expressed with selected quotations
considered to represent the major concerns expressed.
Issue 1: Variation in Valuers’ estimation of pipeline values

Firstly there was substantial criticism of the variation in valuers’ estimations of the
pipeline. Associated with this was criticism of the lack of separation of the transmission
from the distribution pipeline. AGLGN was criticized for failing to provide a break
down of costs between the Transmission and the Distribution pipelines.
Paul Hanson(Energy Markets Reform Forum spokesperson):

29

Duke Energy International has provided some competition to AGLGN. One major customer has
transferred their business to the Eastern Gas Pipeline about the time of the IPART decision. This is
referred to as ‘lost load’ in the Final Decision.
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IPART should reject the proposed DORC valuation of $2.5billion. There is a
lack of information available to make a determination of values between
transmission and distribution pipelines. The Ewebank Preece valuation is
incomplete - the use of DORC valuation of 1.6b and 1.7b is inappropriate.
The values that should be used are Depreciated Actual Cost. There is a need
for a Building Block Approach in order to achieve a competitive outcome.
There is no transparency about the costs. The regulation activities of IPART
should dovetail with those of the Australian Competition and Consumers
Commission.
The separation of the transmission pipeline hasn't been complied with.
Tariffs are discriminatory
-The Initial Capital Base (ICB) should be allocated over the four pipelines refer to the Kinhill report.
-AGLGN has not provided a breakdown of costs (between transmission and
distribution pipelines). AGLGN should provide actual costs - the code has
ring fencing provisions
-Various pricing codes have been in place, and finally
-Cost based pricing is required.
Paul Hanson had the following to say regarding the impact of the Draft Decision on
consumers:
- Some 70% have had their rates reduced while some 25% have had increases.
There has been a Major shift of revenue between assets. IPART required
AGLGN to reduce tariff by $23m. This has been done.
- What is wanted is cost-based pricing. Trunk pricing should flow through to
HP Pipes.
- IPART must get serious about pricing.
Bill Henson BHP:
In the Draft Decision the Initial Capital Base included a cap on Gas
Conversion Costs of $100m, the DORC valuation by Ewbank Preece, was
overstated.
In 1986 the asset values were a 'line in the sand'.
In 1996 J P Kenny reported to BHP; the findings were that
• Optimisation was incomplete
• Unit rates were excessive
• Ewbank Preeces’s estimates were 19-26% too high
• DORC was estimated at $1.6m -$1.75b. (This includes the recognition
that AGLGN asset lives have been arbitrarily extended.)
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Issue 2: ‘Stand Alone Pricing policy adopted by AGLGN

The issue of ‘Stand alone’ pricing policy adopted by AGLGN was a source of
contention. It was alleged that this was connected with massive cross subsidization of
costs. Associated with this was the issue of top down pricing or revenue charging. Many
argued in favor of movement by IPART and AGLGN towards cost based or bottom up
pricing.
Bill Henson BHP:
In 1997 it was alleged that Stand Alone Market Pricing permitted massive
cross-subsidies. IPART accepted Stand Alone Market Price. In 1999
AGLGN argued that there were no cross-subsidies and that the "perception
was that the Tariff market customers can pay higher prices."
Discriminatory pricing - there is no precedent in gas. 'Revenue Menus' appear
to dominate the approach, not 'cost up'.
The process of determining prices is inefficient, inequitable, unreliable and
unprecedented. The real issue is the allocation of cost to assets and nondiscriminatory pricing would follow.
AGLGN was criticized as not being cost reflective and this was argued as a reason why
AGLGN was not growing.
Nick Saphin, Energy Australia:
The AGLGN network business is not under pressure. If pricing is Cost
Reflective the market will grow. Look at the growth forecast and consider the
revenue windfall to AGLGN. For example, 1% growth in revenue results in
$5m additional revenue.
Excessive recovery where there is no competition is the description of what is
happening at AGLGN.
Issue 3: The loss of past capital contributions

The third issue of importance to participants was that of Capital contributions made in
the past have not received recognition in the current decision. This lack of recognition
meant that the capital contributed in the past is considered to now be the property of
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AGLGN and the donors have been refused all rights. The capital contributed was
mainly by contract customers30.

Issue 4: The merging of regulation of transmission with distribution pipelines

The fourth issue related to the introduction of the Eastern Gas Pipeline recently
developed and built by Duke Energy International.
Duke Energy - Ron McNamarra:
Duke Energy would like to see separation between Transmission and
Distribution regulation. The building of the Eastern Gas Pipeline will
increase competition. There is a need to identify the market for gas. Need to
identify services - are these contestable? What assets are necessary? These
should be identified and other assets should then be valued at either 'Sunk'
cost or 'Market'. Asset costs are shifting within the network.
Further input from Duke Energy was as follows:
AGLGN and (the regulatory process) is an impediment to competition. The
EGP, Longford to Sydney, constructed by Duke Energy Industries concerns:
Unbundling - need for an increase in price transparency.
The regulator must unbundle Trunk Receiving Stations.
Max Kimber Duke Energy.
Overall the entirely negative sentiments of contributors other than representatives of
AGLGN and IPART can be summed up as follows:
Bill Henson, BHP:
The decision process is inefficient, inequitable, unreliable and unprecedented.
The issue (to be dealt with) is the allocation of the cost of assets; from this
allocation non-discriminatory pricing would follow.

30

Phil Randall, Director, Gas Advice, discussed the issue of past capital contributions by contract
customers. He referred to the Draft Decision on pages 131, 259, with reference to the Regulated Asset
Base asserting that IPART, has taken a simplistic approach in failing to recognize past capital
contributions.
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Nick Saphin, Energy Australia:
Excessive recovery where there is no competition is the description of what is
happening at AGLGN.

Conclusion

Materials for this chapter have been drawn from a number of sources. The regulatory
framework under which IPART operates is based on:
•

The Trade Practices Act of 1974

•

The ACCC’s stated preference for DORC as its preferred valuation base for
regulated assets

•

The recommendations of the Hilmer review

•

The Gas code

IPART has been required to work within this framework and with the owner’s
representatives in arriving at their decision. While not accepting the highest DORC
offered by valuers, IPART have adopted a compromise approach. However this
compromise did not satisfy the many interested participants at the IPART discussion
forum. These participants did not show support for the outcome of the regulatory
process, and the final decision.
The building of the Eastern Gas Pipeline (EAP) by Duke Energy International (DEI) has
increased competition in that a major contract customer of AGLGN’s has shifted its
business to the EAP. From the viewpoint of AGLGN this represents ‘lost load’ and
reduces AGLGN’s ability to meet the level of revenue approved as part of the MAR.
The impact of the decision is that major users, i.e., contract customers, are dissatisfied
with the decision outcomes of the decision. The underutilization of the pipeline capacity
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has not been the focus of this study but it is generally thought to be underutilized by
approximately 50%.

The chapter considers the asset values, depreciation allowed as well as allowances for
inflation, as defined by IPART in respect of AGLGN’s Access Arrangement 19992004. There is a call to revisit the values placed on AGLGN’s assets and revert to
previous ‘agreed values’ in respect of ‘sunk’ assets and the adoption of ‘market’ values
for other assets. The complaints made in respect of the AGLGN decision are unable to
be countered by IPART because the only public document they can rely on is the Final
Decision document. Events post-decision and the financial effect of their decision are
not available to interested parties. The financial reports of the regulated business are not
based on the regulators DORC value but previous depreciated actual cost. There is a
lack of coherence between the regulatory decision and financial results/outcome that
raises questions about whether the decision has advantaged the regulated company and
disadvantaged customers.

It is interesting that IPART is enunciating their regulatory intentions with regard to the
valuation of the regulatory asset base with the consequential determination of revenues
related to this valuation have arrived at a definition that is very close to the IASB’s
Framework’s definition of Financial Capital Maintenance. The regulatory aims of
IPART are reflective of the IASB framework. Questions must be raised about why
IPART considers it inappropriate to accept the recommendations of the IASB.
To conclude are two paragraphs from the framework:
Para 109
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Under the concept pf physical capital maintenance when capital is defined in
terms of the physical productive capacity, profit represents the increase in
that capital over the period. All price changes affecting the assets and
liabilities of the enterprise are viewed as changes in the measurement of the
physical productive capacity of the enterprise and hence, they are treated as
capital maintenance adjustments that are part of equity and not as profit.
Para 110
The selection of the measurement bases and concept of capital maintenance
will determine the accounting model used in the preparation of the financial
statements. Different accounting models exhibit different degrees of
relevance and reliability and, as in other areas, management must seek a
balance between relevance and reliability. This framework is applicable to a
range of accounting models and provides guidance on preparing and
presenting the financial statements constructed under the chosen model
(IASB, 2003, p.33).
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Chapter 9
The failure of DORC as a regulatory tool
Introduction

Chapter nine considers the failure of DORC to achieve greater efficiency and
effectiveness in the regulation of private monopolies. There are undesirable
consequences resulting from the adoption of DORC especially in the overpricing of
product and under-utilization of ‘sunk’ assets. There has been a failure to achieve the
regulators’ stated aim of achieving a competitive trading outcome for natural
monopolies.

These aims were considered by the Hilmer committee (1992), and

guidelines are to be found in the committee’s recommendations. The Hilmer report
recommended that there be rigorous, open and independent study before competition is
introduced to a sector traditionally supplied by a government monopoly, or where
privatisation is proposed.

The principles of regulation as identified by the Hilmer review, the Trade practices Act
(1974), and the Productivity Commission report (1999) can be summarized as follows:
•

Revenue should meet Long Run costs of providing access to these services,
including a return on investment commensurate with risks involved;

•

not be so far above costs as to detract significantly from efficient use of
services and investment in related markets;

•

encourage multi-part tariffs and allow price discrimination when it aids
efficiency, and
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•

Not allow a vertically integrated access provider to set terms and conditions
that discriminate in favour of its downstream operations, unless the cost of
providing access to other operators is higher.

These principles have informed the Regulatory framework, or regulatory formula as
incorporated into the ‘Building Block’, and CPI –X methodologies for regulation of
natural monopolies subject to Access Arrangements.

The applicability of these principles is not only within Part IIIA of the TPA but also to
assist pricing frameworks in industry regimes. The Productivity Commission:
In sum, the pricing principles must necessarily involve a balancing act
between addressing monopoly pricing and allowing a degree of flexibility for
revenue to be above costs....the ACCC must have regard to the following
principles:
(a) That the access prices:
(i)
be set so as to generate revenue across a facility's regulated services
that is at least sufficient to meet the efficient long-run costs of
providing access to these services; and
(ii)
Include a return on investment commensurate with the regulatory and
commercial risks involved (1999, p.332).

Depreciated Optimised Replacement Cost (DORC) as the central element of the
regulatory framework is a flawed concept. The flaws are:
Circularity
Non-perdurability
Subjectivity
Use of Gaming to increase income
Difficulties in establishing what is the Modern Equivalent Asset (MEA) or
Optimised Replacement Cost (ORC)
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The failure to recognise ‘Sunk’ assets under DORC rules
Two major dysfunctions invalidate the use of DORC as the valuation base applied to the
regulators assets.
•

DORC as a valuation principle is applied in an arbitrary manner by State
Government regulators.

•

Easements are left out of the valuation altogether in many cases and
included at depreciated actual cost (DAC) in some cases.

Objections to the adoption of DORC

The participants at IPART’s open discussion day when the Draft decision in respect of
AGLGN was discussed showed that the representatives of AGLGN’s largest contract
customers had significant frustration with the regulator’s use of DORC as a valuation
principle for the setting of tariffs. Duke Energy International was one of the participants
and strongly criticised IPART’s use of DORC. Internationally, particularly in the United
States, the value of the assets of regulated businesses are carried at Depreciated Actual
Cost for both reporting and regulation. Thus asset valuations and changes in them are
not directly related to price changes. The Business Council of Australia and consumer
groups have objected to the regulators use of DORC on grounds that the use of DORC
results in excessive prices.

Other problems with the regulatory framework with DORC at the center:
•

The determination of ORC ‘used’ is flawed. The use of Tobin’s q is
inappropriate. Therefore the circularity problem remains unsolved.
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•

The use of general changes in the CPI as used to adjust DORC valuations from
one year to another further increase the fiction of subjectivity attaching to
DORC.

•

Whatever method the owners and the regulators decide upon in order to
calculate depreciation as part of the regulatory formula the only certainty is the
desire of owners to maximize the size of the asset base on which they are able to
receive the WACC as part of the MAR thus maximizing their return.

Summary of research findings
Laughlin’s “middle ground thinking”

Chapter two positioned the research within Laughlin’s (1995), ‘middle range’ thinking
taking an analytical and interpretative view of texts and recognising the rhetoric of
discourses taking place between decision makers and interested parties. This view has
informed the approach to the variety of information sources referred to in this study.
Referencing back to Chapter 2 Ibid, 48, and Laughlin’s variables through which to view
different aspects of the research domain from the perspective of the concluding chapter
offers some insights. The ‘theory’ was already well developed although the various
elements inherent in the development of ORC and from ORC, DORC, have been
systematically re examined. There is a story about the dominance of the mainstream
economic theory and the players involved. The dominant players are the national
regulator, the ACCC, and their State counterparts and their endorsement of one
regulatory concept, the Building Block Approach, based on the notion of DORC. The
regulators have shown themselves committed to a single regulatory model and
unwilling to recognize the necessity of “unpicking” the individual problems of a
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particular company. Such an examination of a monopoly company would perhaps
offer the opportunity to develop a fuller and more comprehensive understanding of the
interests of the many interested parties and lead to a different regulatory outcome.

The decision process is entrusted to personnel who promulgate the prevailing
philosophy of DORC. There is a pressing need to explore the wider dimensions of the
regulation of monopoly businesses. Technological change means that capital as well as
day-to-day running costs are changing rapidly. Old patterns of pricing are inappropriate
in these changed circumstances. Strategic re-organisation of these industries and their
management structures is needed. A series of take-overs has reduced the number of
energy companies within the market indicating a fast pace of change.

The ‘methodology’ dimension has explored a wide variety of sources and the research
has refrained from finger pointing at economists in the public service for their
adherence to DORC, or accused them of ideological narrowness. While DORC is
flagged as the model for determining a regulated company’s ICB, individual decisions
demonstrate departures from DORC valuations in varying degrees. This leads to the
notion of the dimension of ‘change’ in research attitudes. The failure to reject DORC as
the regulatory standard by the regulators, even though individual decisions have been at
variance with the DORC notion, has been the cause of several problems.

The narrowness of the focus of the discourse between the regulators and monopoly
companies has ignored the needs of customers. It has also tended to mask the
motivations of the regulated companies which are simply to maximize the revenue from
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their assets. This narrowness reflects the contradiction inherent in achieving the highest
price, as identified by Friedland (1991) Ibid, 53. Charging the maximum price
necessarily reduces the volume of sales. For example, in the case of AGLGN there has
been ‘lost load’. The dominance of economic rationalism and lack of any underlying
social values has allowed DORC to become the regulators’ ‘mantra’.
In terms of Laughlin’s key characteristics the longitudinal and analytical case study
approach taken has had to deal with a variety of data sources and the role of the
researcher has been independent and probably irrelevant to the parties engaged in the
action.

The Current Cost Accounting (CCA) debate

Chapter three discussed the history of Current Cost Accounting (CCA) within the
accounting profession and defines Depreciated Optimised Replacement Cost (DORC).
In examining the interest in CCA, an attempt is made to explain why CCA developed so
widely. The CCA debate provides background, language, concepts, and a history of
debate about changing prices.

The conceptual basis for the regulatory formulae, net present value (NPV), is examined
and considers the definitions of income derived by accounting theorists such as
Edwards Kay and Mayer (1987), Peasnell (1982), Johnstone, (2002), etc. In examining
accounting choices with regard to valuation method it became clear that Deprival Value
although endorsed by the Commonwealth Government in implementing its Accounting
reforms within the Public Sector conflicts with DORC. Deprival Value includes Net
Realiseable Value (NRV) as a valuation alternative; this may mean the ‘sunk’ cost of
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assets. The energy regulators have adopted DORC and they have rejected DV for the
reason that DV includes, as one of its outcomes, recoverable or Realiseable Value.
When the DORC debate began there was no rationale for its adoption by the regulators.
The regulators looked to Accounting for a valuation model for infrastructure assets,
intent in looking to accounting was to find legitimacy for the adoption and use of
DORC. While DORC is not likely to become an accounting standard, it has been
accepted by regulators as a defensible valuation model..

The regulators introduction to Finance Economics and DORC meant that the
Accounting literature became irrelevant. Some version of Replacement Cost for the
valuation of assets was wanted as first preference. The adoption of DORC was not
justified by the Accounting Literature or any other.
CCA versus DORC

The Commonwealth government adopted replacement cost (RC) as the basis for the
valuation of assets at the time of the move to Accrual Accounting in the early 90’s. The
new accounting system moved from a cash based system where budget compliance was
the overriding financial imperative to Accrual Accounting where the government
wanted the sector to meet new goals of efficiency and effectiveness. The accounting
profession has argued about the use of RC as the basis of accounting for more than a
century. The accounting treatment of changes in asset values requires that these changes
should be recorded in the financial accounts. This would ensure perdurability in respect
of the accounting records. Perdurability means that from any point in the history of a
company’s published accounts the analyst can look backward or forward from one year
to the next and trace the accounting treatment of and movement in asset values.
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There is a case to be made for the adoption of replacement cost (RC) as the method of
accounting for regulated businesses. RC would offer the advantage to the many
interested parties of an opportunity to see the financial impact of the regulator’s choice
of Depreciated Optimised Replacement Cost (DORC) values on the regulated business.
For example:
•

Recognition of profit or loss resulting from the move from DAC to DORC.

•

The use of DORC values in the Balance Sheet.

•

The auditors would be able to connect the level of revenues achieved to the
regulated MAR.

•

The extent of incurred operating expenses (Opex), incurred compared with the
approved Opex contained within the MAR.

•

The actual depreciation written off compared with the amount of depreciation
contained within the approved MAR.

The linkage between finance/economics and accounting is strengthened by the
Commonwealth’s government, through the Department of Finance and
Administration, (DoFA)’s, commitment to CCA. DoFA has recently (2003),
through its offshoot the ACCC, issued an Accounting separation regime document
requesting public comment on its proposed use of CCA in respect of Telstra.

The adoption of current cost accounting (CCA) has been taken up by the United
Nations. Blignaut (2002) who discusses the United Nations proposal to construct
satellite accounts (NRA) to supplement the System of National Accounts (SNA)
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(United Nations 1993a, 1993b.) Physical and monetary indicators, intergenerational
equity issues, pollution emissions and environmental damage have led the authors
towards Hick’s first definition of income and the adoption of CCA.
The Australian Government regulators, through their own officers and academic
economists have adopted DORC as their own intellectual property. DORC is kept on a
pedestal for the purpose of setting revenue bounds/prices. This is a kind of academic
capture that has allowed practical issues of financial accounting results to be treated as
irrelevant. The derivation of the notion of DORC from ORC demonstrates the links with
RC as a valuation base. In the chapter support has been found for the adoption of RC in
preference to other valuation bases. The following definitive excerpt from Gee and
Peasnell (1976) offers such support:
All that is being asserted here is that if the assets of a going concern are to be
valued on a deprival value basis, then there is much more to be said for
adhering to replacement cost as approximations to deprival values well-nigh
irrespective of PV or NRV of the asset being valued (1976, P.247).
An attempt has been made to isolate DORC from its regulatory context. However this
context continues to intrude so that the discussion of DORC becomes enhanced by this
complexity.

The study considers two landmark cases relevant to the pricing of

monopoly assets. The notion of ‘fair value’ was enunciated in Smyth v Ames and its
hold on the regulation of railways in the US was followed by the return to the use of
Historic Cost for valuations when this notion was overturned by the second landmark
case, the Hope decision.
The regulators’ views on DORC give detailed instructions about what DORC is and
how the values are arrived at. None-the-less, the determination of DORC valuations
remains extremely subjective and the identification of what constitutes the modern
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equivalent asset (MEA) has yet to be discovered as part of most regulatory decisions.
While the Australian regulators steer clear of any consideration about the role of the
share price on the Stock Exchange as having any relevance to the underlying asset
values, the MMC in the UK thought about the competing interests of shareholders and
consumers before arriving at their ‘balance’ solution to the regulation problem.
Having long been a champion of current cost accounting, Whittington questions
whether there is a role for current cost accounting or replacement cost accounting in the
regulatory process maintaining there is:
…very little role for CCA or RCA….This is certainly the case insofar as
regulation is concerned with determining what is a reasonable return on and
of capital to shareholders. This is because shareholders did not pay for the
replacement cost of assets when the major utilities were privatised.
Furthermore rolling forward the regulatory base using replacement cost
values rather than a general index produces greater uncertainty in the
regulation process (1997, p. 14).
While IPART (NSW) was considering the Access Arrangement for AGLGN in respect
of its recent decision, contract customers argued against the adoption of DORC values
for regulatory assets because AGLGN had not paid DORC values for its pipeline.
Unfortunately their arguments were not acted upon by the regulator and many consider
that AGLGN enjoyed a windfall gain resulting from the increase in asset values and the
final approved pricing structure contained in the MAR.

The regulators formulae – chapter five

Recognition that the capital costs included in the regulated pricing structure are about
60-70% of the price charged to customers, (Davis 1999), demonstrates that the RAB
and the value placed upon it are of the greatest importance to the regulatory
determination of the maximum allowed revenue (MAR) decision. By contrast, the
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variable cost of the pipelines is trivial. Connections are made between the use of rate of
return as the regulatory choice and adoption of a RAB based on DORC valuations. The
valuation of the assets, based on DORC is further increased by changes in the CPI for
purposes of calculating the MAR. The use of the CPI to increase the RAB destroys any
notion of the DORC value representing a modern equivalent asset (MEA). Instead a
DORC valuation of existing assets is a judgment figure upgraded to somewhere
between replacement cost and actual cost and generously increased to correspond with
changes in the CPI. The changes in the CPI may have no relevance to the MEA.

There is evidence that judgment figures have been used to assign values to regulated
businesses. In Victoria legislation has been passed that gives authority to DORC
valuations. One of the examples described in the study is the Electricity Industry Act
1993, where on page 89 of the Appendix a table shows the Optimised Depreciated
Replacement Cost of the five distributors plus (or in some cases minus) adjustment and
giving adjusted asset values described as ‘Opening book values, presumably for tariff
determination purposes’.31
In each case there is a definitive statement of the DORC values to be attributed to assets
for regulation of revenue purposes. Regulatory tariffs are commonly determined in
accordance with the following formula:
Maximum Allowed Tariff (MAR) = Operating Costs (Opex) + Capital Costs.
Capital Costs include the Depreciated Optimised Replacement Cost (DORC),
of the Assets plus Depreciation based on the DORC value of those assets.
From the above it is clear that the calculation of DORC for the assets of a company is
pivotal to the determination of the amount of revenue able to be collected from
31

Item 5.10 (a) states ‘utilise price based regulation adopting a CPI-X approach and not rate of return
regulation;
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customers. In Victoria, DORC values for electricity and gas have been enshrined in
legislation while Deprival Value (DV) has been abandoned as a valuation rule.

Chapter six looks at Depreciation

Chapter six sets out to explain the approach taken by the regulators in regulating for the
return of capital by way of depreciation to asset owners. Bell and Peasnell (1997) have
taken a Deprival Value approach to the determination of depreciation and recognize the
annuity nature of all depreciation flows. King (2002), and Johnstone (2003), examine
the issues relevant to the determination of the transformation of ORC into DORC and
build a model that supports Bell and Peasnell’s annuity view of depreciation. Johnstone
and Davis have demonstrated the impact of ‘Competition’ Depreciation on the revenue
stream. The regulators have attempted to adjust the RAB for inflation with the aim of
ensuring that the capital vested in the assets is adequately compensated for. In adjusting
the MAR to include inflation adjusted return of capital, or ‘Competition’ depreciation,
the regulators have possibly over-rewarded asset owners.

The discussion about theories of depreciation, recognizing that from the perspective of
NPV calculations, the timing of depreciation is irrelevant, has led to an understanding
that the total revenue stream is the relevant flow when considering the ultimate value of
the RAB. The distinction between profits and depreciation does not have information
content. The ‘true’ depreciation can only be found as the impairment of assets. This has
been recognized in the recent Australian Accounting Standards Board Exposure Draft
(ED104), called ‘The Impairment of Assets’.
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Chapter seven discusses the Regulators use of Tobin’s Q

The Australian regulator's argument in favour of DORC as a construct of Optimised
Replacement Cost (ORC) comes from Tobin's Q. The idealized valuation standard is
ORC and in recognizing the ‘used’ nature of assets in use the regulators have called on
the concepts inherent in Tobin’s Q. Evidence of the application of Tobin’s Q to energy
utilities shows measures that relate the RC of assets to market expectations of
performance. The regulators have taken the market expectations of performance and
substituted their estimate of DORC. Economists argue that the RAB = DORC and that
the use of this asset valuation for regulatory purposes emulates the rational market
settings by producing the highest possible tariffs short of those at which a new entrant
might be encouraged to duplicate the existing provider's infrastructure, (and compete for
those tariffs) ACCC (1999).
Perhaps it is time the regulators moved away from this ‘one size fits all’ regulation
formula and made decision considering the individual profile of the business, estimates
of the modern equivalent asset (MEA) or ODV, as well as the ‘Sunk’ value of the
assets.

Chapter eight examines the IPART (NSW) decision in respect of AGLGN 1999-2004.

Materials for this chapter have been drawn from a number of sources. The regulatory
framework under which IPART operates is based on:
•

The Trade Practices Act of 1974

•

The ACCC’s stated preference for DORC as its preferred valuation base for
regulated assets

•

The recommendations of the Hilmer review
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•

The Gas code

IPART has been required to work within this framework and with the owner’s
representatives in arriving at their decision. While not accepting the highest DORC
offered by valuers, IPART have adopted a compromise approach. However this
compromise did not satisfy the many interested participants at the IPART discussion
forum. These participants did not show support for the outcome of the regulatory
process, i.e., the decision.
Major criticisms of the regulatory process were of:
•

Variation in valuers’ estimations of the pipeline

•

‘Stand alone’ pricing policy adopted by IPART in respect of AGLGN

•

Capital contributions made in the past not receiving recognition in the current
decision.

•

Failure to consider the potential market and services for gas for the regulatory
area.

•

Lack of separation of the transmission from the distribution pipeline for
regulation decision purposes.

The building of the Eastern Gas Pipeline (EAP) by Duke Energy International (DEI) has
increased competition in that a major contract customer of AGLGN has shifted its
business to the DEI owned EAP. From the viewpoint of AGLGN this represents ‘lost
load’ and reduces AGLGN’s ability to meet the level of revenue approved as part of the
MAR.

The outcome of the decision is that major users, i.e., contract customers, are dissatisfied
with the outcomes of the decision. The underutilization of the pipeline capacity has not
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been the focus of this study and the determination of the maximum allowed revenue
(MAR) was not based on pipeline capacity. However, the issue of pricing the use of the
pipeline to ensure maximum use is relevant to the decision.

Finally the chapter considers the asset values, depreciation allowed plus inflation, as
defined by IPART in respect of AGLGN’s Access Arrangement 1999-2004. There is a
call to revisit the values placed on AGLGN’s assets and revert to previous ‘agreed
values’ in respect of ‘sunk’ assets and the adoption of ‘market’ values for other assets.

Accounting Treatment of Asset Revaluations

The accepted accounting treatment of an increase in asset values is to transfer the
increase to an Asset Revaluation Reserve. The balance on this account is added to
equity in the balance sheet. Under the balancing system adopted by the UK regulator,
the amount of depreciation that relates to the increased asset valuation is set off against
this account and depreciation expense that relates to the old or ‘agreed’ value of assets
is written off against the amount of approved revenue. This reduces the amount of
regulated revenue able to be recovered from customers and therefore that part of the
regulated assets not purchased by the regulated company (i.e. the RC of assets minus
DAC) is not recovered through prices charged to the consumer.

Political Pressure

There is evidence that State Government premiers have intervened in access decisions
and instructed State regulators to adopt DORC as the valuation principle and in the
determination of the maximum allowed revenue (MAR) for Natural Monopolies.
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(Davis, 1999) writes about the controversy surrounding the setting of the rate of the
WACC in the Victorian gas sector. He attributes much to the conflicting interests and
incentives. The debate that took place demonstrated the practical difficulties in setting
in place a regulatory regime based on theoretical constructs. When the draft
determination in respect of the access application by Energy Projects Decision (EPD) of
the Victorian Treasury in Nov 1997, was announced, it aroused a significant level of
controversy. Although the revenue streams were based on DORC values significantly in
excess of DAC, the controversy that occurred was directed at the WACC being only 7%
relative to company’s expectations of around 10%.
The Premier of Victoria and three other state premiers sent identical letters to
the ORG and ACCC asserting that the proposed rate of return could
adversely affect investment in the gas sector. Subsequently the Victorian
Treasurer postponed the gas privatization program and threatened to call it
off if the final access determination was seen as unsatisfactory (1999, p.10).
There have been moves to establish an energy regulation body that has greater state
representation. Accordingly the ACCC has established such a committee comprising
two representatives from each state and with a chairperson appointed by the ACCC. It is
also envisaged that the secretariat will be managed by the ACCC. This shift in influence
from the ACCC to a body more representative of the states may have been developed at
the moment when regulation in the gas transmission area is about to take a new
direction. Recent events suggest that it is the inter-company relationships that are
becoming the greatest problem area for regulators.
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The Dawson Committee’s findings

Relevant to this study are the Committee's findings with regard to the use and scope of
Section 155 of the TPA. Section 155 provides the ACCC with powers to obtain
information documents and evidence in the course of its investigations. The focus was
and seems to be on requiring corporations or individuals to provide information,
documents, or evidence as requested by the ACCC in relation to a matter that may
involve a contravention of the Act. The recommendations of the Committee are that the
powers of the ACCC should be extended in this area, while requiring that prior to
entering premises the ACCC should obtain a warrant from a Federal Court Judge.
While the ACCC 'ring fences' its negotiations with utilities, they are in a position to
request post-decision reports that provide information on the impact of decisions in a
format that is transparent and auditable. This could include financial accounts covering
the segment of business affected by the ACCC decision, for the period of time covered
by the decision.

The regulators’ role in providing sufficient incentives for new capital investment

The Productivity Commission expressed concern that the present regulatory rewards
contained in the tariff formula are deficient in encouraging new capital investment.
Politicians naturally fear the political damage caused by power failures. An association
is made in the minds of the customers and the media between power failures and low
levels of capital expenditure.
The Commission has proposed in their Position Paper, suggested pricing principles
within Part IIIA that the maximum allowed revenue (MAR) should:
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•
•
•
•

meet Long Run costs of providing access to these services, including a return on
investment commensurate with risks involved;
not be so far above costs as to detract significantly from efficient use of services
and investment in related markets;
encourage multi-part tariffs and allow price discrimination when it aids
efficiency, and
not allow a vertically integrated access provider to set terms and conditions that
discriminate in favour of its downstream operations, unless the cost of providing
access to other operators is higher.

The Productivity Commission supports the idea of an access holiday approach:
In sum, the pricing principles must necessarily involve a balancing act
between addressing monopoly pricing and allowing a degree of flexibility for
revenue to be above costs....the ACCC must have regard to the following
principles:
(a) That the access prices:
(i)
be set so as to generate revenue across a facility's regulated services
that is at least sufficient to meet the efficient long-run costs of
providing access to these services; and
(ii)
Include a return on investment commensurate with the regulatory
and commercial risks involved (2002, p.332).
The ACCC and Rail Track Corporation (ARTC) suggested that the principles in the
Productivity Commission’s position paper would not prevent cross subsidies between
services. ACCC and horizontally regulated services or products:
...one might have expected that if the proposed pricing principles were to
disallow cross subsidies between a regulated activity and a vertically related
contestable activity, then those same principles would also disallow crosssubsidies between horizontally related regulated services or products. That is,
access prices at each connection point should be subsidy free (2002, p.24).

Utility failures – causes and effects

The recent power cuts in the UK have been defended by the UK regulator of power and
gas, Ofgem, as not related to the level of investment in new capital projects. The
London power cut occurred in the early evening on the 28 August, 2003, with over
400,000 customers affected and widespread disruption caused to transport during the
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rush hour. Another power cut in the East of Birmingham, just over a week later saw,
another 220,000 customers affected by a similar power cut caused by a fault on the
national grid. Both power cuts were under an hour in duration. Ofgem has reported that
the London power cut was caused by the failure of back-up protection equipment
caused by the wrong type of fuse being fitted in June 2001. The Birmingham power cut
was again caused by a failure in equipment designed to protect the system from power
surges. This failure was due to the incorrect installation of equipment.

Ofgem’s Managing Director, Competition and Trading Arrangements, Dr Boaz Moselle
added:
Ofgem is still very concerned about both power failures and we are
continuing our investigation. We need to ensure that the companies involved
in the recent power cuts adhered to their legal requirements to run the
electricity networks in an efficient and coordinated manner and to ensure that
the lessons from both power failures are learnt to stop similar problems
occurring again (2003, p.5).
A recent decision by the ACCC shows that DORC as the basis of regulatory decisions
has been overtaken by other events.

The much delayed Final Decision on the terms and conditions of gas transportation
services for the Moomba to Sydney gas pipeline (MSP) for the next five years has been
announced by Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. (October 2003). The
ACCC has not agreed with all the terms and conditions of the access arrangement as
submitted by the owner of the MSP, East Australia Pipeline Ltd (EAPL). In particular,
the ACCC did not agree with the tariffs EAPL proposed should be charged to transport
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gas through the MSP from Moomba to Sydney and several regional centres, such as,
Lithgow and Wagga.
The Australian Financial Review reported the ACCC Chairman, Mr. Graeme Samuel,
as saying:
EAPL is currently charging approximately 66 cents per gigajoule to ship gas
from Moomba to Sydney.
The ACCC has determined that the starting tariff should be 52 cents (GSTexclusive). Even though the ACCC has approved a lower tariff, EAPL's cash
flows will not be affected in the short term. This is because EAPL has a
contractual arrangement with its main customer, AGL, under which AGL is
required to make minimum monthly payments to EAPL regardless of the
level of tariff (AFR, October 2003).
While the ACCC broadly agrees with important aspects of EAPL's proposed access
arrangement, such as proposed capital expenditure and volumes, the ACCC could not
agree to EAPL's proposal for:
- The value of the pipeline assets at $779 million. The ACCC concluded that the value
should be $559 million.
- operating costs of $23 million per annum. The ACCC concluded $18 per annum
million was a better estimate of the efficient costs of operating the pipeline.
- A return on equity for the MSP of around 15 per cent. The ACCC estimates that a
return on equity of 11.3 per cent is more consistent with the benchmark for regulated
pipeline assets.
The ACCC's Final Decision sets out the amendments that will have to be made by
EAPL for the access arrangement to be approved. EAPL is require to submit by 23
October 2003, an amended access arrangement that meets the required changes set out
in the Final Decision.
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A final note

It seems that linking regulatory practices to a single approach, i.e., the Building
Block approach with DORC at its center, has now become the determinant of the
regulatory outcome in assessing the level of approved revenues. In the new
regulatory environment where technological change is accelerating this ‘one size
fits all’ approach will be inadequate to stem the tide of monopoly power.
Economists in the regulatory agencies will be vulnerable to pressures to
accommodate dominant economic interests. While DORC is supposed to be
derived from a notion of ORC, in reality the determination of DORC is a movable
feast. The study has refrained from adopting a stand that identifies any party as the
‘bad guys’ in taking advantage of the use of DORC in the Building Block
approach. As recent events show, the regulators are becoming entrapped in
debates about the magnitude of the ICB based on the notion of DORC. All the
problems identified earlier in the thesis and mentioned in this chapter Ibid, 292, are
being experienced one way or another. In Victoria the notion of DORC has
political origins while in New South Wales and other States, the ideological
dominance of the ACCC in accepting DORC as part of the Building Block
Approach is established.

Littlechild, Ibid, 222/3, refers to an approach to regulation based on the work of
Schumpeter and Hayek. Littlechild (2002), argues that there is a lack of uniformity
about these (regulated) companies, they are different from each other, and yet the
regulator continues with the ‘one size fits all’ style of regulation.
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Recommendations:

1. The Trade Practices Act of 1974. The ACCC should make greater use of its
power to obtain regular financial information from regulated companies.
2. Monitoring of regulatory decisions. The regulators should require that owners
report back to them on a segmented business by business or individual asset
basis so that results can be monitored adequately.
3. Limiting of Operating and Administration expenses. The amount of the expense
described and written off each year as Operating Expenses should be subject to
ongoing scrutiny by Regulators. Budgets approved for repairs and maintenance
should receive particular attention.
4. Recognition of ‘sunk’ assets. Regulators are bound by the NEC and COAG
direction that ODV is the overriding valuation principle. The realiseable or
‘sunk’ value of assets should be part of the regulators’ spectacles when arriving
at valuations.
5. Facilitating new capital infrastructure developments. There is a well identified
need to develop medium to long term plans in respect of new capital investment
in order to meet the demands placed on energy utilities in the medium term. Two
problems that have been identified are the problem of building new facilities in
the expectation that demand will require increasing levels of output over an
extremely long useful life of new capital facilities, and the short term nature of
much financial decision-making that requires a pay back period of three years.
Meeting the Hilmer Committee recommendations that prices should reflect long
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run average costs may require a Public/Private partnership. Public ownership of
new facilities, run and operated by private companies.

The adoption of DORC bestowed a ‘windfall gain’ on regulated utilities as a result of
regulatory decisions. The study concludes that the problems encountered in the
determination of DORC valuations are substantial. Pricing strategies based on the
IFRS/IAS framework values that were accepted by the regulators would not have the
flaws evident in the use of DORC.
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Addendum of recent developments
Regulatory situations where DORC is estimated below DAC

The recent Office of Gas Access Regulation in Western Australia Draft Decision in
relation to Epic Energy was based on a DORC value of $1368.4m while the DAC value
was $2466.1m for the Dampier to Bunbury Natural Gas Pipeline (DBNGP). The WA
Gas Regulator, Dr Ken Michael, stated that he had decided that the price that Epic
Energy had paid for the pipeline was not based on a sound commercial assessment.
Epic Energy objected to the Draft Decision based on the lower DORC value and made
application to the Supreme Court of WA. The Supreme Court handed down its decision
on 23 August 2002 that it did not consider it necessary to quash the Draft Decision.
Trounson (2003), reports that U.S. energy companies El Paso Corp. (EP) and Dominion
Resources Inc. (DNIR) each have a 33% stake in Australian pipeline company Epic
Energy announced (3rd October 2003) the sale of its 1,530 kilometer long Dampier-toBunbury gas pipeline in Western Australia. Trounson suggests that these companies:
Weighed down by debt and disappointed by pricing regulation, a sale could
fetch around A$1.8 billion (Australian Financial Review, 2003, p.4).
A consortium of the Australian utility Alinta Ltd. (A.ALN) and Macquarie Bank Ltd.
(A.MCQ) has said that it is interested in buying the Bunbury pipeline, possibly in
partnership with industrial conglomerate Wesfarmers Ltd. (A.WES).

Australia’s biggest natural monopoly owner of gas transmission networks is about to
become bigger

AGL has also shown interest and is presently negotiating for the purchase of the
DBNGP. Australian Pipeline Trust (APT) as part of a consortium with the
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Commonwealth Bank and a Japanese interest is also trying to acquire ownership of Loy
Yang, the largest power station in Victoria. The ACCC decided against this increase in
the range of AGL interests; however the ACCC decision was overturned when AGL
sought a reversal before the Australian Competition Tribunal (ACT).

The ACT

announced on December 18th 2003 that the acquisition was not anti-competitive,
approved AGL’s proposal, and awarded costs against the ACCC.
The chairman of the ACCC Mr. Graeme Samuel, said:
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission is disappointed by
the decision of the Federal Court to grant AGL a declaration which would
allow it to proceed to buy a minority interest in Loy Yang power station, The
ACCC is currently assessing the judgment.
Because this is the first declaration that has been sought in relation to a
merger and the important issues it raises, the ACCC will need to closely
examine the decision and obtain detailed legal advice in relation to the
judgment.
Although Justice French granted the declaration, he recognised that the
ACCC had established that there were real issues for consideration in this
matter.
The ACCC presented to the court, advice from electricity and competition
experts that the proposed acquisition would lead to an increase in electricity
prices to electricity retailers in Victoria (ACCC website 2004).

The above accounts of sales and ownership changes demonstrate that the upheavals in
the pipeline industry have moved ahead of the regulatory problem. Howarth (2003),
reports that although the price of shares in Australian Pipeline Trust (APT) have fallen
in response to the final decision of the ACCC in respect of the tariffs on the Moomba to
Sydney Pipeline (MSP), increasing competition from the Duke Energy International
(DEI) owned Eastern Gas Pipeline (EAP) is anticipated to result in a fall in prices
charged by the MSP. DEI has recently announced the possibility of selling up their
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pipeline assets in Australia. The reason given by Trounson (2003), for this decision is
their requirement to liquidize some of their investments in order to meet debt arising
from the collapse of ENRON in the US. In Australia Duke owns the Eastern Gas
Pipeline (EGP) that links the Gippsland Basin off the coast of Victoria to markets in
neighboring New South Wales. It also has the Tasmanian Gas Pipeline, the Queensland
Gas Pipeline, and an 11.8% stake in the Goldfields pipeline in Western Australia.

Local potential buyers of the various Duke assets include pipeline operators such as
Australian Pipeline Trust, Gasnet Australia Group and Envestra Ltd. Duke has about
2,300 kilometers of gas pipelines and 441 megawatts of thermal power generation
capacity in Australia and New Zealand. Its generation assets include power stations at
Port Hedland and Newman in Western Australia, at Bairnsdale in Victoria, and at
Glenbrook in New Zealand.

Moomba Boomba: Note on the impact of the explosion at the Santos owned plant at
Moomba on 1st January 2004.

An AGL media release of 2 January 2004 stated:
The Australian Gas Light Company (AGL) has advised that, as a result of the
outage at the Santos Moomba gas plant, it has been forced to trigger force
majeure provisions on to its large industrial and commercial customers. This
means that, whilst the Santos plant outage continues, AGL will not guarantee
the full delivery of gas supplies to these customers from next week.
The severity of these remarks was soon modified to a more conciliatory statement:
As a result of the fire and subsequent loss of gas supply at Santos Limited’s
Moomba Plant yesterday, The Australian Gas Light Company (AGL) this
morning advised it was working with its large industrial and commercial
customers to minimise the impact on their businesses as a result of this
situation.
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AGL Group Manager, External and Regulatory Affairs, Jane McAloon said,
AGL is sourcing additional quantities of gas from the Bass Strait in Victoria
to meet as much of our customers’ current requirements as possible.
However, if the Moomba plant outage continues beyond next Monday this
situation will be reassessed (AGL website 5/01/04).
AGL says the Moomba fire might cost it $5m before tax and recoveries writes Hughes
and Chessall in the Sydney Morning Herald
The dominant gas supplier in NSW, AGL, yesterday came clean on the
financial impact of last week's explosion and fire at the Santos controlled
Moomba gas supply plant, soothing investor concern by moving to pass on
the extra supply costs to all of its gas customers.
Santos has moved to return the facilities delivered volumes to about 40% of
normal market demand but is still to begin fixing the damage as
investigations into the cause continue. Santos this week predicted a $25
million to $30 million net profit hit from the explosion (SMH 7/01/04, p.6).
In the wake of the Moomba blast questions have been asked about monopoly of supply
and profiteering in the industry, Roberts (2004). Roberts reports that with Moomba's
effective shut down following the latest incident - it is using some gas in storage and
small volumes of semi processed gas to maintain a modest flow down the pipeline.
AGL is obtaining gas from Victoria via the direct link between the main pipeline grid in
NSW and Victoria although the small size of this pipeline constrains the amount of
flow, 30 terajoules a day. Gas selling on the spot market in Victoria for $2.80 a
gigajoule costs $4.50 in Sydney, with AGL putting the difference down to "haulage",
the cost of piping the gas to the user. Claims of profiteering have been circulating

Duke Energy International says there has been no change to its haulage charges on the
EAP, while APT says that "take-or-pay" contracts with its main customer AGL means
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that APT gets paid irrespective of the supply disruptions. This has been confirmed by
AGL spokesman Jim McDonald. For its part, AGL is busily on-passing the higher gas
costs to users, leading to calls for government intervention to clarify just what is going
on.

It has been argued by the owner of Weston Aluminium that although surcharge prices
have risen by over $2 a gigajoule, confusion continues over the need for the surcharge’.
There is more than enough prospective gas in the Gippsland basin acreage of Exxon
Mobil and BHP Billeton in Bass Strait to overcome the shortages in NSW but the small
size of the pipeline connections between Victoria and NSW is ruling out this option.
Output has increased from 400 to 600 terajoules a day and more than half of this
increase is going to NSW via Duke Energy's eastern gas pipeline. The question has
been raised as to why gas is being used to generate electricity instead of simply
importing additional electricity from Victoria or NSW to help fill the gap. National
Electricity Market Management Co data indicate that there has been a significant
capacity on the interconnectors feeding electricity between Victoria and South Australia
that could have been utilised.
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